Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
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Democracy Promotion andForeign Policy Identity and Interests in US, EU andNon-Western Democracies
Daniela Huber Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy
© Daniela Huber 2015
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-41446-5
ISBN 978-1-349-68205-8 ISBN 978-1-137-41447-2 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-41447-2
To my mother Maria, my father Manfred, my sister Claudia, and my brother Michael
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List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Part I Democracy Promotion – Who Does What and t Why?
1 Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 7
2 What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum 22
3 Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 30
Part II The United States and Democracy Promotion in Central and South America in the
Last Period of the Cold War
4 The Return of Democracy Promotion to US Foreign Policy 51
5 A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America 65
6 The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity and Its Activation in a Grand Foreign Policy Debate 73
Part III The EU and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean Region since the End of
the Cold War
7 The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion and Its Ups andDowns in the Mediterranean Region 101
8 The EU’s New Security Environment 121
9 The Formation of a Democratic Role Identity, Its Hype, andSubsequent Stumbling 127
Part IV Turkey and Democracy Promotion in theMediterranean Region since the Early 2000s
10 The Emergence of Democracy Promotion in TurkishForeign Policy 149
11 The De-securitization of Foreign Policy 160
12 Turkey’s Evolving Democratic Role Identity and Its Activation through Two Relevant Others 166
Bibliography y 200
List of Figures
3.1 The argument 434.1 Total military assistance to all countries in Central and
Latin America 1976–1989 in million historical USD 57 4.2 Total military assistance to all countries in
Central and Latin America 1976–1989 in millionhistorical USD by country 57
4.3 Total economic assistance to all countries in Central andLatin America 1976–1989 in million historical USD 58
4.4 Total economic assistance to all countries inCentral and Latin America 1976–1989 in millionhistorical USD by country 59
6.1 Freedom House Index for the (a) Americas and (b) worldwide by numbers of countries, 1973–2014 74
6.2 Commonality of ICCPR in per cent of UN Member States 75 6.3 Commonality of American Convention on Human Rights
in per cent of OAS Member States 76 6.4 Public support for ‘helping to bring democratic
form of governance to other nations’ and for ‘defendinghuman rights’ 88
6.5 Frequency of democracy and human rights in State of the Union addresses 89
7.1 EU assistance programs in the Mediterranean region ineuro millions 111
7.2 (a) MEDA II (2000–2006), (b) ENPI (2007–2013), and(c) reshuffled ENPI (2011–2013) by country in totaland per capita 117
8.1 Illegal migration arriving in Spain, Italy, and Malta (1993–2006) through the Western, Central,and Eastern Mediterranean routes (2008–2013) 123
9.1 Freedom House Index for (a) Eastern Europe/Eurasia and(b) Middle East/North Africa by number of countries,1991–2014 135
9.2 Status of ratification of the European Convention for theProtection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 136
9.3 Signatories Arab League Charter on Human Rights inper cent of Member States 137
x List of Figures
9.4 Frequency of democracy and human rights in CouncilConclusions, mean by year, 1989–2013 143
10.1 Total Turkish official development aid in million US dollars 154
10.2 Turkish official development aid in million US dollars by recipient region 154
10.3 Turkish ODA in million US dollars by MENA country,2010 versus 2012 156
12.1 Freedom House Index (Political Rights and Civil Liberties) for Turkey, 1972–2013 167
12.2 Frequency of democracy in the President’s annualmessage to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey(2003–2006 Ahmet Necdet Sezer; 2007–todayAbdullah Gül) 170
12.3 Annual TESEV ratings on the perception of Turkey in the Arab world 178
List of Tables
2.1 The substantive content of liberal democracy promotion 252.2 Three types of action to promote democracy 28 5.1 Civil wars in Central and South America 1977–1988 687.1 Status of association of Mediterranean partner
countries with EU 115 7.2 Association council meetings and human rights and
democracy subcommittees 119
This book would not have been possible without the generous intellec-tual, professional, and emotional support of Piki Ish-Shalom and AlfredTovias at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Also crucial for this book has been Nathalie Tocci from the Istituto Affari Internazionali; it is a privilege to work with her. Many ideas have also come from exchangeswith Thomas Risse, Tanja Börzel, Arie Kacowicz, Galia Press Barnathan,Rony Silfen, Nava Löwenheim, and Daniela Persin. I acknowledge thefinancial support of several institutions, including the German FriedrichEbert Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), andthe Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
The support of my family has been essential. My parents gave me somuch love and have always supported my academic path; I am eter-nally grateful to them and dedicate this work to them and my sister andbrother. My two children Niccolò and Valerie were always patient with me during the writing process and I have to thank their grandparents –Daniele and Lucia, Maria and Jürgen, and Manfred and Marianne – for all their help. This also applies to their aunt Claudia and to Roberta andSeila. Most of all I want to thank Lorenzo Kamel, whom I met during my time at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, for all the beautiful ideas hehas given me, the new viewpoints and ideational doors he has openedup, and for all the inspiring discussions which contributed so much tothis book.
Democracy promotion is a puzzling and curious foreign policy phenom-enon attached to democracies; indeed it is as old as democracy itself.Ancient Athens maybe has been the most systematic and aggres-sive democracy promoter of all time. For Athens, this was a strategic policy to overthrow hostile regimes and install friendly, democratic ones. However, not always is this policy strategically so straightfor-ward. Today’s main protagonists of democracy promotion – the UnitedStates (US) and the European Union (EU) – are rather fighting with the dilemma of having proclaimed democracy as a principled foreign policygoal, but not pursuing it coherently when it endangers other interests.This has exposed them to sharp international critiques such as beinghypocritical or even an ‘axis of double standards’, making democracypromotion the key issue with which ‘democracies and their critics’ (toparaphrase Robert Dahl’s seminal book) are struggling today, not leastsince this increasingly also applies to non-Western emerging democra-cies. Notably Turkey, but also Brazil, India, Japan and South Africa, are starting to engage in democracy promotion in their respective regionsand have been confronted with their double standards in this respectas well.
Thus, democracy promotion is becoming an increasingly widespreadforeign policy phenomenon among diverse democracies in the world,but at the same time seems to be such a dilemmatic foreign policy that no democracy applies it coherently. Why then is it that democracypromotion is incorporated into foreign policy in the first place? Whatdrives and motivates democracies to promote it or not? What explainsthat democracy promotion is not always pursued coherently and whydoes the use of democracy promotion vary so decisively over time andspace? What constrains democracies to follow through on democracy
2 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
promotion? In short: What triggers democracy promotion and what hinders it or – more precisely – what encourages and pushes and what constrains democracies to promote democracy abroad?
While research on democracy promotion is an exponentially growingfield of study in International Relations (IR), no theoretically compre-hensive volume that explains the origins of and impulses for democracypromotion and so embeds the phenomenon in IR theory has been forth-coming yet. This book hopes to contribute to a more rigorous academicdiscussion of democracy promotion through a comprehensive theoret-ical approach which situates democracy promotion in its normative, aswell as strategic, contexts. Furthermore, it is placed in a more recentcomparative turn of the literature. Much research has focused on oneprotagonist of democracy promotion only (usually either the UnitedStates or EU), and while some comparative research has emerged, it hastypically compared US and European democracy promotion. This book seeks to tell a more comprehensive story of democracy promotion byfocusing on its main protagonists – the United States and the EU – butalso on a non-Western newcomer in the field: Turkey. It examines the use and non-use of democracy promotion by all three actors in theirrespective neighborhoods (Central and South America for the UnitedStates, the Mediterranean region for the EU and Turkey) in the decades in which democracy promotion first made inroads and turned into anestablished foreign policy, that is the late 1970s and 1980s for the UnitedStates, the 1990s and 2000s for the EU, and the 2000s for Turkey.
This book is in four parts. The first part includes the conceptual andtheoretical chapters, while the following parts consist of the three casestudies: US, EU, and Turkish democracy promotion. The first chapteropens with a historical tour of democracy promotion’s protagonists. After a short overview on historical democracy promoters such asAncient Athens and the French and British empires, three generationsof contemporary democracy promoters are described: the United States,European democracies, and the EU, as well as non-Western emergingdemocratic powers. With the United States, the EU, and Turkey, a casestudy from each generation is chosen. The second chapter defines theexplanandum of this study: the varying extent to which a democ-racy engages in democracy promotion. There are three types of actionthrough which democracies can promote democracy: coercive, utili-tarian, and identitive measures. Finally, the third chapter explores theresearch question – what encourages and pushes and what constrains democracies to promote democracy abroad? – in theoretical terms. Itargues that threat perceptions constrain democracy promotion, while a
democratic role identity – rooted internally in a democratic-type iden-tity and externally in international norms of democracy – enables and pushes for democracy promotion. A democratic role identity can limitthe hindering effect of threat perceptions on democracy promotion if the relevant other is successful in mobilizing it.
The book then turns to the first case study: US democracy promotionin Central and South America in the last period of the Cold War. Thefourth chapter shows how democracy promotion skyrocketed from nil to an important foreign policy component when President Jimmy Carter entered the White House, even though toward the end of his presi-dency this agenda had already declined. It was absent in the first year of President Ronald Reagan’s term, but soon started to find its way back into his foreign policy, especially from the mid-1980s onwards. The fifthchapter shows how low threat perceptions during the period of détenteenabled democracy promotion, even though threat perceptions then losttheir independent effect on foreign policy. The sixth chapter exploreshow the internal democratic transformation in the United States spilledover into foreign policy, also supported by the growth of international human rights norms and of democracy to the standard form of govern-ance during the Carter administration. While the Reagan administration at first rejected this reawakened democratic role identity in foreign policy,a grand foreign policy debate started in which the Reagan administration went from denying this role identity, to cheap rhetoric and its expo-sure through a transnationally acting human rights community, to the adoption of a democratic role identity in a conservative version, making democracy promotion a shared bipartisan foreign policy goal.
The third part of the book explores EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean neighborhood since the end of the Cold War. The seventh chapter shows that democracy promotion started to enter the EU’s foreign policy agenda in the Mediterranean in the early 1990s and received a push in the early 2000s. From the mid-2000s onwards, however, theEU showed clear signals of diverting from its democracy agenda, while a final turning point came with the Arab Spring which seems to haverevived this agenda again. Chapter 8 shows that EU democracy promo-tion started in the early 1990s in a new security environment; low threatperceptions enabled EU democracy promotion in the beginning, while – as in the US case – they lost their independent effect afterwards. Theninth chapter argues that the formation of the EU’s democratic role iden-tity was not only useful for the EU to create attachment to the Union,but in the 1990s it also formed in a euphoric international environment where democracy became a zeitgeist. This role identity skyrocketed in
4 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
the early 2000s in face of the highly successful enlargement process whose logic was transported to the Mediterranean neighborhood despite increasing threat perceptions. However, when this role identity was not activated by the other, threat perceptions restrained EU foreign policy again and democracy promotion entered into a shaky period that mighthave ended with the Arab Spring.
The final, fourth part of the book turns to Turkey’s democracy promo-tion in the Middle East and North Africa since the early 2000s. Chapter 10explores variance in Turkey’s democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa and finds that democracy promotion emergedin the early 2000s mainly through a cooperative approach that reliedon communicative-identitive means, but this approach lost steam inthe 2007–2011 period. With the Arab uprisings, democracy promotion revived again, but this time through an activist, principled, and oftenconfrontational approach. Chapter 11 shows that the de-securitizationof Turkey’s relations with the Arab world in the early 2000s enableddemocracy promotion. As in the US and EU cases, low threat percep-tions enabled democracy promotion in the first place and lost theirindependent effect on foreign policy afterwards. Chapter 12 argues thatthe Justice and Development Party (AKP) developed a democratic roleidentity in foreign policy to prove its democratic credentials to a broader electorate in Turkey, as well as to the EU and the United States who – representing an important other for Turkey’s identity – actively contrib-uted to the development and activation of this role identity. When the EU and the United States increasingly turned away from democracypromotion from 2006/2007 onwards, Turkey also de-emphasized thetheme. Turkey’s democratic role identity was once more activated from 2011 onwards, this time by the second important other in Turkey’s iden-tity, the Arab world. This was also supported by internal politics, as the AKP government was facing domestic protest and foreign policy becamea domain where the outlook of Turkey’s democracy was contested.
The conclusions discuss what we have learned in comparativeperspective, how this contributes to IR theory more generally and tothe research field of democracy promotion specifically, and what we can expect for the future of democracy promotion. It argues that democracypromotion is mainly driven by identity dynamics. The book contributesto constructivist literature on norms by highlighting that internationalnorms also influence norm-compliers and on identity by suggesting thatthis literature should not only focus on role identity, but also consider the crucial role that an internal identity and the other can play infostering or activating a role identity.
Democracy Promotion – WhoDoes What and t Why ?
While democracy promotion is often perceived as a new foreign policyphenomenon, it has actually ebbed and flowed throughout history along-side democracy itself. This chapter briefly follows democracy promo-tion’s history with a short overview on historical democracy promoterssuch as Ancient Athens, as well as the French and British empires, beforeit moves to contemporary democracy promoters, concretely three gener-ations of them: the United States, Europe, and non-Western emergingdemocratic powers.
Historical democracy promoters
Democracy promotion has appeared together with democracy itself;indeed it was arguably through democracy promotion that AncientAthens became aware of the concept of diverse forms of governance, the uniqueness of its own form, and the possibility to change or chooseamong them (Bleicken 1979). 1 First instances of democracy promotionemerged already in times of transition to democracy. With the Thetes – the lowest Athenian class and backbone of Athenian sea power whichhad demanded equal rights in their city – democratic ideas were sailing ‘in persona’ throughout the Aegean (Bleicken 1979, 168). This diffu-sion of democratic ideas was highly explosive. The transformation of Athens into a radical democracy where political power was transferredto the poorer classes (de Ste. Croix 1954) and the growing awarenessthat this form of governance could also be transported to other citystates represented a massive challenge to the traditional orders in Hellas, spearheaded by Sparta. The Peloponnesian wars were then notonly caused by the growth of Athenian power (Thucydides 1972, I.23),but – to paraphrase Thucydides – by the growth of Athenian democracy
1 Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists
8 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war. Itwas precisely during the Peloponnesian wars that a debate on the best constitutional form appeared in the Hellenic world. 2
It was also during the Peloponnesian wars that Athenian democracy promotion grew and became systematic. Typically, Athens would arrivewith a fleet to a city in which then either the local democrats would seize power alone or the Athenians would directly intervene. In case of intervention, the Athenian assembly defined which kind of democracy to install and Athenian officials supervised the implementation.3 Athensalso systematically imposed massive social changes on the cities where it promoted democracy (Schuller 1981, 286). Wealthy oligarchs were not only disempowered politically, but also economically. Their possessionswere confiscated, they were exiled, and, in the worst case, executed. Nonetheless, democrats that were put in power by Athens were often weak and thus dependent on Athenian protection in the form of military garrisons installed in allied city states (Schuller 1979, 83). Democracy promotion therefore was an instrument to ensure loyalty to the Athenianempire. Furthermore, allied democratic cities were more transparent andthus easier to monitor. Athens posted episkopoi and other officials in allied democratic cities who followed assembly discussions and so were always aware of the political directions allies were heading to.
During the course of the Second Peloponnesian War, however, Athenian democracy promotion became increasingly violent. Whilein the Erythrae decree (about 453 BCE) confiscation of oligarchic property was still regulated and subsumed to jurisdiction, during theSecond Peloponnesian War this was increasingly replaced by executions without judicial process. An extreme example of this is the Atheniantoleration of the mass slaughter of oligarchs by democrats in Kerkyrain(today Corfu) in 425 BCE, as well as the Athenian execution of 1,000oligarchs in Mytilene in 427 BCE. Such atrocities led to irreconcilabilitybetween oligarchic and democratic factions and festered endless civilwar (stasis) in city states. Whereas up to the Second Peloponnesian War democracy had gained in legitimacy through Athenian achievementsin arts, sciences, and wealth, and was hence spreading throughoutGreece, during the course of the Second Peloponnesian War democracybecame increasingly associated with the violent rule of the mob due toAthens’s aggressive behavior. It did not only instill stasis in city states through democracy promotion, but was also involved in mass atroci-ties, most famously perhaps in Melos, and engaged in disastrous mili-tary campaigns as in Sicily – leading ultimately to the disqualification of democracy by history.
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 9
For a long period democracy had a negative connotation. Not only did Plato criticize democracy (in The Republic, written about 380 BCE[Plato 1980]), but Aristotle also saw democracy as a perversion of thebest regime type – polity – and argued for a mixed constitution in Politics (Aristotle 1977, written about 350 BCE). Reflecting on Athenian experi-ences, philosophers as diverse as Thomas Aquinas, Niccolò Machiavelli,and James Madison were either critical of democracy or cautious aboutsome of its shortcomings (Roberts 1994). The concept of democracy onlystarted to gain ground again when the idea of representative democracyemerged in the 17th century. James Mill called this the ‘grand discovery of modern times’ (quoted in Ball 1992, xx) and by the late 18th century ‘it was obvious and unarguable that democracy must be representative’(Dahl 1989, 28–29). Representation was not only seen as a bulwark against the instability of direct democracies, but also became associatedwith international peace. In 1795 Immanuel Kant argued in Perpetual Peace that republics (states with representative governments and separa-tion of powers) are more peaceful since all citizens would be responsiblefor their decisions and bear the results of war (Kant 1957). Democracyhad lost its negative connotation and was making inroads in NorthAmerica, France, and England.
It was the American Revolution and the US Declaration of Independenceof 1776 that represented ‘the high point of the radical democratic surge’(Dolbeare 1989, 25) of that period. While the United States did notactively seek to promote democracy abroad at the time, democraticideas diffused to Europe, above all to France which had supported theAmerican revolutionaries in order to balance against the British Empireand thus allowed the distribution of American literature in France. Whatmost impressed French readers about the American Revolution ‘wasthe very act of constitution-making itself, the constituting or reconsti-tuting of government through the principle of the people as constituentpower’ (Palmer 1969, 266). Thus, while the American Revolution didnot directly drive the French Revolution, it did encourage the belief inthe possibility of change in France.
The French Revolution had the same effect in Europe, and Europeanmonarchs and nobilities immediately perceived it as an ideational threatto their power. When revolts started to occur in countries like Holland,Geneva, or Poland, foreign monarchs intervened right away to suppressthem, stirring fears in France about an eminent foreign reactionary intervention in their country (Palmer 1969, 484). The first revolutionarywars can therefore be seen as ‘preventive wars’ which initially aimed atcreating buffer zones between France and hostile monarchies such as
10 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Germany and Austria (Blanning 1986; 1996). In these zones the Frenchrevolutionary armies systematically introduced radical institutional changes including the abolition of serfdom, quasi-feudalism, the powerof the clergy and of the guilds in the cities, as well as the establishment of equality before the law (Acemoglu et al. 2009, 11; Grab 2003). Many of these reforms were later on continued by Napoleon, notably throughthe Code Napoléon (Woolf 2002; Grab 2003). While these often radical institutional changes were accompanied by what came to be calledla Terreur (Andress 2006), they also destroyed the institutional underpin-rnings of the power of oligarchies and elites (Acemoglu et al. 2009) andmade reforms such as due process in courts, the abolition of privileges,and civil law systems difficult to reverse in the reactionary time periodheralded by the Concert of Europe in 1815.
Ideas of the French Revolution were also incorporated in the officialdoctrine associated with France’s imperial conquests: the mission civili-satrice. But rather than exporting the French Revolution, the way the revolution was remembered in France4 made the French feel superior totheir colonial subjects, implying that ‘France’s colonial subjects were too primitive to rule themselves, but were capable of being uplifted’ (Conklin1997, 1). Thus, rather than transferring the values of the revolution totheir colonies, the French believed they first had to ‘modernize’ theircolonial subjects, often through despotic means, before they wouldbe able to rule themselves. Like the French, the British also perceivedthemselves as superior due their political, economic, and technologicalbreakthroughs in the 19th century and saw their colonial subjects as ‘uncivilized’ nations, incapable of self-rule. As James Mill argued,
If we wish for the prolongation of an English government in India,which we do most sincerely, it is for the sake of the natives, not of England. India has never been anything but a burden; and anything but a burden, we are afraid, it cannot be rendered. But this Englishgovernment in India, with all its vices, is a blessing of unspeakable magnitude to the population of Hindustan. Even the utmost abuse of European power is better, we are persuaded, than the most temperate exercise of Oriental despotism. (quoted in Pitts 2005, 125)
The Empire’s official doctrine became that it was spreading liberal prac-tices throughout its colonies, notably through colonial assemblies,free trade, and evangelical missionaries. The justification ‘of Britishimperial rule … through much of the nineteenth century, began to restprimarily on arguments that Britain brought (and was alone capable
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 11
of bringing) good government to India’ (Pitts 2005, 16), despite the fact that democratic institutions were exported only sporadically andmainly to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In India limited repre-sentative institutions were introduced only toward the end of the 19thcentury. Democracy promotion has never been a systematic policy of the British Empire.5
Contemporary democracy promoters
Democracy promotion came back in a systematic manner only in the 20th century when the United States abandoned its policy of isolation and entered the stage of world politics. The United States can indeed beseen as a first-generation contemporary democracy promoter since its poli-rcies and experiences have influenced and shaped democracy promotionpolicies of later generations of democracy promoters through direct (theUnited States has urged other democracies to participate in democracypromotion) as well as indirect influence (other democracies have copiedUS policies). It was under President Woodrow Wilson that the essentialunderstandings of the purposes, meanings, and instruments of democ-racy promotion were laid which influence the conceptualization of thispolicy until today.
While Thomas Jefferson tried to protect US democracy from corrup-tion from Europe by a policy of isolation which prevented the US fromparticipating in Europe’s imperial race, Woodrow Wilson sought to protect American democracy by ‘making the world safe for democracy’(Tucker 1993). Sporadic democracy promotion had already started in the Philippines (1899) and was pursued by Wilson in Mexico (1914),Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916). After World War I and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Wilson sought toset up democracies in newly established states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Besides democracy promotion through bilat-eral means, he also pursued democratic aims in multilateral rela-tions and tried to create a Pan-American Liberty Pact (Drake 1991). Membership in the League of Nations was limited to democracies, asWilson believed that a ‘steadfast concert for peace can never be main-tained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocraticgovernment could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its cove-nants’ (Wilson 1917; T. Smith 1994, 84–109; Cohrs 2006). 6 However,maybe Wilson’s approach was too idealistic, maybe the world wasnot ‘safe for democracy’ yet. In any case, democracy could not estab-lish itself in Europe and the League of Nations failed. With the Great
12 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Depression this first activist approach to democracy promotion cameto an end (Drake 1991; Munoz 1998).
After the World War II, the United States was more concerned with the stability of allied states than democratization. There were twostriking exceptions to this rule: the cases of Germany and Japan. In noother historical instance was democracy promotion pursued with sucha massive financial and systematic effort. In other cases, like Turkey and Greece, for example, democratization was ignored for the sake of stability. The United States found itself ‘in the uncomfortable position of actively supporting authoritarian regimes, and this in the name of fostering a liberal democratic world order’ (T. Smith 1994, 139). But the low point of US democracy promotion was yet to come. From the liber-alism of Wilson to the liberal realism of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the UnitedStates moved to the active overthrow of democratically elected regimesin Iran (of elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, 1953) andGuatemala (of elected President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, 1954) duringDwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. Containing communism took precedence over democracy promotion (Light 2001, 77) and a Cold War consensus emerged in which almost any means was justified. This period was shortly interrupted by the presidency of John F. Kennedy, who sought to escape the dilemma of containing communism and promoting democracy by keeping up strong alliances with autocraciesand investing billions of dollars into the Alliance of Progress to change thesocio-economic structure of neighboring countries. Following Kennedy,stability became the ‘holy grail’ (Schoultz 1998, 358) of the LyndonB. Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Gerald Ford administrations. The Nixon/Ford-Kissinger administrations pursued a realist policy that turned ablind eye to any democratic concerns and did not even try to cover this foreign policy with democracy rhetoric. Another democratically electedgovernment was overthrown with US involvement: the government of Salvador Allende in Chile. Kissinger commented that he did not ‘seewhy we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people’ (quoted in Schoultz 1998, 349). Lateron Kissinger also instructed US ambassador to Chile, David Popper, whohad confronted the Chilean government with allegations of torture, ‘tocut out the political science lectures’ (quoted in Schoultz 1998, 349).Kissinger, however, had based his rationale on a comprehension of the international system which was already out of tune with the new under-standings of the era. Democracy and human rights became the call of the time, not only inside the United States, but also in the world arena.Following profound changes in American democracy and the normative
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 13
structure of the world order, the consensus on Realpolitik disintegratedand gave way to new conceptions of foreign policy.
With President Jimmy Carter a radically new foreign policy agenda entered the White House. Inspired by the rights consciousness withinthe United States, Carter incorporated human rights and democraticfreedoms into his foreign policy toward Central and South Americaon an unprecedented level and sparked a foreign policy debate in the course of which democracy promotion became a shared bipartisanforeign policy goal. During the last period of the Cold War a bureaucracy and script for democracy promotion was developed which guides USdemocracy promotion until today. The Carter administration strength-ened the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in theState Department, the Reagan administration established the NationalEndowment of Democracy (NED), and the Clinton administration madedemocracy promotion one of the three main pillars of its foreign policy,created United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Democracy and Governance program, its Office of Transition Initiatives(OTI), and the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund(HRDF). The surge of US democracy promotion activities, however, camewith the first Bush administration. Facing a highly uncertain world afterSeptember 11, it began to see the lack of democracy in the Arab worldas the breeding ground for ‘the ideologies of murder’ (Bush 2003) anddeveloped its Freedom Agenda which made democracy promotion a USmission toward ‘every nation and culture’ (Bush 2005), with a primary focus on the Middle East. Besides the justification of the Iraq War with democracy rhetoric which damaged the whole Western democracyagenda (Carothers 2009b ; Whitehead 2009), the Bush administra-tion established the US–Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), ademocracy assistance program for the Middle East, and the MillenniumChallenge Corporation (MCC). This democracy euphoria, however, was soon dampened when electoral gains of political Islam were made inrelatively free elections in Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon in the 2005–2006period. Crowned by the electoral victory of Hamas in the 2006 parlia-mentary elections in Palestine, this represented a foreign policy disasterfor an administration that had been entirely driven by its FreedomAgenda in pushing the Palestinian Authority to hold free elections andthat consequentially was caught off guard by Hamas’s electoral victory.As a result, the Bush administration backtracked on its Freedom Agendaand what emerged ‘was a policy caught between free trade liberalization,as the positive route to eventual democratization, and domination, tothe extent that it increasingly favored regional stability, the continuation
14 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
of long-term security interests and the undermining of regimes thatchallenged its hegemony over the region’ (Hassan 2012, 127). Barack Obama’s rise to the presidency imbued people in the region with hopesfor a ‘new beginning’ (Obama 2009). Facing not only a world but also a home public increasingly doubtful of democracy promotion, the Obamaadministration at first de-emphasized the issue, but was soon pulledback into it through democratic breakthroughs in the world (Carothers2012), notably the Arab uprisings, even though its reaction to them hasbeen marred by contradictions (Huber 2015).
In parallel to the re-emergence of democracy promotion in US foreign policy, in the late 1970s, a new second generation of democracy promoters emerged in Europe. Nordic countries began to incorporate principles of human rights and democracy into their foreign policy at the time and other European countries followed suit (Laakso 2002). The most important mechanism for the promotion of democracy,however, became the European Community (EC)/European Union(EU). It anchored and promoted the transitions in Spain, Portugal, andGreece in the mid-1970s and the Eastern transitions after the end of the Cold War (Pridham 1995). While the EU might have less capa-bilities to promote democracy through coercive means than a nationstate, with the accession process, it has arguably the most effective democracy promotion instrument at its disposal which nation states like the United States do not possess. The EU has tried to project this capacity also on the Eastern and Southern neighborhood through theEuropean Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which mirrors the enlargementprocess in its set-up, even though association has proven less effec-tive than accession (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). Furthermore,the EU has introduced other specific instruments into the democracy promotion catalog such as the incorporation of respect for humanrights and democratic principles in its contractual relations with thirdcountries or the use of multilateral forums to promote democracy. Inaddition to its specific instruments, the EU also uses similar instru-ments to the United States, notably democracy assistance through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) andother funding instruments. In 2010, the 16 leading European donorstates plus EU institutions spent almost 3 billion euros for democracypromotion worldwide (European Commission 2012a). Like the UnitedStates, the EU has institutionalized democracy promotion, namelythrough the Directorate General EuropeAid which is responsible for EIDHR and the Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy. The High Representative of the EU which now
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 15
heads the European External Action Service (EEAS) is also engaged in democracy promotion through diplomatic means.
Finally, a third generation of democracy promoters is emerging, that is,non-Western democratic powers such as Brazil, India, Japan, SouthAfrica, and Turkey. They have been qualified as sporadic (Brazil) (Burges and Daudelin 2007), quiet (Japan) (Akaha 2002), or reluctant (India)(Mohan 2007) democracy promoters, even though their commitment todemocracy promotion can be characterized as growing, not only due topressure from the United States (Carothers and Youngs 2011, 3), but alsoas a result of their own search for international prestige. Their efforts typically focus on their own region and neighborhood.
In South America first instances of democracy promotion started whenthe Southern Cone – Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay – democratized. In the 1980s the reformers of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Mexico initiated ‘a veritable carousel of bilat-eral and subregional summit meetings’ (Raymont 2005, 249–250) which represented the peak of what Arie Kacowicz has described as the ‘strong,long-lasting, and under-studied tradition of formal support for democ-racy and human rights in the region’ (Kacowicz 2005, 62). Argentinawas specifically active in this respect (A. F. Cooper 2006, 18). For newly elected Argentinean President Raul Alfonsín the support of democratiza-tion within South America was essential for anchoring democratizationat home (Fournier 1999). Being surrounded by authoritarian regimesin the region and fearing autocratic foreign intervention in the youngArgentinean democracy, he started to pursue an active approach of advancing democratic norms and values in the neighborhood to lock them in at home. This approach included increased cooperation withEuropean democracies, the forging of a democratic alliance with thedemocratizing countries Brazil and Uruguay, support for democratiza-tion in Uruguay and Bolivia, the naming and shaming of authoritarianneighbors, and concrete help to the Paraguayan democratic opposition(Fournier 1999). Alfonsín also promoted the Protocol of Cartagena deIndias which was adopted in 1985 as an amendment of the charterof the Organization of American States (OAS). In the preamble repre-sentative democracy was now called ‘an indispensable condition for thestability, peace, and development in the region’ and democracy promo-tion became an explicit purpose of the OAS which now obliged itself ‘to promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention’ (OAS 1985). As the norm of sover-eignty remained strong in the region, democracy promotion was accept-able only in cases of coups d’état which deposed elected leaders or in
16 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
failed state contexts. Today, Brazil is one of the most active regionalpowers in the Americas for democracy promotion (Santiso 2003).Brazil has not only opposed coups d’état in the region, but has alsocontributed to state- and democracy-building as part of its peacekeepingmission in Haiti. Furthermore, it has promoted the inclusion of democ-racy requirements into multilateral instruments such as Mercosur or theInter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS which entered into forcein 2001 and declares that ‘(t)he peoples of the Americas have a rightto democracy and their governments have an obligation to promoteand defend it’ (OAS 2001). Brazil prefers to promote democracy throughmultilateral venues and the OAS has an array of means at its disposaltoday, including electoral observation, development of public adminis-tration, anti-corruption, education for democratic practices and values,and support for legislative institutions.
Like Brazil, India also adheres to a strong norm of non-interference and has shown a preference to promote democracy through multilateral forums. It is one of the largest contributors to the UN Democracy Fundand a founding member of the Community of Democracies (Carothers and Youngs 2011, 8). However, in contrast to Brazil which lives in a rather democratic neighborhood and can promote democracy throughregional multilateral institutions like the OAS or Mercosur, India is located in a comparatively more autocratic region where norms of human rights and democratic freedoms do not have a similarly longtrail as in South America. This impedes Indian efforts to promote democ-racy through multilateral forums, even though such vehicles are devel-oping. In 2007, at the initiative of the United States, the Asia PacificDemocracy Partnership (APDP) was founded with Australia, Canada,India, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, SouthKorea, Thailand, the United States, and East Timor. Its first election obser-vation mission was Mongolia’s 2008 parliamentary elections. The SouthAsian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985,adopted a Charter of Democracy in 2011. Member states are Afghanistan,Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.Furthermore, India is supporting democratic institution-building inAfghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Indeed, its work in Afghanistan is important for the international community since itis the fourth largest bilateral donor there and supports the building of Afghan bureaucracy, parliament, elections, as well as infrastructurein the country (Twining and Fontaine 2011). Like India, Japan is alsopart of the APDP, but nonetheless its democracy promotion efforts have been focused on bilateral democracy assistance, accounting for about
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 17
3 per cent of its total official development aid (ODA). Of almost 20 billionUSD ODA, 614 million were spent for governance and civil society in2011 (OECD Statistics 2013).7 Living beside the autocratic big power of China, Japan like India has shied away from more offensive practices of democracy promotion like naming and shaming of violations of humanrights or democratic freedoms of countries in its neighborhood.
In contrast to Japan, as well as Brazil and India (with which it formsIBSA), South Africa has more clearly made democracy part of its foreignpolicy identity after the fall of apartheid and even engaged in an inva-sion in Lesotho in 1998, arguably to protect an elected government froma coup d’état. Indeed, the norm of non-intervention is weaker in Africa than in Asia or South America; the African Union was a pioneering inter-national organization in that it enshrined the responsibility to protectinto its Constitutive Act (African Union 2000). This enables South Africato drive more active democracy promotion policies in its region. At thesame time, this outspoken foreign policy identity of South Africa has – as in the case of the United States and the European Union – exposed Pretoria to criticism where it did not meet its own rhetoric, leading it toscale down its democracy talk (Landsberg 2000). Nonetheless, it is oneof the top contributors to peacekeeping missions in Africa (Heineckenand Ferreira 2012), seeks to prevent coups d’état, provides electoralassistance on the continent, and has advocated the African Peer ReviewMechanism in which states can voluntarily be reviewed by their Africanpeers in areas such as democracy and political governance, economicgovernance, corporate governance, and socio-economic development.
Finally, Turkey also has started to include democracy into its foreignpolicy identity, specifically since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in the early 2000s. Turkey perceives itself as a demo-cratic model for Muslim countries and the AKP as a model for democraticconservative Islamic parties. While Turkey had incorporated a democ-racy component into its development aid and adopted pro-democraticstances in multilateral forums such as the Organization of the IslamicConference (OIC) already before the Arab Spring, its democracy promo-tion policy was hampered by the autocratic nature of its neighboringregimes with which AKP-led Turkey established good relations in a push for a greater regional reach. However, the Arab Spring has changed this picture fundamentally and Turkey has firmly placed itself on the side of the revolutions while struggling with its own problems with democ-racy. It has harshly criticized the military coup against ousted EgyptianPresident Mohamed Morsi, has invested political and economic capitalin post-revolutionary Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and supports the Syrian
18 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
opposition. Turkish observers even argued that Turkey conducts its foreign policy there ‘very much on the liberal principles that underpin the normative bases of the international order. More importantly, thisdevelopment underscored not only Turkey’s similarity to Western values but also its dissimilarity from potential contenders to the global order’(Kardas 2012). For Turkey democracy promotion has become an impor-tant part of its power projection in a transforming region.
The three case studies of this book
This short historical tour of democracy promotion’s most important protagonists shows that the amount of potential case studies of democ-racy promotion is extensive and does not justify the tendency of theresearch field to look at single Western cases only. Research should now become comparative – some studies have emerged in this respect (Tocci 2008; Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009; Carothers and Youngs2011; Börzel, Dandashly, and Risse 2015) – notably also to arrive at a more comprehensive theoretical discussion of democracy promotion.Since the previous section has identified three generations of democracypromoters – the United States, European democracies and the EU, as well as non-Western emerging democratic powers – this book explores a democracy promoter from each of these generations, not only to high-light potential learning effects from one generation to the next, butalso to study Western, as well as non-Western, democracy promoters.Concretely, this book looks at the United States, the EU, and Turkey. The United States has been the most important protagonist in the fieldwithout which a discussion of democracy promotion hardly makes sense. Regarding the second generation of democracy promoters – European democracies and the EU – this study examines the EU, since it is not onlythe main venue through which European democracies promote democ-racy, but has special instruments at its disposal and has arguably been one of the most successful democracy promoters leading to ‘mimicry’and imitation of its democracy promotion policies by other regionalorganizations such as the OAS or nation states like the United States andrecently Turkey. Finally, from the third generation, Turkey is chosen dueto the relatively high profile democracy promotion has recently receivedin its foreign policy compared to other emerging democratic powers.Each of these cases is studied singularly based on process tracing (seethe section on methodology in Chapter 3) to identify the mechanismsthat trigger or hinder democracy promotion. The three cases are then discussed comparatively in the conclusion of this book.
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 19
To enable such a comparative discussion, however, the range of thesethree cases has to be limited. Given that democracy promotion is stillunder-theorized (Wolff and Wurm 2011, 77) and that – as Peter Burnellhas pointed out – it is questionable if a comprehensive theory can be set up to explain it in face of the ‘number and range of dramatis personaewho are now engaged in democracy assistance, the diversity of organi-zational forms, approaches and principal concerns’ (Burnell 2000, 34),complexity has to be reduced. Therefore this study limits the timeperiods when and the space where democracy is promoted. In terms of time, this study focuses on those periods when democracy promotionmade first inroads into American, European, and Turkish foreign poli-cies and became an established foreign policy principle, namely the late1970s and the 1980s for the United States, the 1990s and 2000s for theEU, and the 2000s for Turkey. All time periods have been characterized by decisive ups and downs in democracy promotion of the respectiveactors and so enable an observation of the initial triggers of democracypromotion, as well as what keeps encouraging and constraining democ-racies in pursuing this policy over a relatively extended period of time. In terms of space, this book focuses on democracy promotion in theneighborhood, 8 that is, the United States in Central and South America, and the EU and Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While the US has capacities to promote democracy worldwide, thisapplies less to the EU and even less to Turkey. Thus, to hold the capa-bility factor constant across the case studies, it makes sense to examinedemocracy promotion in the neighborhood only, where all three actorshave been comparatively more powerful than their democracy promo-tion targets in terms of military, economic, and political weight and thus had and have the capability to promote democracy. By keeping thecapability to promote democracy constant, we can concentrate on exam-yining variance in the willingness of democracies to pursue this foreignpolicy.
Finally, in terms of comparability of the cases, it should be noted that with the United States and Turkey this study examines two nation states,while the EU is a new actor in world politics which has been diverselydefined as a quasi-federal state (Sbragia 1992), a ‘multiperspectivalpolity’ (Ruggie 1993), a ‘postmodern state’ (James A. Caporaso 1996), a ‘multilevel polity’ (Hooghe and Marks 2001), a ‘fusionist state’ (Wessels 1997), ‘a hybrid polity’ (Manners and Whitman 2003), and ‘a polycen-tric “polity” possessing a multilevel governance “regime”’ (Bellamy and Castiglione 2004). This raises the question how comparable the cases arein terms of actorness. Following Caporaso and Jupille (1998), actorness
20 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
can be assessed with four criteria: recognition, authority, autonomy, andcohesion. Recognition is the ‘acceptance of and interaction of an entitywith the others’ (Caporaso and Jupille 1998, 214). The United States,EU, and Turkey have all been accepted in their respective regions as distinctive actors through de facto as well as de jure interaction, evenif this acceptance did not imply that the others found the behavior of these three actors legitimate. Quite to the contrary, all three actors alsosuffer from a lack of legitimacy in their neighborhoods, not least due tothe imperial luggage they carry. The three actors are also comparable in terms of authority, the ‘legal competence to act’ (Caporaso and Jupille 1998, 214). Since the Maastricht Treaty the EU has developed complexbut stable rules and mechanisms for decision-making in foreign policy(Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). Thus also in terms of authority the EUis comparable to the United States and Turkey. Autonomy is ‘distinc-tiveness, and to some extent independence from other actors, particu-larly state actors’ (Caporaso and Jupille 1998, 217). This might be thecriterion where the EU differs most from the United States and Turkey, since member states can interfere in matters sensitive for them, notablythrough the Council. However, the Commissioner on Enlargement andEuropean Neighborhood Policy, as well as the High Representative and the External Action Service, have sufficient autonomy to act in order tosee the EU as an actor in its own right. Furthermore, if the EU is analyti-cally treated as a single actor, the compartmentalization of EU foreignpolicy 9 can be compared to nation states such as the United States and Turkey, where foreign policy has been subject to virulent infighting among the White House, the Departments of State and Defense, aswell as Congress in the United States (Woodward 2003) or between the elected government and the security establishment in Turkey (Robins2003, 52–92). Indeed, the definition of foreign policy adopted in thisbook as presented later on alludes to the growing compartmentaliza-tion of foreign policy that applies to nation states, as well as the EU.Finally, Jupille and Caporaso also raise the criterion of cohesion orcoherence in foreign policy which, as Tanja Börzel, Assem Dandashly, and Thomas Risse argue, is not necessarily an ingredient for assessingactorness. ‘Whether an actor pursues an inconsistent and incoherentforeign policy is an empirical question, not a definitional criterion’(Börzel, Dandashly, and Risse 2015). They propose capability as a fourth criterion and, again, the EU has acquired most of the traditional foreignpolicy tools – that is, military,10 economic, and diplomatic tools – as well as specific EU ones that nation states have traditionally not possessed(K. Smith 2003, 67) but which they are starting to copy (see, e.g., the
Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists 21
case of Turkey in this book). In all, as this short discussion of the actor-ness question showed, the EU does not only possess sufficient actornessin foreign policy, but can be treated as a state-like actor and rather well compared to the United States and Turkey specifically in the field of democracy promotion. Nonetheless, to prevent conceptual misunder-standings, the evolution of competences of the EU in democracy promo-tion will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 7 on EU democracy promotion.
The first chapter focused on the protagonists, but what identifies thispolicy? What is democracy promotion and how can we measure itsvarying use over time? This chapter defines democracy promotionand then outlines three types of actions to promote democracy whichserve as the basis to measure variance in the (non-)use of democracypromotion.
Defining democracy promotion
Democracy promotion is a specific type of foreign policy. Adapting thedefinitions of Christopher Hill on the one hand, and Stephan Keukeleireand Tom Delreux on the other, foreign policy is here defined as the sumof official activities conducted by an independent actor that are directedat the external environment with the objective of influencing that envi-ronment and the behavior of other actors within it. This definition issufficiently wide to allow for the foreign policies of states, as well asother important actors in world politics such as the EU. Furthermore, byfocusing on ‘sum’, it includes all kinds of output from diverse parts of their governing mechanisms and thus reflects the growing reality thatforeign policy nowadays is conducted not only by foreign offices but byan array of domestic institutions and actors (Hill 2003, 3). Finally, this definition alludes to the differentiation between relational and struc-tural foreign policy as suggested by Keukeleire and Delreux, according towhich the former is a ‘foreign policy that seeks to influence the attitudeand behavior of other actors as well as the relations with and betweenother actors’, while the latter is a ‘foreign policy which, conducted over the long-term, aims at sustainably influencing or shaping political,legal, economic, social, security or other structures in a given space’
2 What Is Democracy Promotion?The Explanandum
What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum 23
(Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 27–28). Democracy promotion – eventhough it might also rely on relational foreign policy activities – is in its essence a structural foreign policy as it complies with one of its main characteristics, that is to ‘shape the organizing principles and rules of the game and to determine how others will play that game’ (Keukeleireand Delreux 2014, 28) as will be further elaborated in the theory part of this book.
Democracy promotion is then defined as all those foreign policyactivities which aim at fostering the transition to, consolidation of, orimprovement of democracy in other states and their societies. Since thisstudy examines the motivations of democracy promoters, this defini-tion focuses on the goals of the democracy promoter and not the effec-tiveness of this policy. It excludes cases where a foreign policy is not explicitly aimed at promoting democracy, even though it might effec-tively do so as an unintended side effect,1 or where a foreign policy ispropagated as democracy promotion, even though this just serves aswindow dressing. 2
This goal-oriented definition, however, also implies that democracy is a subjective, rather than objective, category: democracy is in the eye of the beholder; it is what the democracy promoter believes it to be. Sucha definition is a double-edged sword: on the one hand it acknowledges that democracy is an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1955) andthat there are diverse models of democracy (Held 2006). On the otherhand, the promotion of almost any form of governance – such as, forexample, ‘sovereign democracy’ through Russia – can then be classi-fied as democracy promotion, making the concept an empty category.This is related to the parallel discussion in the democratization litera-ture triggered by David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) who pointedout that in the wake of the third wave of democratization democracyhas lost its conceptual validity through adding adjectives to democracysuch as ‘authoritarian democracy’ or ‘military-dominated democracy’.Hence, to uphold conceptual validity and to limit complexity, it makes sense to define democracy and therewith the substance of democracypromotion.
Today’s democracy promotion tends mainly toward a liberal model of democracy. This applies to US and European democracy promotion(Hanau Santini and Hassan 2012; Teti 2012; Huber 2013), as well as to Indian approaches (Pogodda and Huber 2014) or those of Turkey (Aras 2013). According to Jürgen Habermas who has distinguished threecontemporary normative models of democracy – the liberal, republican,3
and deliberative model4 – liberal democracy sees the human being as a
24 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
homo oeconomicus and society as a ‘market-structured network of inter-actions among private persons’ (Habermas 1996, 21) in which rationalinterests of individuals are aggregated into a competitive political systemthrough elections; votes are expressions of preferences. Contributionsto liberal democratic thought range from John Locke, James and JohnStuart Mill, and Joseph Schumpeter to Robert Dahl, or – in an extremeform – Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick. Since Robert Dahl’s definition has not only became paradigmatic in political science, but also providesclear criteria for assessing democracy, this study uses it as a definitionalanchor point. Democracy is reached when all citizens have equal oppor-tunities for expressing their preferences, for setting the agenda anddeciding on different outcomes (effective participation), for expressinga choice (voting equality at the decisive stage), and for discovering and validating (enlightened understanding); when the people have theexclusive opportunity to decide how matters are placed on the agenda(control of the agenda); and when equality extends to all citizens withinthe state (inclusiveness) (Dahl 1989).
In this model of democracy, fair rules of the game are guaranteed through the rule of law as well as human rights in the liberal under-standing of the term which mainly includes liberal defensive rights, civiland political rights, and a certain level of social and economic rights (at least in Dahl’s definition which supposes some degree of socio-economicequality). Indeed, the rule of law and human rights are central back-ground conditions of this model of democracy. None of Dahl’s criteria is imaginable without classic civil and political rights, such as the freedomof speech and assembly. This explains why liberal democracy promoterstend to group democracy, human rights, and the rule of law together –all three belong to the substantive content of liberal democracy promo-tion. Turning from background conditions to the essence of democracy,in the process of ‘contestation and participation’ (Dahl 1971), free andfair elections are central, but so are actors such as political parties, civilsociety organizations (CSOs), and the media. Finally, on the level of citizens, enlightened understanding and inclusiveness presupposes aneducated citizenry, as well as the guarantee of minority rights. Table 2.1 sums up the substantive content of liberal democracy promotion.
Types of actions to promote democracy
Democracy can be promoted through diverse actions, namely coercive,utilitarian, and identitive ones.5 Coercive democracy promotion is democ-racy promotion by force through military intervention, the threat of
What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum 25
intervention, or covert force. Possible examples of a unilateral pro-democratic military intervention would be the US invasion of Panama (1989) or the invasion of Iraq (2003) which had both been justified withdemocratic motives (among other reasons); a bilateral instance is the French intervention in Mali in 2013 at the request of Mali’s govern-ment; and a multilateral example is the United Nations Security Councilauthorized intervention in Libya in 2011. However, this type of action to promote democracy is problematic from several viewpoints. First, itdoes not actually aim at any of the three targets outlined above, but atregime change only. The more substantive work which follows a militaryintervention classifies as utilitarian or identitive democracy promotion.Thus it makes more sense to look at the efforts invested after a military invasion than at the invasion itself. Second, military invasions usuallydo not aim at building democracy only. Either democracy promotion
Table 2.1 The substantive content of liberal democracy promotion
Targets Goals Means
Fair rules of the game Democratic constitution Assistance for constitutionalreform
Civil and political rights Accession to international human rights treaties, constitutional reform, support to CSOs
Rule of law Support for justice, ministries, police, anti-corruption measures
Channels for representation anddemocratic-will formation
Free and fair elections Assistance for electoral lawreform
Electoral support and monitoring
Effective parliament Legislative strengtheningEffective political parties Party assistanceActive civil society
organizationsAssistance to NGOs,
trade unions, business associations, social movements, etc.
Strong independent media
Assistance to ‘classic’ and social media
Citizen Politically educated citizenry
Inclusiveness Support to minorities
Table created by author; compare to Babayan (2012, 34), Schmitter and Brouwer (1999, 44),and Carothers (1999, 88).
26 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
did not constitute a direct reason for participation in a war as, forexample, in the often cited case of the entrance of the United States intoWorld War II against Germany and Japan, where democracy promotioncame in after the war in utilitarian, not military, form; or democracy promotion was named as one of the reasons besides security or economicgoals as in the US invasions in Panama and Iraq; in these cases, however, it is unclear if democracy only served as a rhetorical device or indeed constituted one of the reasons to intervene. Added to these challengesare normative concerns. Military democracy promotion is not a peacefulforeign policy and arguably not a democratic one. Mlada Bukovansky,for example, terms military democracy promotion an ‘undemocratic act’ (Bukovansky 2007, 176–177) and Piki Ish-Shalom shows how an under-standing of democracy in normative terms cannot lead to a strategy of promoting democracy at gunpoint (Ish-Shalom 2007, 545). It might alsohurt democracy per se, at home and abroad (Whitehead 2009; Bigo 2010; N. P. Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre 2004). Due to this ambivalence,it makes sense to exclude military democracy promotion from the classof phenomena of democracy promotion examined in this study and tofocus instead on the utilitarian or identitive commitments which followa military invasion.
Utilitarian democracy promotion either seeks to manipulate the incen-tive structure of a regime through negative and positive conditionality which would then build democratic structures by itself or a democracypromoter might also directly invest into building democracy throughdemocracy assistance. Negative conditionality (the ‘stick’ approach)usually limits or cancels military or economic aid in response to repres-sion or unwillingness to reform. An example is US President JimmyCarter’s policy of canceling military aid to South American human-rights violating regimes unilaterally in the late 1970s/early 1980s. It candecisively hurt and weaken the economic strength of a regime, but is a one-way road: once foreign aid to a country is cut, the democracyhas no instruments of pressure anymore. Positive conditionality (the‘carrot’ approach) strengthens the economic and political resources of a regime in response to improvements. The EU’s enlargement process in which democratizing states can gain entrance into the Union are abilateral example of this policy. Democracy assistance is more diverse than conditionality and does not necessarily have to work with targetgovernments; it can directly support grass-roots groups as well. This ispursued unilaterally, for example, through the European Instrumentfor Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) or through the Middle EastPartnership Initiative (MEPI) of the United States, bilaterally through the
What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum 27
commonly steered EU Task Forces with Arab Spring states, or multilater-ally through initiatives such as the United Nations Democracy Fund.
Identitive democracy promotion, in contrast, does not work through financial means. It seeks to persuade the other of one’s values or tochange the other’s behavior in accordance with one’s values through speech acts. Speech acts are utterances which do not only ‘state some-thing’, but actually ‘do something’ (Austin 1962, 12).6 Regarding democracy promotion, speech acts can be unilateral, public speechesthat either name and shame violations of democratic freedoms or lack of progress in democratizing, urge for and demand democratic progress,or laud progress in democratizing. The speaker’s audience is not onlythe addressee, but also her/his home public and the home public of thespeaker. Besides such unilateral speech acts, there are also bi- or multi-lateral exchanges on issues of democracy, which are often not public.Examples are the EU’s bilateral democracy and human rights commit-tees in the framework of the Euromed Partnership or its multilateralplatforms such as the Euromed Parliamentary Assembly. Such instances of identitive democracy promotion differ from utilitarian democracypromotion in their logic of action: while utilitarian democracy promo-tion relies on the logic of consequentialism, identitive democracypromotion is based on the logic of arguing (Risse 2000). The strategic useof speech (Schimmelfennig 2001) is also included here, since it is under-standing-oriented (Müller 2004) and might even send clearer signals, if interaction has so far been dominated by strategic, not communicative,speech acts. Finally, the power of the good example (on the side of a democracy) and mimicry/voluntary imitation (on the side of the autoc-racy) also belongs to instances of identitive democracy promotion.
Measuring the explanandum
This book answers the question what triggers and hinders democraciesto promote democracy abroad and therewith seeks to explain why theuse of democracy promotion varies over time. Thus, the explanandumof this study is the varying extent to which a democracy engages in utili-tarian andd identitive actions to promote democracy. This is measured intwo steps. First, the actions are observed according to their substantivecontent to make sure that what is declared as democracy promotionis democracy promotion as defined in this study. This measurement isbased on the indicators outlined in Table 2.1 (substantive content of democracy promotion). Second, the actual extent of democracy promo-tion is measured through an observation of the actions of a democracy
28 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
based on the indicators outlined in Table 2.2 (types of action to promotedemocracy).
To screen the substantive content of democracy promotion of theUnited States, the EU, and Turkey, each case study starts out with surveying the definitions of democracy provided by the democ-racy promoters. In the US case, the analysis focused on the concep-tual sections of the Country Reports on Human Rights published bythe US Department of State, while in the EU case the annual humanrights and democracy reports of the European Council were surveyed,as well as those communications and regulations from the EuropeanCommission which deal with democracy promotion. For the Turkish case study, the annual reports of the Turkish International Cooperationand Development Agency (TIKA) and the home page of the Turkish Foreign Ministry were observed.
The varying extent of democracy promotion was then measuredthrough the extent to which the United States, the EU, and Turkey
Table 2.2 Three types of action to promote democracy
Unilateral Bilateral Multilateral
Coercive Unilateral military invasion by single state or ad hoc coalition (e.g., Iraq 2003)
Military intervention as requested by a government (e.g., Mali 2013)
Militaryintervention backed by UNSC Resolution (e.g.,Libya 2011)
Utilitarian Positive and negative conditionality (US Millennium Challenge Corporation), Democracy Assistance (EIDHR, MEPI)
Bilaterally agreed conditionality(Article 2 in EU Association Agreements), commonly steered democracy assistance (EU Task Forces)
HRDP steeredthrough a multilateralorganization (UNDEF), conditionality toreceive aid (World Bank)
Identitive Naming and shaming, power of the good example (Turkey’s policyof representing a model)
Persuasion through bilateral committees (EU democracy and human rights committees)
Persuasion through multilateralplatforms (Euromed platforms),international human rights treaties (ICCPR,ICESCR)
Source : Table created by author.
What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum 29
engaged in utilitarian and identitive type of actions to promote democ-racy. Utilitarian democracy promotion includes democracy assistance, as well as positive and negative conditionality. Democracy assistance wasassessed through the amount of aid that was allocated for democratiza-tion with relevant data being published by the three actors themselves,as well as the OECD statistics database. To follow the use of negative and positive conditionality, the developments in each target country inthe neighborhood and the reaction in terms of punishments or rewardsby the respective democracy promoters were systematically observedover time. In respect to identitive democracy promotion, only publicdocuments were surveyed, as access to confidential documents on meet-ings behind closed doors was limited. In the US case, statements to thepress after bilateral meetings, as well as the speeches of the presidentsor secretaries of state to the Organization of American States (OAS) werefollowed; these can be found in the Public Papers of the President andtthe American Foreign Policy Current Documents . In the EU case, besidesunilateral speech acts of the High Representative and the Commissionerfor Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy, resolutions of the European Parliament and European Council conclusions, whichare all published on the home pages of the Commission, Parliament,and Council, were surveyed. Also, the setup and institutionalization of bi- and multilateral platforms to discuss these issues and EU reports onsuch meetings were included in the analysis. In the case of Turkey, thespeeches of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Presidentpublished on the respective home pages were observed.
The first two chapters answered the who promotes what questions, but twhy is it that democracies promote democracy abroad? y What triggersdemocracy promotion and what hinders it or, more precisely, what encouragesand pushes and what constrains democracies to promote democracy abroad?This is the main puzzle of this study, the nature of which this chapter explores in theoretical terms.
While literature on the effectiveness of democracy promotion and the international dimension of democratizations is well developed,rationales of democracies to pursue this foreign policy are still under-theorized. Jonas Wolff and Iris Wurm point out that ‘what is still alargely unexplored desideratum is the challenge to theoretically grasp“democracy promotion” as an aim and strategy of democratic foreignpolicies – that is, to embed the empirical research on democracy promo-tion in theoretical perspectives on international relations’ (Wolff andWurm 2011, 77). This theoretical underdevelopment is regrettable, since democracy promotion is increasingly significant in world politics. Thusit makes sense to start out ‘by problematizing a politically importantoutcome’ (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 65) in order to testexisting theories, combine theories, and develop new theory on democ-racy promotion. The empirical puzzle that this study deals with is thevarying extent to which a democracy has engaged in democracy promo-tion over time. Hence, the factors that enable, push, or hinder democ-racy promotion have to be identified. This section is taking account of the literature on democracy promotion which has emerged in differentstrains of IR theories, namely Realism, Liberalism, Critical Theory, andConstructivism. Since much of the literature on democracy promo-tion has been self-referential within theoretical disciplines as well aswithin the US and Europe, it is important to review it in order to start a
3 Why Is Democracy Promoted?The Argument
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 31
more comprehensive theoretical discussion on the issue which bridgesgeographical and theoretical gaps to substantiate existing arguments.Thus, the following section should be read as a critical engagement withthe literature as a basis on which the argument of this book is then developed.
Realism and democracy promotion
Realism deals with states as rational, unitary actors in an anarchic envi-ronment in which they seek to acquire power to defend their pre-givennational interests. Structural realists are suspicious of idealistic policieslike democracy promotion. John Mearsheimer or Christopher Layne, for example, see democracy promotion as a dangerous undertaking thatwill lead to ‘disastrous military interventions abroad, strategic overex-tension, and the relative decline of American power’ (Layne 1994, 329).Kenneth Waltz claimed that ‘crusades are frightening because crusaders go to war for righteous causes which they define for themselves and try to impose on others’ (Waltz 2002, 36). Besides, structural realists alsoregard democracy promotion of ‘second-order normative concern’ andargue that it can surface only if security or vital economic interests arenot at stake and when systemic pressures are indeterminate (Hyde-Price2008, 39). The most comprehensive theorizing on democracy promo-tion from a structural realist perspective has been set up and tested forthe US case by Benni Miller who argues that only under hegemony willdemocracies promote ideology abroad, pursuing it by offensive means ina highly threatening environment and by defensive means in a benignone (Miller 2010). Mark Peceny’s study on US military interventionsfor democracy contradicts this theory in two respects: first, he findsinstances of US democracy promotion before and during the Cold War,that is, under multi- and bipolarity, and argues, secondly, that higherthreats also hinder offensive democracy promotion (Peceny 1999, 10).What might be missing in the realist discussion of democracy promo-tion is a more rigorous elaboration of democracy promotion and its rela-tion to the security interest of democracies which will be pursued lateron in this chapter.
Liberalism and democracy promotion
In the 1980s realism increasingly lost its ‘hegemonic status’ in IR theory due to the development of other theories, such as institutionalism, liber-alism, critical theory, and constructivism. Liberalism opens the ‘black
32 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
box’ of the state. Its objects of studies are not states as actors, but indi-viduals and groups within states. Preferences are not given, but endog-enized: ‘For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters … not,as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities’ (Moravcsik 1997, 513).Moravcsik distinguishes three types of liberalism: commercial, repub-lican, and ideational.1 Possible explanations for variance in the scope of democracy promotion will now shortly be discussed in light of all threeof them.
In the logic of commercial liberalism, companies could have an interest in promoting democracy abroad in order to reach certain preconditionsfor investment in other countries and thus lobby for such a foreign policy. At the same time, democratizing countries are too volatile for invest-ment and companies might actually be interested in lobbying againstdemocracy promotion if they either directly deal with autocrats or if they prefer stable autocracies which ensure predictability for business. So commercial liberalism is rather indeterminate in explaining variancein the scope of democracy promotion. This also applies to theories on democracy promotion that could be subsumed to republican liberalism.Peceny has argued for the US case that democracy promotion becomesmore likely if international liberalists are present in the policy process(Peceny 1999, 10). Since the 1980s, however, conservatives also havedeveloped a pendant to liberal internationalism (Nau 2008). Regarding EU democracy promotion, it has been argued that Northern member states are more favorable toward democracy promotion than Southernmember states which ‘remained wed to more traditional views on secu-rity than their northern counterparts’ (Youngs 2002a, 44). Democracypromotion could then increase (or decline) when Northern Europeancountries succeed (or not) in setting this foreign policy on the agenda. But this argument leaves a crucial question open: Why are NorthernEuropeans favorable to democracy promotion and Southern Europeansnot? The answer might again be that Southern Europeans have higherstakes in terms of security interests in the Mediterranean than NorthernEuropeans, for whom it is easier to follow an identity-guided foreignpolicy. So we are back in the identity-security interests square whichmight function as a selector or filter of such foreign policy preferences. Finally, ideational liberalism also deals with the sub-systemic level and(trans)national actors, but, in contrast to utilitarian liberalism, theseactors are not assumed to act out of pre-given interests, but in accord-ance with norms, values, and knowledge. Change is driven by norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) or epistemic communi-ties (Adler and Haas 1992). Such actors can indeed be crucial to push
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 33
democracies to pursue democracy and human rights promotion, asThomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) have shown. Transnationally acting human rights groups can, for example, lobby a government in ademocracy or influence the public discourse in a democracy to promote democracy and human rights in a specific country. This mechanism is part of the argument of this study which will be further developed below.
Critical theory and democracy promotion
Critical theory challenges the supposedly non-normative appearance of realism and other problem-solving theories by arguing that theyare based on normative assumptions (Cox 1996). At the same time italso provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the behavior of capitalist states. Of the many different strains of critical theory, tran-snational historical materialism can contribute to the analysis of democracy promotion. Transnational historical materialism relies onthe theory and ideas of Antonio Gramsci, for whom hegemony is notonly maintained through coercion, but more importantly so throughthe propagation of a common culture. The ruling class needs somedegree of acceptance and thus creates an ideology and institutions thatseem to represent all classes without actually harming the interests of the ruling class. In International Relations theory, Gramsci’s ideas were applied, for example, by Robert Cox, who argues that world hegemony‘is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms whichlay down general rules of behavior for states … rules which support thedominant mode of production’ (Cox 1993, 61). In this logic, democracypromotion could be a policy to create a common culture in a hegemonicbloc. Indeed, William Robinson applies this to US democracy promo-tion and argues that the promotion of ‘low-intensity democracy’ servesthe interest of a transnational capitalist elite ‘to secure the underlyingobjective of maintaining essentially undemocratic societies inserted intoan unjust international system’ (Robinson 1996a, 6).2 The puzzle thenturns from why democracy is promoted to why it has not always beenpromoted. Robinson explains the US shift from supporting dictatorshiptoward promoting democracy in South America in the 1980s by the riseof global capitalism (Robinson 1996b, 616). However, by focusing on economic rationales only, he omits other political-strategic, as well asnormative, concerns and neglects that democratic ideas are not ownedby the West, but also developed and find much resonance outside of it,as Amartya Sen (1999) has forcefully argued.
34 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Constructivism and democracy promotion
Constructivism had its ‘breakthrough’ in international relations theory with the end of the Cold War, not least since Realism did not deal withimportant new phenomena in world politics, such as the emergence and influence of transnational actors or the ‘power of human rights’ (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Constructivism per se is not an IR theory likerealism or liberalism, but rather a meta-theory which deals with the char-acter of things, the constitution of actors, and their interaction (Risse 2003,100–102). Instead of the ‘logic of consequences’, actors follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’, meaning that they go by rules and that action ‘involvesevoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that iden-tity or role to a specific situation’ (March and Olsen 1998, 951). Materialfactors are not disregarded, but ‘ideas and communicative processes definein the first place which material factors are perceived as relevant and howthey influence understandings of interest, preferences and political deci-sions’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 6–7). How can this approach to the study of international relations explain variance in the scope of democracy promo-tion? While constructivism is a meta-theory, there is nonetheless a broad and ever-growing array of empirical research (Adler 2002, 103).
Regarding democracy promotion specifically, constructivist research has focused on the question of identity, while the role that international norms can play for democracy promotion has been neglected. To be concrete, two literatures have emerged on identity and democracy promo-tion – one on the EU and one on the United States – both characterized by the tendency to perceive their cases as ‘sui generis’. In his seminal study of US democracy promotion, Tony Smith (1994) refers to a specific American identity conception flowing from the evolution of US democracy. Also, Henry Nau (2000) sees the US democratic self-image as a central explana-tory factor. Similarly, a European literature on identity and democracy promotion which was triggered by an article of Ian Manners presents theEU as a sui generis case. Manners argued that because
of its particular historical evolution, its hybrid polity, and its consti-tutional configuration, the EU has a normatively different basis forits relations with the world. … (N)ot only is the EU constructed ona normative basis, but importantly … this predisposes it to act in anormative way in world politics. (Manners 2002, 252)
Besides their ‘sui generis’ approach, or indeed as a result of this, none of these theories has established how and under what conditions identity
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 35
influences foreign policy (except for the realist critique that denies anysuch influence in the first place). Thus, what is needed is a more rigorousdiscussion of how identity dynamics affect democracy promotion froma constructivist perspective.
The argument of this book
The discussion of democracy promotion as a foreign policy in the frame-work of IR theories has revealed two desiderata: a more rigorous discus-sion of democracy promotion in the context of the security interest of democracies and a more rigorous discussion of democracy in the context of identity dynamics. Both issues will now be elaborated and then beconfronted with each other.
Democracy promotion and the security interest
The assumption of many structural realists that democracy promotion isopposed to the security interest and of second-order normative concernsis contested. Democracy promotion cannot only be seen as opposingthe security interest, but also as a distinct security policy which reduces threats and fosters a stable order (Ikenberry 2000, 103–126). Neo-classical, motivational realist theories on the democratic peace (i.e., the obser-vation that democracies do not wage wars against one another) havepointed to reasons why it is a rational long-term policy for democracies to promote democracy abroad and why, in general, democracy promo-tion can be seen as a perfectly realist foreign policy. Democracies areperceived as ‘sheep in sheep’s clothing’ (Kydd 1997), that is, as securityseekers. Their transparency enables them to send reliable signals andthus alleviate the security dilemma which is the reason for the lack of trust and cooperation in the international system (Fearon 1994; Kydd1997; Schweller 2000). But not only utilitarian-inspired considerationspresent motivations to promote democracy. It also helps to pursue security interests from an identity-driven perspective: for constructiv-ists, the security dilemma among democracies is reduced, since theytrust one another which equals complete information (Risse-Kappen1995, 32). In addition, when other states are ‘converted’ to democracy,their ontological threat of representing other values and norms in theinternational system is removed.3 Democracy promotion manipulateshow other states perceive the international system, seeing the power of democracies as favorable and as ‘no threat to their fundamental visionsof societal order’ (Owen 2002, 257). Thus, with democracy promotiondemocracies can also counter the challenge of rising non-democratic
36 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
powers in the international system. In 2008 one of the most renownedscholars on democracy, Larry Diamond, assessed a backlash againstdemocracy around the world, led by Russia, China, but also by Iran andVenezuela, representing strategic sponsors for many autocracies in the world (Diamond 2008a, 12). Thus, democracy promotion could also beseen as a policy of democracies to contain not only these powers, butthe very values and norms that they are representing.
Hence, from a neo-classical realist viewpoint democracy promotion should be perfectly coherent with classical material security interests,such as preventing conflict and setting up stable alliances, as well aswith more ontological security interests, such as protecting one’s ownsystem of values and norms. Therefore, the puzzle becomes not whydemocracy is promoted, but why democracy promotion has not alwaysbeen promoted. Decisive in answering this question is what is called inthis book the democracy dilemma: in the long term democracy promo-tion might be a strategic policy to foster security interests, but in the short term it is risky when applied toward allied autocracies. Transition states are the most war-prone states, with several power centers compli-cating reliable signaling.4 They are volatile, unpredictable, and might bring actors to power that are perceived as threatening and might defectfrom alliances. In a benign environment democracies can afford a risky policy of democracy promotion for the benefit of long-term security,but if they find themselves in a highly threatening, conflictual environ-ment they will be risk-averse and pursue short-term-oriented securitypolicies. In other words, they will refrain from a risky policy of democ-racy promotion for the sake of short-term security interests. Thus risingthreat perceptions from the environment should be a central hinderingvariable of democracy promotion. This applies to this study specifi-cally, since in all three cases – US, EU, and Turkish democracy promo-tion in the neighborhood – we are dealing with dilemmatic cases of democracy promotion where democracy is promoted in allied autocra-cies. The logic of democracy promotion changes when pursued towardunfriendly regimes. In these cases, the democracy dilemma does notexist and democracy promotion fosters the security interest in the shortand long term; rising threat perceptions might then not hinder democ-racy promotion, but influence the means by which it is pursued, as hasbeen argued by Miller (2010).
Democracy promotion and identity dynamics
Identity is a vague concept and diversely defined (Fearon 1999).Alexander Wendt has introduced a typology of identities in which
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 37
corporate identity relates to the material base of an identity such as thebody in the case of the person or the territory in the case of states; type identity to the regime type of a collective; role identity to the perception of the self through the eyes of the other; and collective identity to theidentification between the self and the other (Wendt 1999, 224–233).In IR theory, identity has usually been conceptualized as role identityto account for social interaction among states. The paradigmatic defini-tion of Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, for example, maintains thatidentity ‘comes from social psychology, where it refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness (“selfhood”) held and projected byan actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations withsignificant “others”. Thus the term (by convention) references mutuallyconstructed and evolving images of self and other’ (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 59). Democracy promotion fits into this picturepar excellence. Promoting democracy abroad constructs an image of the self as democratic and the other as undemocratic and continuouslyprojects and enforces these images on the self and the other, as well as on the broader international community. Through promoting democ-racy Western democracies lay international claim on the prerogativeto interpret what and who a democracy is. This explains why democ-racies would promote democracy abroad, but why then do democra-cies not always promote democracy abroad? To answer this question,one needs to dig deeper into the roots of a democratic role identity, that is, an identity that is constituted by democracy being a shared foreign policy purpose that defines a community’s relations with the ‘undemocratic other’.This identity is highly complex and Janus-faced; it stands at the inter-face of the domestic and the international level; it is always internallyand externally oriented. Thus, this section will now debate the role thatan internal democratic type identity, international norms, and interac-tion with the other play in the evolution and activation of a democratic role identity in foreign policy. It will also discuss under what conditionsthreat perceptions – which have been identified above as a central factor that constrains democracies to use democracy promotion in foreignpolicy – can/cannot hinder the translation of a democratic role identity into concrete foreign policies.
A salient democratic type identity
To start with the internal level, a democratic role identity is rooted withina democratic type identity, that is, the constitutive values and normsthat define membership in a democracy. A democratic type identity is necessary for democracy promotion to begin with; it enables it. But can
38 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
it also push more concretely for democracy promotion? In the followingI will argue that it can in certain scenarios, assuming that political actors are self-reflexive about identity and use foreign policy for identitypurposes. While identities are always in flux, some scholars argue thatthere can be times when they are ‘settled and stable enough that wecan almost treat them as social facts’ (Risse 2010, 29).5 In these times ademocratic type identity enables democracy promotion in general, butit might not concretely push for it. This is different, however, when a democratic type identity is salient, that is, when constitutive norms and founding values are contested on the public agenda. They can be posi-tively contested when a community debates deepening and widening democratic founding values and constitutive norms; they can be nega-tively contested when these values and norms are called into questionby a group within a state that opposes its democratic character (e.g., extremist groups) or by a group outside a community which deniesit recognition as a democracy (if, e.g., Western democracies refuse torecognize a state as a democracy). In all these scenarios, foreign policy can become part of the process of identity affirmation. Concretely, fourmechanisms can be thought of.
First, if a democracy fears that its basic democratic values are threat-ened by non-democratic groups, foreign policy can serve to foster an environment which makes it difficult for future politicians to divert froma democratic constitution. The example of the French revolutionary government in the 18th century or of Argentinian President Raul Alfonsin in the 1980s described in the historical overview of this book would fit into this scenario. By promoting democracy in the neighborhood, Alfonsin sought to make sure that the young Argentinian democracy was not endangered by an autocratic subversion from abroad. Furthermore, Alfonsin could also foster the new democratic identity of Argentineans by creating a common foreign policy purpose in its near surroundings. Thiscould be called the anchoring mechanism. Second, if a democracy feels notrecognized as such internationally, democracy promotion might also bea mechanism to affirm its own democratic identity by pursuing a foreign policy practice ascribed to Western democracies. This could lead to inter-national recognition of the democratic character and acceptance intothe ‘club of democracies’ and so foster the self-perception of being demo-cratic. This could be called the imitation mechanism. Third, if democracy is positively contested at home, that is, if there is a debate as to how toenhance one’s own democracy, this provides an incentive for politicians to promote democracy abroad in order to project a democratic image and foster a common identity. This would apply specifically if reform
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 39
processes are complex and difficult to pursue. Democracy promotionwould then be the easy way out to gloss over democratic shortcomingssince it is – as Wiarda put it – ‘ soul-satisfying in a personal and collective sense’ (Wiarda 1986, 328). In this case democracy promotion cannot beseen anymore as a foreign policy, but it becomes entirely an internal policy. This could be referred to as the substitution mechanism. Finally, if democracy is positively contested and a community seeks to enhance thedemocratic character of a democracy, the raised awareness for democraticvalues might simply spill over into other policy fields such as foreign policy. An example would be the civil rights movement in the United States which did not only lay the basis for an increased rights conscious-ness at home, but also in other countries, not least since the rights move-ment itself had always been internationally oriented. In sociology thisphenomenon is referred to as the ‘Tocqueville Paradox’ and might be called the spillover mechanism .
International norms and a democratic role identity
To turn to the external part of a democratic role identity, internationally growing norms of democracy might also boost a democratic role iden-tity. International norms hardly appear as driving factors of democracypromotion in the literature which is puzzling since this foreign policyphenomenon seems very much embedded in the growth of democracyas an international norm. International norms are defined as ‘collec-tive expectations about proper behavior for a given identity’ (Jepperson,Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54). In this study, indicators for a growing international norm of democracy are not only a growing right of democ-racy in international law, but also the rise of democracy to a global standard form of governance. If this norm grows, democracy promotiondoes not only become more legitimate, but also more feasible in the firstplace. Democracy promotion is dependent on some degree of coopera-tion from the other side. Furthermore, such a growing norm can also push for democracy promotion more concretely. Constructivist theory tendsto focus on the effect that norms have on states who are not complyingwith norms (Risse and Sikkink 1999). This study, instead, observes if andhow they affect the identity and foreign policy behavior of states andactors such as the EU who are by and large considered compliers, thatis – in the case of an advancing norm of democracy – democracies.
I suggest three pulls on compliers: first, there might be a confidencepull. When democracy-related norms grow internationally, a democracy will be increasingly confident that its system of government is desiredalso by other societies. In other words, the democracy receives a boost
40 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
for its democratic identity. This confidence pull persuades a democracyto act in an appropriate way by promoting democracy abroad; it hasa constitutive effect on the democratic identity of a norm-complyingstate. Second, there is moral pull on norm-compliers. Norms might give them a greater responsibility to speak up for suppressed people and to demand compliance with international norms. Democracy promo-tion is not only appropriate but actually becomes a moral duty. In this case the norm has a regulatory effect on norm-compliers. Third, there might be a strategic pull of norms. If, for example, human rights grow as international norms, it increases one’s soft power (Nye 1990) to takethe lead of such a wave. In this case norms are neither regulatory nor constitutive, but provide a concrete strategic incentive for democraciesto get involved. As in the case of a contested democratic type identity above, the actor here is also self-reflexive and is not following normsautomatically, but as part of a rationalization process. Her/his ration-ality, however, is bounded and embedded in the context of norms andidentity.
To conclude the discussion of democracy promotion from the perspec-tive of security interests and identity dynamics, the first hypothesis of this book can be identified: Threat perceptions constrain democracy promo-tion, while a democratic role identity – rooted internally in a democratic typeidentity and externally in international norms of democracy – enables and pushes forr democracy promotion. What happens, however, if these twoexplanatory variables are confronted with each other? If threat percep-tions are low, a democratic role identity enables democracy promotion, but what if threat perceptions are high? What will then take the upperhand: threat perceptions or a democratic role identity or, in other words, the interest for physical security or for ontological security?
Three democracy promotion phases and the crucial role of the other
To answer this question, three phases of democracy promotion have to be distinguished: phase I, where a democratic role identity is devel-oping but democracy promotion is not yet part of foreign policy; phaseII, where democracy promotion has been incorporated but the demo-cratic role identity is not yet entirely internalized; and phase III, whereit has become internalized and democracy promotion represents anestablished part of foreign policy. Phases I and III are relatively clear cut. In phase I democracy promotion will enter foreign policy only if threat perceptions are low. Vice versa in phase III, it is unlikely that a democracy would divert from democracy promotion even under high
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 41
threat perceptions. An internalized democratic role identity wouldlimit perceived or politically feasible policy alternatives (Holsti 1987,38–39), democracy promotion would be a routine, and the meaning of its conduct would not lie anymore in ‘the achievement of some goalulterior to it, but in engaging in the specific type of behavior for its ownsake’ (Weber 1962, 60). This means that democracy promotion would then have moved from intentional-reflexive to unreflexive behavior. Democracy promotion would be pursued even if dangerous. This isbecause, as Jennifer Mitzen has argued, routines – even dangerous ones – provide ontological security (Mitzen 2006a, 341). The Athenian case of democracy promotion during the Second Peloponnesian War described in the historical overview above might come close to this scenario, buttoday this scenario remains hypothetical.
More complicated should be phase II, in which role identities arenot internalized, but internalizing, and in which they are not entirelyconstraining the effect that rising threat perceptions have on foreignpolicy. In such a situation, that is, when a democratic role identity is evolving but not internalized and when threat perceptions are rising, weshould not only see a frequent diversion from democracy promotion,but also the emergence of cheap talk, that is, a justification of foreign policy with hypocritical references to a democratic role identity. Overthe longer term this might either lead a democracy to revert back to phase I, but it could equally also push it closer toward phase III and therole of the significant other – the ‘target’ of democracy promotion – willbe critical in determining the direction.
Frank Schimmelfennig has pointed out that cheap talk – rhetorical commitments to a role identity – can entrap. He argues that evenweakly socialized actors can be shamed into compliance by exposingthe inconsistency between their declarations and their current behavior(Schimmelfennig 2001, 64). While the shamed actor can try to use rhetor-ical action to downplay the shaming, there are limits to such rhetoricalaction, as actors can lose their credibility and reputation. So, even if actors only use ‘the standard of legitimacy opportunistically to advancetheir self-interest, they can become entrapped by their arguments andobliged to behave as if they had taken them seriously’ (Schimmelfennig2001, 65). Schimmelfennig shows how the significant other – in his caseCentral and Eastern European governments who shamed the EuropeanUnion into compliance with its constitutive values and rhetoric – acti-vated a certain role identity. Necessary conditions for the significantother to play a role are, first, his/her willingness to shame a democ-racy promoter into compliance with its own rhetoric: autocratic regimes
42 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
might have no incentive to do this but rather to foster threat perceptionsregarding the opposition in their country; advocacy groups on the otherhand might have the interest to appeal to a democracy’s democratic roleidentity (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Second,and besides willingness, the other needs to have the capabilities to pusha democracy promoter into compliance with its own rhetoric. The otherwould need to have access to the democracy promoter on the intergov-ernmental or on the transnational level through transnational links toadvocacy groups, for example. If the significant other so succeeds tocall on and activate a democratic role identity, this identity will become increasingly internalized and democracy promotion a routine. The other plays indeed a crucial counterpart in sustaining or rupturing arole identity since such identities are formed through social interaction;they are ‘formed and sustained relationally’ (Mitzen 2006b, 357). Actorssee themselves in the role others attribute to them (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 66) and self-image is dependent on approval andsupport through the other (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 26).
If, however, the significant other is neither willing nor capable of shaming a democracy promoter into compliance with its own rhetoric, then the democratic role identity will not hinder the effect of threatperceptions on foreign policy. Over the long term, hypocritical refer-ences to a democratic role identity that are not supported through action should then be problematic for this identity. Mitzen has pointed out that ‘consequences of action will always either reproduce or contradict identi-ties, and since identity motivates action its stability over time depends on it being supported in practice’ (Mitzen 2006b, 344). Thus, a democratic role identity, if not translated into practice but only referred to through cheap talk, would decline and we would revert back to phase I.
In conclusion, the second hypothesis of the book is that a democratic role identity can limit the hindering effect of threat perceptions on democracy promotion if the other is successful in mobilizing it. The argument is also summarized below in Figure 3.1.
Methodology and measuring the explanans
The argument of this study is based more on an idealist than a materi-alist ontology. The actor is seen as a homo sociologicus in the context of a social system into which he was socialized, even though this does notmean that an actor cannot also use utilitarian considerations within it.The homo sociologicus finds itself in a world not only of brute material facts, but also of ‘social facts’ which exist by forms of human agreement
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 43
(Adler 2002, 100; Searle 1995, 228). Social and material facts are notindependent of each other: material facts exist out there but, per se, theyare not socially significant. What matters is how they are interpreted.At the same time, material facts influence social facts: they ‘emergefrom the interaction between knowledge and the material world’ (Adler2002, 95). Social facts are made of ideas, norms, values, beliefs, rules,and practices. They are created by communication and intersubjectiveagreement, and are not independent of the social context in whichthey become institutionalized. Nonetheless, such socially constructedfacts can constitute objective facts similar to material ones (Searle 2009;Durkheim 1952).
One could now argue that such an idealist ontology is best compat-ible with an epistemology of ‘understanding’, instead of ‘explaining’.6
Nonetheless, this research project goes the middle way of an idealistontology coupled with an epistemology of explaining. Alexander Wendt calls this combination the ‘via media’ of modernist constructivism(Wendt 1999, 47). As a scientific realist, Wendt finds that unobservable entities like ideas can be knowable through scientific theories (see also
Democratic role identity
(Democracy promotionstarts only when threat
perceptions are low anda democratic role
identity is growing)
Significant other does not shame democracyinto compliance with its cheap rhetoric
Significant other shames democracyinto compliance with its cheap rhetoric
Varying use of democracypromotion
(Frequent diversion ofdemocracy promotion
when threat perceptionsare high with cheap
references to democraticrole identity)
Democracy promotion asa routine
(Democratic role identityis internalized, high
threat perceptions do notlead to diversion fromdemocracy promotion)
Figure 3.1 The argument
Source : Figure created by author.
44 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Searle 2009). Furthermore, Wendt suggests that the ‘distinction between Explanation and Understanding is not one between explanation anddescription, but between explanations that answer different kinds of question, causal and constitutive’ (Wendt 1998, 194). Also constitutive theory can be explanatory in a deep sense since it back traces the causal mechanisms or generating processes instead of examining causal effectsonly (Dessler 1999). This approach is pursued in this study throughprocess tracing which – as Jeffrey Checkel argues – ‘means to trace the operation of causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation’ and is ‘compatible with a positivist or, to be more precise, scientific realist understanding of causation in linear terms’ (Checkel 2008, 116).
To pursue this approach, each case study starts by observing theexplanandum, that is, the variance in democracy promotion (for whichindicators have already been set up in the above section on measuringthe explanandum). It then turns to the explanans and observes theevolution of threat perceptions and a democratic role identity (for indi-cators see this section below). For assessing both factors, as well as thelinks between them and democracy promotion, this study relies on thequalitative analysis of official documents and speeches in which policiesare explained to the public and justified. Surveying political speechesand documents bears the question on the assumptions made about therepresentational and instrumental nature of the material (Hermann2008, 155). Do these documents indicate the reasons why decisionshave been taken or do they have instrumental purposes? Since anypolitical speech is embedded in a discourse, meaning that it is as much influenced by a discourse as it is influencing the same, the answer to thisquestion is both: ‘if language is used strategically, it will be effective only if at least some important portion of the population has internalized theidentity cues and responds to their use’ (Abdelal et al. 2009, 28). Thisobservation might apply even more when dealing with democracies. Apolitician needs to take into account public opinion as much as he willtry to influence it. Hence the surveyed material is representational andinstrumental at the same time.
It should be noted that policymakers are seen as ‘guardians’ (Holsti1987, 37), ‘conveyor belts’ (Alexander 1988, 270) or ‘key aggregatorsof societal demands’ (Bicchi 2007, 24). They are studied but assumedas ‘agents collectively representing the state as a social actor in foreign rpolicy’ (Aggestam 1999). The given unit of analysis is the collective actorand the individual policymaking institutions are not factored in on theside of the explanatory factors. They are nonetheless observed as thisstudy is based on process tracing. Their speech and discourse is followed
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 45
in order to trace back the influence of the variables; they are part of thecausal chain and are observed as such in the case studies. Putting this in agent-structure terms, the argument of this book focuses on the struc-tural level – norms, identity, and the strategic setting – which shapesthe context within which foreign policy institutions (institution hereincludes offices such as president, prime minister, foreign minister, highrepresentative etc., as well as the associated bureaucracies) make theirmoves. So while the explanatory factors represent the structural side of the coin, these structures are not only constraining, but also encourageor even push the agent to pursue a foreign policy of democracy promo-tion. Thus, while this argument takes the structure as primitive, itnonetheless belongs to a structurationist, not a structuralist theoretical framework. Structures, to use Bretherton and Vogler’s conceptualization, provide ‘distinct patterns of opportunity and constraint’ (Brethertonand Vogler 1999, 28–29).
Concretely, the surveyed data are, in the US case, all presidentialspeeches for the given time period (as found in the Public Papers of the President), as well as the speeches of the secretaries of state, deputy secre-ttaries of state, assistant secretaries of state for human rights and humani-tarian affairs, and national security advisers which are published in theAmerican Foreign Policy Current Documents. Memoirs were also includedin the analysis. In the EU case, the data include all council conclusionsand all speeches of the high representatives Javier Solana and CatherineAshton. The high representatives stand for agreed upon policies andcommon positions, while they are not entitled to speak on issues whereno such position exists. In addition, commission papers and speechesof the presidents of the commission and the commissioners for externalrelations and enlargement which deal with the EU’s foreign policy of democracy promotion, are surveyed. For the case of Turkey, all speechesof the prime minister, foreign ministers, and the presidents regardingdemocracy promotion which are accessible online were observed. Finally,the broader public discourse in all three cases on democracy promotionwas followed through newspaper articles as well as secondary literature.
This study has identified threat perceptions as one of the hinderingfactors of democracy promotion. Threats related to material interestssuch as physical security are usually referred to as tangible threats, whilethreats can also be symbolic when the ontological security of a given identity, culture, or norm is at stake. For both threats – tangible and symbolic – the relation to the other is of crucial importance.
46 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Classical realism and neo-realism both claim that asymmetries inobjective factors such as power capabilities are the major factor withwhich states assess threats, but this approach was challenged in therealist school of thought itself. Stephen Walt pointed out that duringthe Cold War states did not balance against rising powers, but againststates displaying offensive intentions. Concretely, he argued that poli-cymakers identify threats by considering the impact of aggregate power,proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions (Walt 1985, 9). But how are offensive intentions assessed? While Walt does not give an answer to this, Robert Jervis argued that ‘a state is likely to be seen as athreat if it displays a willingness to ignore accepted procedure, a disre-gard of what are usually considered the legitimate rights of others, andan exceptionally high propensity to accept risks in order to improve itsposition’ (Jervis 1985, 15). This is similar to Raymond Cohen’s argument that the other will be perceived as a threat when he breaks rules. Rules enable ‘actors to coordinate their behavior by providing a focus for theirmutual expectations’ (Raymond Cohen 1979, 188). Such rules in theinternational arena constitute norms of accommodation and boundedcompetition (Farnham 2003, 403). According to this rationale, threatperceptions would rise when other states or groups such as terroristsdisplay an increasing level of external and internal violence. Thus, a first indicator of threat perceptions are increased levels of violence from the side of the other . r
Equally important and compatible with this indicator, the second indicator of increasing threat perceptions in this study relates to thelevel of symbolic threats. Constructivist research has shown thatthreat perceptions are rooted in identities which provide ‘a measure of inclusion and exclusion by defining a social “we” and delineating theboundaries against the “others”’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 9). This kindof relational comparison to the other serves to determine the identityof the self, but it also excludes the other, even though there are diverselevels of exclusion or ‘othering’, as has been argued by Thomas Diez. Hedifferentiates four different forms of othering which can serve as indica-tors of rising threat perceptions in this study: the representation of theother as different; the representation of the other as violating universalprinciples, in which the standards of the self are treated as universal(note that democracy promotion already inherently implies this form of othering); the representation of the other as inferior as, for example, inOrientalism; and the representation of the other as an existential threat,that is, the securitization of the other as a security threat, legitimizing extraordinary measures such as war (Diez 2005, 628). Thus the second
Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument 47
indicator of threat perceptions in this study is increased levels off othering from the side of the self.ff
Democratic role identity
As has been shown in the theory chapter, a democratic role identityin international affairs is rooted internally in a democratic type iden-tity and externally in international norms and the relationship to therelevant other. Thus it is closely related to the four indicators of identitywith which Rawi Abdelal et al. have tried to nail the identity puddingto the wall and which will be used as a basis for ‘measuring’ democratic role identity, even though the fourth indicator – cognitive models – issubstituted by international norms in this book:
Constitutive norms refer to the formal and informal rules that define group membership. Social purposes refer to the goals that are shared bymembers of a group. Relational comparisons refer to defining an iden-tity group by what it is not – that is, the way it views other identity groups, especially where those views about the other are a definingpart of the identity. Cognitive models refer to the worldviews or under-standings of political and material conditions and interests that areshaped by a particular identity. (Abdelal et al. 2009, 19)
Constitutive norms, in our case the internal democratic rules that deter-mine the interaction in the polity as well as democracy per se as afounding value, are the very base of a democratic role identity. Thetheory chapter has highlighted that these constitutive norms matter for democracy promotion not so much when they are stable, but ratherwhen they are salient, that is, when the foundational democratic valuesand norms are negatively contested (there is a group which opposesthem) or positively contested (a community seeks to enhance them orincorporate new democratic values) on the public agenda. Thus, insteadof simply assessing the constitutive norms of a democracy promoter, this study looks for a discourse on democratic founding norms and valuesin a society and if politicians refer to democracy promotion within thisdiscourse.
Instead of cognitive models, this study looks at international norms –concretely internationally growing norms of democracy – which are similarly decisive in shaping role identities of democracies. Such normscan be followed through international law – in this study through inter-national conventions – as well as through the growth of democracy to a global standard form of governance – in this study through the Freedom
48 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
House index which is based on Dahl’s definition of democracy used in this book. Also here, it is again important to back trace if political actorsrefer to such norms as motivations for promoting democracy and if soin which argumentative context.
Social purposes is the central category when measuring a democraticrole identity, since democracy promotion is a social purpose of a democ-racy. The robustness of this purpose is measured, first, through the commonality of democracy promotion as a stated social purpose – thatis, how it is anchored in law and how widely this goal is shared in acommunity – and, second, through the specificity of the foreign policy script associated with this purpose – that is, how deeply this goal is insti-tutionalized. Regarding commonality, opinion polls on public supportfor democracy are observed over time. Specificity is assessed throughobserving the legal development that possibly mandates the instances,definitions, and means of democracy promotion. It is also analyzed, if institutions for democracy promotion are established, and what is theirmandate. Finally, speeches of politicians are followed to observe howfrequently they refer to democracy promotion as a social purpose.
Lastly, a role identity has always to be seen in relation to the other. Crucialfor the theory developed in this study is how the other is perceived by ademocracy promoter (see the part on threat perceptions) and if and howthe other – either a government or a non-governmental organization – seeks to interfere in the public discussion of a democracy on its own role identity. Thus for this indicator it was observed if the other sought to participate at all in the public discourse on democracy promotion in ademocracy, through which channels, and to which effect.
The United States and DemocracyPromotion in Central and SouthAmerica in the Last Period of theCold War
When the United States entered the stage of world politics in the early20th century, democracy promotion played an important role in its foreign policy agenda, especially toward its neighborhood. Only withthe advent of the Cold War did a foreign policy agenda emerge that preferred stability over values and the fight of communism over thepromotion of democracy. This period of realpolitik which had its peak during the Kissinger era, ended when President Jimmy Carter enteredthe White House. His was the first US administration that incorporatedhuman rights and democratic freedoms systematically into US foreignpolicy toward Central and South America.1 Only in the last year of his presidency did this agenda decline, specifically toward Central America.Carter was voted out of office and President Ronald Reagan initiallyreturned to realpolitik in the neighborhood.2 Human rights or demo- cratic principles appeared neither in Reagan’s rhetoric nor policy prac-tice toward the neighborhood. Surprisingly, however, in the second yearof his first term, democracy promotion suddenly started to make inroadsinto US foreign policy again, first characterized by a confusing back andforth, but becoming more coherent in the mid-1980s. This section now examines in detail how the substantive content of democracy promo-tion, as well as the types of action to promote democracy varied anddeveloped in the last decade of the Cold War.
The evolution of the substantive content of democracy promotion
The substantive content of democracy promotion developed consid-erably from the Carter to the Reagan administration. Since the Carteradministration was the first during the Cold War to anchor human rights
4 The Return of DemocracyPromotion to US Foreign Policy
52 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
and democratic freedoms in its foreign policy agenda, there were noestablished models on how to pursue this path yet. The administrationhad to define human rights and choose instruments and targets. RobertaCohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights during theCarter administration, characterized the policy in the beginning as ‘trialand error on an ad hoc basis’ (Roberta Cohen 1979, 225). Over time,however, a script emerged. The definition of human rights was inspired by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) andthe International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESCR), even though the rights of the ICCPR were prioritized. Secretary of State Vance defined human rights in a speech at the University of Georgia in 1977 as, first, ‘the right to be free from governmental viola-tion of the integrity of the person’; second, ‘the right to the fulfilment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education’; and third, ‘the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedomof movement both within and outside one’s own country; freedom to take part in government’ (Vance 1977, 505). This first script was further specified by the Christopher Memorandum in 1977 which stated thatpriority should be given to the first group of human rights (violations of the integrity of the person) and, only if this group is protected, priorityis given to the third group (political and civil rights) (Christopher 1977).The second group was last in priority. The same categorization is alsofound in the country reports on human rights (published yearly since1977 by the US Department of State) which dealt most extensively withthe first and third group of rights during the Carter administration.The Christopher Memorandum also determined standard proceduresfor promoting human rights and democratic freedoms. Countries thatdemonstrated democratic tendencies should be supported in developingthese, while for countries with disrupted or no such tendencies ‘disso-ciation may ultimately be an appropriate US action’ (Christopher 1977, 21). For gross violators of human rights, Christopher advised bringingin international concerted action. The strategies the Memorandumsuggested were, first, diplomatic actions, public statements, and varioussymbolic acts; second, changes in levels of security and economic assist-ance and food aid; third, initiative in international financial institu-tions; fourth, the use of overseas broadcast facilities and cultural andeducational programs; and fifth, improved access to the United Statesfor refugees and dissidents.
With the Reagan administration entering the White House, the focusshifted toward an electoral model of democracy at the expense of the
The Return of Democracy Promotion 53
human rights agenda. Reagan first outlined his script for democracypromotion in his ‘Crusade for Freedom’ speech to the British Parliamentin 1982. He stated that the ‘objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions,political parties, universities which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differencesthrough peaceful means’ (Reagan 1982a). This became the base for his‘Project Democracy’ – a democracy assistance program that Reaganproposed to Congress which modified the proposal and set up the bipar-tisan National Endowment for Democracy (NED).
For the Reagan administration, democracy was the precondition towhich human rights would be adhered. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, argued in1982 before the Conference on Free Elections that ‘free elections arenot simply a human rights goal. They are also the means which willguarantee that other human rights are also respected’ (US Departmentof State 1985a, 381). Reagan’s first Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, also believed that ‘the rights of individuals are mosteffectively promoted and expanded by and through democratic politicalinstitutions – where governments are elected through periodic competi-tive elections, elections that feature freedom to criticize government,to publish criticism, to organize opposition and compete for power’(Kirkpatrick 1988, 85). For Kirkpatrick elections represented ‘the centralinstitution of democracy. All the essential elements of democracy arepresent in democratic elections’ (Kirkpatrick 1988, 8). The administra-tion – as Forsythe argued – had ‘a pronounced tendency to collapse “human rights” into “democracy” or “democratic freedoms” and to talk about, if not to push for, structural change towards democracy’ (Forsythe1988, 19).
This was also reflected in the country reports on human rights. In1982 and 1983, the reports underwent decisive changes. Regarding thesection on the integrity of the person, the category of ‘killing’ was addedso that not only human rights violations by states, but also by ‘terror-ists’, could be included. The 1982 report states that ‘(k)illing for politicalmotives, whether by governments or oppositionist political organiza-tions, is obviously the most serious human rights violation, and deservesparticular attention’ (US Department of State 1983a, 2). As this categorywas controversial,3 it was renamed ‘unlawful or arbitrary deprivation of life’ in 1983. The reports also started to concentrate more on the sectionon civil and political rights which were further developed. The 1983report stated that ‘(p)olitical participation is not only an important right
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in itself, but also the best guarantee that other rights will be observed’and that ‘an effort has been made this year to be more precise aboutthe real meanings of “elections” and “parliaments”’ (US Department of State 1983a, 2). The category of ‘political rights’ – ‘the right of citizens to change their government’ – became an independent section. It referred more extensively to the possibility of participation through politicalparties, trade unions, the parliament, and the observation of free andfair elections. Thus, as Picken has argued, the administration rearranged‘the priorities in ways that suited its own ideology, but which departed significantly from the understanding of human rights set forth in theUniversal Declaration and the treaties based on it. It rejected the validityof economic and social rights, underplayed many civil and politicalrights, and focused primarily on free and fair elections and a narrow understanding of democracy’ (Picken 2001, 96).
Later on, in the wake of the transformation of the Southern conestates in South America, Carter’s foreign policy script also had a come-back, when the Reagan administration’s agenda became more inclusiveagain of other human rights. Furthermore, other issues which are partof today’s standard program of democracy promotion started to enteras well. The 1987 human rights report, for example, began to deal moreextensively with the question of an independent judiciary. It statedthat
(f)ree elections and a democratic system are essential, but not suffi-cient, elements of a society which respects human rights. The mere fact that democracy has been established is no guarantee that humanrights will be fully respected in such a democratic country. As thesereports demonstrate, effective law enforcement, including the opera-tion of an independent, effective, and efficient judiciary is neededif the rights of the individual are to be protected against all formsof encroachment. We note with regret that, in a number of LatinAmerican democracies, the law enforcement system lags significantlybehind other institutions of government in safeguarding humanrights and due process. (US Department of State 1988, 2)
So, toward the end of the Reagan administration, a democracy promotion script emerged which represented a synthesis of Carter’s and Reagan’s definitions and instruments. Sikkink points out that Bush and Clintoninstitutionalized and normalized this synthesis (Sikkink 2004, 149–150)and that this was ‘the true outcome of the debate and struggle of theReagan years. In many ways it resurrected the policy tools of the Carter
The Return of Democracy Promotion 55
period, but it also invented new tools and institutions, the NationalEndowment for Democracy and the Administration of Justice Programbeing two of the more visible examples’ (Sikkink 2004, 179–180).
Thus, in the last decade of the Cold War, the substantive framing of democracy developed to a large degree. While Carter’s definition of human rights leaned on the ICCPR and, less so, on the ICESCR, Reagan further marginalized economic and social rights and paved the wayfor an electoral-structural model of democracy. In the second Reagan administration we can witness the emergence of a democracy- promotionscript which is largely valid today even though additional issues areas – ranging from the rule of law, civil society, media, and business, to citizen education – have been added to the catalog. 4
Variance in democracy promotion, from Carter to Reagan
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations focused on unilateralmeans of democracy promotion, even though Carter also sought tostrengthen human rights treaties by seeking Senate consent for theratification of five human rights treaties: the American Conventionon Human rights, the UN Genocide Convention, the UN Conventionon Racial Discrimination, the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, andCultural Rights, and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Butwhile Carter and Reagan both mainly used unilateral means of democ-racy promotion, Carter focused on negative political conditionality andidentitive democracy promotion, whereas Reagan mainly employeddemocracy assistance, even though in his second term negative polit-ical conditionality was re-introduced to US policy in Central and SouthAmerica.
The Carter administration indeed represents an exceptional phenom-enon in the contemporary history of democracy promotion. Never before or after has negative political conditionality been applied so systemati-cally and extensively. Immediately after the administration took office,Secretary of State Vance announced the reduction of aid to Argentinaand Uruguay due to their human rights violations. During Carter’s termmilitary or economic assistance was cut or entirely stopped to Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay,and Uruguay. Some countries, like Brazil and Argentina, canceled aid pacts by themselves after human rights reports were issued by theState Department or after some aid had been cut. Even in Nicaragua,
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where the allied regime of Anastasio Somoza DeBayle was on the vergeof falling in 1978 and the opposition was perceived as pro-Soviet, theCarter administration cut off all military arms and services due to itshuman rights violations. Positive political conditionality, in contrast,was used less systematically (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 557). Asa result of these policies, between the fiscal years of 1977 and 1979, mili-tary assistance toward Latin America decreased from 8.1 to 2.3 per cent of US foreign aid (Schoultz 1981, 264). Schoultz claims that ‘for humanrights reasons, the FY1980 military aid program to Latin America borevirtually no resemblance to that of a decade earlier’ (Schoultz 1981,362). 5 In 1980, however, Carter’s policy changed. While military assist- ance still showed a declining tendency in the region in total, toward some countries, especially El Salvador, but also Honduras, it increased again despite gross human rights violations of the respective regimes. Inthe last days of his presidency, Carter even included lethal weapons in military supplies to El Salvador – a novelty in his presidency.
In contrast to military assistance, conditionality was less systemati-cally applied when it came to economic assistance, since the allocationof this type of assistance was not only influenced by decisions relatedto democracy promotion, but also to poverty. The Carter administra-tion redesigned some aid programs so that assistance would reach thepoorest people, as in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti. David Cingranelliand Thomas Pasquarello observed that the level of development of a country was ‘the most important determinant of whether or not anation received economic assistance’ (Cingranelli and Pasquarello1985, 553) and that ‘there was no relationship between a nation’s overall human rights record and the provision of economic assistance’(Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 555). This is disputed by Poe (1992,163), who finds that the human rights record did play a role – amongother factors.
One of the first actions of the Reagan administration was to resumemilitary aid to regimes like Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Guatemala. Military aid for Honduras, but especially El Salvador, skyrocketeddespite massive human rights violations and an ever-increasing deathtoll throughout the civil war. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the decrease of military aid during the Carter presidency (the short rise in 1978 is due to increasing assistance to Colombia to support its fight against drugtrafficking and related guerrilla activities), the skyrocketing increase intotal military aid in the first Reagan presidency, as well as the falling trend in the second. Figure 4.2 shows this trend by country. That mili-tary aid was declining in the second Reagan presidency was a result of
The Return of Democracy Promotion 57
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Figure 4.1 Total military assistance to all countries in Central and Latin America1976–1989 in million historical USD
Source : Figure created by author based on data from USAID (2009).
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Figure 4.2 Total military assistance to all countries in Central and Latin America1976–1989 in million historical USD by country
Source : Figure created by author based on data from USAID (2009).
58 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Congressional interference as will be seen later on. With military aid vetoed by Congress, the Reagan administration tried to substitute itwith economic assistance, as in the case of El Salvador. Economic assist-ance, like military assistance, shows a massively increasing trend in the first Reagan presidency and slightly decreases in the second as shown inFigure 4.3 in total numbers and Figure 4.4 by country.
In conclusion, regarding political conditionality, the Carter adminis-tration mainly used negative conditionality through cutting military aid. It employed this instrument most extensively in its first three years. In1980 its use declined especially in Central America, where military andeconomic aid was increased, negative human rights records notwith-standing. The first year of the Reagan administration was characterizedby a reversal of the Carter policy. In late 1982, democracy promotion started to appear with sporadic cases of negative conditionality and thisbecame a more consistent policy during Reagan’s second term, specifi-cally toward the remaining autocracies in South America’s democra-tizing southern cone.
Democracy assistance was not a systematic instrument of the Carteradministration in contrast to the Reagan administration. One of the few
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Figure 4.3 Total economic assistance to all countries in Central and Latin America 1976–1989 in million historical USD
Source : Figure created by author based on data from USAID (2009).
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Trinidad and Tobago
Figure 4.4 Total economic assistance to all countries in Central and Latin America 1976–1989 in million historical USD by country
Source : Figure created by author based on data from USAID (2009).
60 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
programs that the Carter administration funded was the training of Latin American labor leaders through the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AFILD), an activity that aimed at keeping labor leaders in a liberal-democratic, as opposed to a communist, framework. AFILD alsohad programs in schools and community centers, but its budget was rela-tively minor. In 1980, for example, the Carter administration requestedeight million US dollars (USD) for its activities (Schoultz 1981, 333).
In contrast to this, the showcase democracy promotion instrument of the Reagan administration became democracy assistance through theNational Endowment for Democracy (NED). Reagan’s original proposalof a ‘Project Democracy’ was not accepted by Congress, but a bipartisan endowment found large support. From 1984 to 1990 the funding of theNED ranged between 15 and 18 million USD (Carothers 1994, 125) – a comparatively minor amount compared to other economic assistance.In addition to NED’s programs, democracy assistance programs werealso carried out by AID or the State Department. A big part of democ-racy assistance concentrated on electoral support which was given,for example, to observer missions in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,Honduras, and Chile. Aid was used for technical expertise, civic educa-tion, NGOs, universities, trade unions, and media, and was often backedup by political pressure. At the same time, aid was also exploited in morepolitical ways. In El Salvador, José Napoleón Duarte was heavily subsi-dized so that he would win the presidential election in 1984 (Kryzanek 1985, 165). Besides electoral support, there were cases of judicial assist-ance, as in Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay, and the fostering of participa-tion by supporting media, underprivileged groups, policy institutes, andother pro-democracy groups.
Identitive democracy promotion
Besides negative political conditionality, identitive democracy promo-tion was the preferred instrument of the Carter administration. In hisaddress at the University of Notre Dame, Carter remarked that
I understand fully the limits of moral suasion. We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In our own history, that power has ranged from Thomas Paine’s ‘Common Sense’ to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s ‘I Have aDream.’ In the life of the human spirit, words are action, much moreso than many of us may realize who live in countries where freedomof expression is taken for granted. The leaders of totalitarian nations
The Return of Democracy Promotion 61
understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.(Carter 1977a)
Identitive democracy promotion was used overtly, as well as behindclosed doors, and it was conducted on the bureaucratic and presiden-tial levels. On the bureaucratic level, the Human Rights Office in theState Department determined human rights violations of a country andthen communicated its concerns to the highest levels of government.Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Schneider explained that this ‘has occurred with regard to nearly every country that we consider has engaged in serious violations, including those with whom we have otherimportant interests’ (Schneider 1979, 264).
On the presidential level there was, on the one hand, the praisingof ‘good examples’ like Costa Rica or Venezuela as role models, and,on the other hand, the private and public communication with humanrights violators. The first strategy included symbolic acts like the visitof First Lady Rosalyn Carter to democratic countries such as Costa Rica,Jamaica, and Venezuela, as well as countries likely to democratize suchas Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. Also, in meetings with democratic leaders, Carter praised his counterpart, as, for example, in the case of Venezuela,when he claimed that ‘the nation of Venezuela has earned the greatadmiration of those who believe in freedom and in the open, demo-cratic processes of government’ (Carter 1977b). The second strategy wasused by Carter on his trip to Latin America in 1978, as well as uponvisits of heads of state in Washington throughout Carter’s presidency.For example, after a private discussion with President Pinochet of Chile, Carter remarked in the following joint press conference, that he
discussed with President Pinochet the problems that exists with thequestion of human rights in Chile … We talked about the release of prisoners and the right of those to be tried, the expedition of the judi-cial system which has, he admitted, been delayed in some instances,and the elimination of their intelligence agency, I think a couple of weeks ago; also the new process by which a prisoner can be releasedfrom incarceration in exchange for extradition. In other words, if theywant to be released, they have to leave the country. We have had avery frank discussion about this serious problem. I think the Chileanleaders, including President Pinochet, recognized that the reputationof their country has been very poor in the field of human rights. Heacknowledged that they have had problems in the past. He claimed
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that progress had been made in recent months and told me that theirplans are for an increase in human freedoms in the future. But I think that he can describe plans for the future better than can I. He knowsthat this is a very serious problem for Chile. (Carter 1977c)
Usually Carter used communicative practices for such discussions. He did name and shame human rights violations, but at the same timealso admitted US shortcomings regarding human rights. Carter pointedout that
we are still concerned about deprivation of human rights in manycountries of the world. … We’ve tried to be broad-based in our expres-sion of concern and, also, responsible. At first, our policy was inter-preted, I think, improperly, to deal exclusively with the Soviet Union.I’ve just pointed out how our own country has been at fault in someinstances. … But throughout the entire world, in Latin America, inour own country, in the Communist nations in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union, we are very much aware of the concern abouthuman rights. (Carter 1977d)
With his approach, Carter felt that ‘the seeds of reform had beenplanted. At least they were confronting a question they had not beenforced to address before’ and noted that the discussion on human rightswas usually initiated by the other, who felt an urge to show him that progress was being made (Carter 1982, 151).
At times, however, Carter’s communicative approach led to confu-sion, especially when the recipient expected the strategic use of speech.A good example of this was Carter’s letter to Somoza. In 1978, Somoza had made some minor steps to improve the human rights situation.Carter wanted to encourage these improvements through his letterwhich consisted of two equal parts. In the first three paragraphs, Carterpraised Somoza’s ‘steps towards respecting human rights’ as ‘important and heartening signs’ (in Somoza 1980, 144–145). In the last three para-graphs, Carter urged further improvements regarding a possible amnestyfor political prisoners, reform of the electoral system, and the ratifica-tion of the American Convention on Human Rights. Somoza, in his firstreaction, only noted the first three paragraphs and interpreted them asa sign of American support for him. In his book Nicaragua Betrayed he ddescribes that ‘(w)ith knowledge of the broad-based attack upon me andthe government of Nicaragua, the resulting emotional sensation wouldbe one of satisfaction’ (Somoza 1980, 145). However, later on he became aware of the second part, realizing that ‘Mr. Carter mentions “human
The Return of Democracy Promotion 63
rights” six times’ and perceived the letter as ‘his [Carter’s] vehicle forthe destruction of me and the government’ (Somoza 1980, 146). Theletter was a failure on any front: Somoza being on the verge of losinghis power perceived it as an attempt by the United States to removehim from power instead of an effort to encourage improvements inthe human rights situation. Robert Strong claims that Somoza ‘neversaw it (the letter) for what it was, a simple and straightforward messageendorsing and encouraging a few minor concessions made to the inter-national demands for greater attention to human rights in Nicaragua.Somoza missed the point’ (Strong 2000, 93).
In contrast to Carter, Reagan believed that such public statements were counterproductive and claimed to pursue ‘quiet diplomacy’, excepttoward unfriendly regimes like Nicaragua and Cuba, whose human rightsviolations were constantly shamed in public. However, the claim thatthe administration was pursuing quiet diplomacy with allied autocraciescannot, as Sikkink has pointed out, ‘be taken seriously. The administra-tion’s nonuse of a key tool of human rights policy – the symbolic powerof public comments by the president and his closest advisors – was inter-preted as a reversal, a desertion of that policy’ (Sikkink 2004, 179).
However, in 1983, some sporadic instances of public statementsor statements that were made public appeared, and this tendencybecame more frequent in Reagan’s second term. On human rights day in December 1984, Reagan expressed shame at the ‘lack of progresstoward democratic government in Chile and Paraguay’ as an ‘affrontto human consciences’ just before shaming Nicaragua (Reagan 1984a).Chile was increasingly singled out as a shameful case. In 1985, Reagan again voiced his concern over military rule in Chile. In 1986, the USinitiated a UN resolution which expressed concern over human rightsviolations in Chile and urged the regime to investigate these matters. In1987 Permanent Representative to the United Nations Walters stated inthe UN General Assembly that
the United States has concerns about the situation of human rights inChile; … We are particularly troubled by persistent reports of clandes-tine groups, allegedly containing members of the security forces, actingwith virtual impunity and carrying out abductions, torture, and even murder. The government must exert maximum effort to halt these acts and prosecute those responsible. (US Department of State 1988, 207)
The administration also protested limits of freedom of speech andassembly toward Paraguay and, as Abrams pointed out in 1987, urgedthe government ‘to allow the people of that country to join in Latin
64 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
America’s democratic wave’ (in Carothers 1994, 164). So slowly a policyshift was discernible which – as pointed out by Carothers – ‘was by nomeans a clear break, rather it was a gradual change of emphasis and atti-tude that took place from 1982 on’ (Carothers 1991, 132).
In conclusion, not only did the substantive framing of democracydevelop from the Carter to the Reagan administrations, but also thetypes of action to promote democracy. In 1977, democracy promotionskyrocketed from nil to an important foreign policy component. TheCarter administration radically changed US foreign policy and madefrequent use of negative conditionality, as well as identitive democracy promotion. This, however, declined in 1980 and the Carter adminis-tration increased military aid to human rights-violating authoritarian regimes like El Salvador and Honduras. This trend accelerated under theReagan administration. In the first one and a half years of Reagan’s term democracy promotion in Central and South America was absent. TheReagan administration did not make use of any instrument of democ-racy promotion, but instead resumed military aid on a large scale. Inlate 1982–1983 democracy promotion started to find its way back intoUS foreign policy in the region. The Reagan administration introduceddemocracy assistance which became its main instrument of democracypromotion, even though funding for it was still relatively low. Sporadic instances of negative conditionality and identitive democracy promo-tion appeared and became more frequent in 1984–1985, especiallytoward the remaining autocracies in the democratizing Southern coneof South America.
So, what explains this variance in the use of democracy promotionin US foreign policy toward Central and South America over time? Thisquestion will now be answered in the following two chapters.
While Central and South America had never been subject to direct NorthAmerican colonial rule as in the other two case studies of this book (theOttoman and European empires in the Middle East and North Africa), since the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries (G. Smith 1994) it hasnonetheless been seen as within the unquestioned sphere of influenceof the United States – the ‘unofficial empire’ (Poitras 1990, 106) – whereno foreign intervention was accepted. Material security interests behindthis claim to the hemisphere were manifold. The Caribbean and Centraland South America constitute the direct neighborhood of the UnitedStates which it wants to keep allied. The Caribbean and Central Americaespecially are often referred to as the ‘third and fourth border’ of theUnited States due to their geographic proximity. Connected to this is the interest to keep the sea lanes free, most importantly the Panama Canal.In addition, but maybe less importantly, the United States has military bases in Central America and imports some strategic raw materials likeoil, copper, and bauxite from the region and even though their amountdoes not seem vital to US security interests, George Kennan once calledthem ‘our raw materials’ (in P. H. Smith 2000, 126).
During the Cold War, however, the two most important securityinterests in the region became US standing and the containment of communism. US policymakers of all political backgrounds believed theUnited States could not afford a perception of weakness in the region(Schoultz 1987, 275) since the loss of only part of its unofficial empirewould imply a loss of face for the United States in the world. Carter’sNational Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed that a ‘loss would have widespread ramifications for ourselves, for others, for perceptionsof international affairs that intangibly merge (and inevitably so) withthe realities of international politics’ (Brzezinski 1985, 109). Similarly,
5 A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America
66 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Reagan’s first Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, believed that with the loss of allies, ‘everywhere our friends will have noted that the US cannot be counted on in times of difficulty and ourenemies will have observed that American support provides no securityagainst the forward march of history’ (Kirkpatrick 1979, 36).
Thus, when the region entered into a period of massive transforma-tion in the late 1970s, it turned into one of the key battlegrounds of theCold War. While the rapidly increasing calls for democracy and humanrights in the region provided an opportunity for democracy promotion,this transformation also provided opportunities for the promotion of communism. In 1979, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinskicommented on this when he stated at the Annual Convention of theInternational Platform Association that
We are living through an era of the most extensive and intensive polit-ical change in human history. Never before at one time have so many nations and peoples been subjected to so many political upheavals,to so many competing political ideologies, to so much rapid growth in mass political awareness. In truth, our generation is living through a genuine global political awakening. … As a result of this develop-ment, these internal conflicts pose opportunities and temptations forexternal interventions. (US Department of State 1983a, 46–47)
The genuine political awakening that could be noticed worldwide there-fore led to a decade of crisis, to the end of détente and a last peakingof the Cold War, now fought out in the developing world, notably in Central and South America. The region turned into ‘both a battlegroundand a prize in the conflict between communism and capitalism, East and West, the USSR and the United States’ (P. H. Smith 2000, 117) andthe two superpowers were drawn into a final competition which resultedin what Odd Arne Westad has called the great tragedy of the Cold War: ‘that two historical projects that were genuinely anticolonial in theirorigins, became part of a much older pattern of domination because of the intensity of their conflict, the stakes they believed were involved,and the almost apocalyptic fear of the consequences if the opponentwon’ (Westad 2007, 397).
The end of détente
Initially, when Jimmy Carter was elected president in 1976, the Cold War was still in a period of détente and in his inauguration speech Carter
A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America 67
remarked that ‘we are now free of that inordinate fear of communismwhich once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear’(Carter 1977e). In his 1978 State of the Union speech he still claimedthat for ‘the first time in a generation, we are not haunted by a majorinternational crisis or by domestic turmoil, and we now have a rare andpriceless opportunity to address persistent problems and burdens’ (Carter1978) – one of these being the promotion of human rights and demo-cratic freedoms. However, international crises and domestic turmoil –what Zbigniew Brzezinski was going to call an ‘Arc of Crisis’ – was to appear soon, as détente was coming to an end.
In the 1970s superpower interventionism concentrated on Africa,especially South Africa and the dissolving of the last Portuguese colo-nies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. In 1977the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened in the Ogaden War on the sideof Ethiopia, close to the strategically important Gulf region. This inter-ventionism, however, began to ‘hit home’ only in 1979, when therevolutionary Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) ousted US ally Somoza from power in Nicaragua. While Carter initially metDaniel Ortega – the head of the FSLN – and transferred 75 million US dollars (USD) in aid to the Sandinistas,1 the administration nonethelesssoon got conclusive evidence of Sandinista support for the Salvadoranguerillas which was perceived as a breaking of rules of conduct, notleast since the FSLN also concluded trade agreements with the USSR and invited East German and Cuban military advisers to their country. Subsequently, aid to Nicaragua stopped and relations deteriorated. Inthe United States, the Carter administration was criticized for having‘actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendlyto American interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persua-sion’ (Kirkpatrick 1979). Nicaragua was seen as a precedent, a first falling domino in a highly unstable neighborhood with insurgencies on therise in other Central American countries like Guatemala, Honduras, andEl Salvador. As Table 5.1 shows, civil wars in Central and South America were rapidly increasing and the resulting instability was perceived as aresult of or at least an opportunity for a communist subversion of the US neighborhood.
Threat perceptions took on hysteric dimensions with the Iranian revo-lution. The fall of the Shah in January 1979, the rise to power of AyatollahKhomeini, and the taking of American hostages led to one of the biggestcrises in the United States which ‘absorbed more concentrated effortby American officials and had more extensive coverage on televisionand in the press than any other event since World War II, including the
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Vietnam war’ (G. Smith 1986, 198). The turning point, however, camewith the massive Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in December 1979which was perceived in the United States as an outright act of aggressionand a clear violation of international law – thus as a breaking of rules of bounded competition. In the eyes of the United States, the Soviet Unionhad crossed a red line and Carter saw this as the ‘most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War’ (Carter 1980a).
While the president had still claimed in 1979 when referring to theNicaraguan revolution that it is ‘a mistake for Americans to assume or toclaim that every time evolutionary changes take place, or even an abruptchange takes place in this hemisphere, that somehow it’s the result of secret, massive Cuban intervention’ (Carter 1979a), in 1980 he began tocaution that ‘Central America and the Caribbean region are undergoinga period of rapid social and political change. There is a threat that inter-vention by Cuba may thwart the desire of the people of the region forprogress within a democratic framework’ (Carter 1980b). He called onCongress to help him ‘to stop the encroachment of Cuban-engenderedcommunism throughout Central America and the Caribbean’ (Carter1980c). As a result we can observe a clear policy change in 1980 away from democracy and human rights promotion, notably in the case of ElSalvador as has already been mentioned in Chapter 4. It was in 1980–1981, after the assassination of Archbishop Óscar Romero by death squads with violence escalating in the country and 28,000 persons being killed in a ‘strategy of mass murder’ (Stanley 1996, 222–225) that PresidentCarter increased military aid and even included lethal weapons in mili-tary supplies to the allied regime, a support which would then skyrocketwhen Ronald Reagan was elected president.
Table 5.1 Civil wars in Central and South America 1977–1988
Civil wars Years Persons killed
Guatemala vs. Leftists 1978–1984 73,000Nicaragua vs. Sandinistas 1978–1979 35,000El Salvador vs. Salvadorian
Democratic Front1979–1992 25,000
Peru vs. Shining Path 1982–1995 30,000Nicaragua vs. Contras 1982–1990 43,000Colombia vs. Drug Lords 1984–today 31,000
Source : Table created by author based on data from Correlates of War (2010).
(Apart from these civil wars, there was the Peru-Ecuador War of 1981, the Falkland Islands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom of 1982 and the US invasion of Grenada in 1983).
A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America 69
The representation of the other as an existential threat
Threat perceptions heightened when Ronald Reagan entered the WhiteHouse. The USSR, as well as its allied states such as Cuba, were repre-sented as existential threats to the United States which justified extraor-dinary means that did not only cross moral, but also legal, borders.
Reagan argued in his State of the Union address, it ‘isn’t a nutmegthat’s at stake in the Caribbean and Central America. It is the US nationalsecurity’ (Reagan 1983a). Threat perceptions of the Reagan administra-tion were heavily influenced by the symbolic threat that communism –Reagan usually referred to it as ‘Marxism-Leninism’ – represented to theUS value system. Wolff observes that the ‘Right’s demonization of the Soviet economic system also represents its fascination with what wasso utterly opposite to its own teaching’ (Wolff 1998, 224), namely theminimal state. Reagan, for example, urged to ‘let us be aware that whilethey [the communists] preach the supremacy of the state, declare itsomnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual dominationof all peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modernworld’ (Reagan 1983b).
For the administration, democracy became a synonym for peace,communism for war. Secretary of State Shultz, for example, claimed at the General Assembly of the OAS in 1982 – that is, before the democratic peace theory became a paradigm – that ‘(w)e also know that democra-cies are far less likely to go to war than governments whose leaders neednot obtain the consent of their people’ (US Department of State 1985b, 1284). 2 Similarly, Reagan in a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1985, maintained that ‘(f)ree people whose governments rest upon theconsent of the governed do not wage war on their neighbors’ (Reagan 1985b). In the same speech he stated that ‘it’s difficult for us to under-stand the restrictions of dictatorships which seek to control each insti-tution and every facet of people’s lives – the expression of their beliefs,their movements, and their contacts with the outside world’ and cameup with a Marxist-Leninist war theory in opposition to the democraticpeace theory:
In Afghanistan, there are 118,000 Soviet troops prosecuting waragainst the Afghan people. In Cambodia, 140,000 Soviet-backedVietnamese soldiers wage a war of occupation. In Ethiopia, 1,700 Soviet advisers are involved in military planning and support opera-tions along with 2,500 Cuban combat troops. In Angola, 1,200 Sovietmilitary advisers involved in planning and supervising combat
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operations along with 35,000 Cuban troops. In Nicaragua, some 8,000 Soviet-bloc and Cuban personnel, including about 3,500 military andsecret police personnel. All of these conflicts … share a common char-acteristic: They are the consequence of an ideology imposed fromwithout, dividing nations and creating regimes that are … at war withtheir own people. And in each case, Marxism-Leninism’s war with the people becomes war with their neighbors. (Reagan 1985b, italics added)
Since, however, allied autocracies also were involved in wars, internal suppression and human rights violations, a line had to be drawn between communism which was named totalitarian and autocracies seen as‘less repressive’, ‘more susceptible of liberalization’, and ‘more compat-ible with US interests’ (Kirkpatrick 1979). They were seen as the betteralternative to democracy for societies in Central and South Americasince the administration believed that they were inherently undemo-cratic and would transform into totalitarian states when given a choice. Jimmy Carter, as Kirkpatrick, for example, argued, had ‘failed to takeaccount of basic characteristics of Latin political systems. … . Violenceor the threat of violence is an integral, regular, predictable part of thesepolitical systems – a fact which is obscured by our way of describingmilitary “interventions” in Latin political systems as if the systems werenormally peaceable. Coups, demonstrations, political strikes, plots, andcounterplots are, in fact, the norm’ (Kirkpatrick 1981). 3
Based on these beliefs we can observe an increase in threat percep-tions when Reagan assumed power. For Secretary of State Shultz, CentralAmerica had moved to the ‘center stage on the already crowded globalarena’ (US Department of State 1985b, 1245) and become the hotspot of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ subversion. The basis for foreign policy of the Reaganadministration toward Central America was the report of the NationalBipartisan Commission on Central America – also called the KissingerCommission – which claimed that Central America ‘was becoming aMarxist-Leninist lake’ and that never ‘before has the Republic been insuch a jeopardy from its exposed southern flank’ (Kissinger 1984). While the report found that the turmoil in the region had indigenous roots,it argued that ‘Central America’s predicament has been brought to a head by the confluence of Soviet-Cuban intervention and internationaleconomic recession’ (US Department of State 1986a, 1009) and that ‘theCubans, Soviets and Nicaraguan Sandinistas are engaged in a serious andsubstantial effort to promote Marxist-Leninist revolution in the region’(US Department of State 1986a, 1012).
Extraordinary threat perceptions justified extraordinary means. Between 1981 and 1989, El Salvador received almost 1 billion USD
A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America 71
in military and about 2.6 billion USD in economic aid (USAID 2009).The Reagan administration sent military advisers to El Salvador and provided training to its army, notably also to the infamous Atlacatlbattalion responsible for the massacre of El Mozote in 1981, in which itslaughtered virtually all inhabitants of the village, including children,after torturing and raping them. Also in Grenada, two days after a coup against the non-aligned Maurice Bishop by the Stalinist Coard factionin 1983, the United States invaded the island in Operation UrgentFury arguing that US students on the island had to be saved, that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States felt threatened by the newgovernment and had requested military intervention by the US, and that the intervention was ‘a joint effort to restore order and democracyon the island of Grenada’ (Reagan 1983c).4 However, the most extraor-dinary means taken, at least from a legal point of view, happened in relation to Nicaragua. The United States started to fund and militarilyequip the Contras which consisted of former members of the NationalGuard and other anti-Sandinistas leading a guerilla fight against the Sandinistas from neighboring Honduras.5 When after the mining of the harbor of Corinto an outraged Congress cut off all assistance to theContras and also prohibited the solicitation of third parties to fund theContras, the administration sought new ways of funding them, secretlysold weapons to Iran in the midst of the Iran–Iraq war, and, in turn, provided part of the proceeds to supply the Contras with weapons inviolation of Congressional legislation. This became known as the Iran–Contra Affair in the wake of which 14 members of the administrationwere indicted, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane,and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and HumanitarianAffairs Elliott Abrams.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, but especially from 1987 onwards, threatperceptions slowly started to decline. This was, first, due to the transfor-mations of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay which boosted confidencein the United States that democratizations did not necessarily end incommunism and democracy was the wave of the future (see Chapter 6).Second, the administration witnessed increasing protests in EasternEurope, as well as a severe economic crisis in the USSR. In an addressbefore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1985, Secretary of State Shultz argued that
Today – the supreme irony – it is the Communist system that looks bankrupt, morally as well as economically. The West is resilient and resurgent. … And on every continent, from Nicaragua to Cambodia,
72 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
from Poland to South Africa, to Afghanistan, we see that the yearningfor freedom is the most powerful political force all across the planet.So, as we head toward the 21st century, it is time for the democraciesto celebrate their system, their beliefs, and their successes. … History is on freedom’s side. (US Department of State 1986b, 7–8)
But even though this led to increased optimism, Reagan recalls that ‘inthe spring of 1987 we were still facing a lot of uncertainty regarding the Soviets: Gorbachev had announced his new programs of perestroika andglasnost and it was evident something was up in the Soviet Union, but westill didn’t know what it was’ (Reagan 1999, 662). In 1988, Reagan read Gorbachev’s book Perestroika, concluding that it was ‘a bill of particulars condemning the workings of Communism’ and an ‘epitaph: Capitalismhad triumphed over Communism’ (Reagan 1999, 680). But not only the‘rapid changes we were then beginning to see in the domestic life of the Soviet Union under perestroika and glasnost … gave the Free World reason to feel optimistic at the start of 1988: Gorbachev would soonannounce his decision to pull out of Afghanistan after eight years of abrutal war’ (Reagan 1999, 680). In the same year the USSR also decisivelyreduced military and economic aid to Nicaragua. Thus, in late 1987 and 1988, threat perceptions declined at last.
What can be concluded from this overview? First, it could be observed that low threat perceptions indeed enabled democracy promotion inthe first place when Carter incorporated human rights and democraticfreedoms into his foreign policy agenda. When threat perceptions grewagain with the end of détente and increasing instability in CentralAmerica, democracy promotion was initially driven back: the Carteradministration diverted from its negative conditionality approachtoward Central America and increased military aid in 1980–1981, a trendthat skyrocketed under the Reagan administration. However, Reagan also started to take first steps toward democracy promotion in late 1982and this agenda further increased in the mid-1980s, that is, when threatperceptions were abounding. Thus, low threat perceptions enableddemocracy promotion in the very beginning – even though they cannot explain the push for democracy promotion in the later 1970s – but then lost their independent effect on US foreign policy later on. What thenexplains the push toward democracy promotion in the later 1970s andthe gradual shift in US foreign policy that is discernible again from 1982 onwards, high threat perceptions notwithstanding?
The decade of crisis just described also had a normative side to it: with thepolitical awakening, human rights norms increased rapidly, and democ-racy began its unprecedented advance to become the standard form of governance in the Americas. This chapter starts out by tracking the pullthis normative change had on the United States before it analyzes theimpact of the internal democratic transformation in the United Stateson the evolution of a democratic role identity in foreign policy.
International normative change and its pull on the United States
Before 1978, as Larry Diamond has argued, ‘dictatorship, not democ-racy, was the way of the world’ (Diamond 2008a, 7). In Latin America, only three countries had democratic systems of governance before 1978: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. The wave of (re)democratizationswas then led by Ecuador (1978–1989), Peru (1979–1980), Honduras(1980–1982), Bolivia (1982), El Salvador (1982–1984), Argentina (1983),Uruguay (1984), Brazil (1985), Guatemala (1985), Chile (1988–1990),and Paraguay (1989–1990). In 1990, Cuba and Haiti were the only coun-tries that were considered undemocratic in the region. Figure 6.1 showsthis trend in percentages for the Americas, as well as worldwide, based on the Freedom House Index. In the Americas, the number of democra-cies reached one third of all regimes when Carter assumed office. The50 per cent threshold was passed in 1983 and during the observed timeperiod the number of democracies never fell below it; to the contrary, democracy constantly accelerated between 1983 and 1988 and even
6 The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity and Its Activation in a Grand Foreign Policy Debate
74 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
reached a peak of constituting more than two thirds of all regimes in 1987. On the worldwide level, democracies passed the threshold of a third of all regimes in 1985 and never fell below this threshold again. Democracy entered an acceleration phase, but never passed the 50 per cent threshold in the observed time period (1977–1988). Thus, democracy emerged asa standard form of governance in the Americas at the beginning of theCarter administration, and it became standard and cascaded there in the second term of Reagan’s presidency, when democracy also emerged as astandard form of governance on the worldwide level.
Free Partly free Not free
Free Partly free Not free
Figure 6.1 Freedom House Index for the (a) Americas and (b) worldwide by numbers of countries, 1973–2014
Source : Figure created by author based on data from Freedom House (2014a).
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 75
In addition to the growth of democracy to standard form of govern-ance, the right to democracy and civil and political rights also advancedin international law. In 1976, the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR) entered into force. Being more precise than theUN Charter of 1945, the ICCPR also ‘shifted the focus, from “peoples” topersons and from decolonization to personal political participatory enti-tlements in independent nations’ (Franck 2000, 34). Figure 6.2 showsthe increasing commonality of the ICCPR: the first 35 states signedit in 1976, it passed the one-third threshold in 1978, the 50-per-centthreshold in 1986, and the two-thirds threshold in 1993. Today it issigned by more than 80 per cent of all UN Member States. Thus, from1978 on, the norm entered into an acceleration phase. Many of thesignatories do not actually implement the norm, but are nonethelessattesting to the growth of the norm by seeking to be an accepted part of the international community through signing the convention.
In the Americas the right to democracy has a long trail. In the Treaty of Peace and Friendship emanating from the Conference of Washington in1907, Central American governments decided not to recognize govern-ments which had emerged through force instead of elections (Munoz1998, 3). Since then democracy was repeatedly mentioned in inter-American conferences. In 1948 the Pan-American Treaty of the Charterof the Organization of American States (OAS) was signed. The Charter
Figure 6.2 Commonality of ICCPR in per cent of UN Member States
Source : Figure created by author based on data from OHCHR (2006).
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proclaims that one of the aims of the organization is ‘to promote andconsolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non-intervention’ (OAS 1948, Art. 2). However, as democracy was notfurther defined or specified, this represented a weak appearance of thenorm. At the same meeting in 1948, the American Declaration of theRights and Duties of Man was adopted. It mentions civil and politicalrights more extensively and clearly than the Charter, but is not legallybinding. Nonetheless, it is a legal source for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights until today, even though the more extensive American Convention on Human Rights displaced it. The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1969 and entered into force in 1978.It is more precise than the Charter and the Declaration and protectsfreedom of thought and expression, assembly, association, and of partic-ipation in government. The commonality of the Convention is shownin Figure 6.3. In 1977 it accelerated and reached a status of formal acceptance by more than two thirds of all states. In 1979 the humanrights regime was also strengthened through the establishment of theInter-American Court of Human Rights.
The acceleration of human rights norms and the right to democracywas also reflected in other developments in the Americas. In 1977 a resolution was passed which condemned the human rights record of the Somoza regime. This resolution was approved by other human
Figure 6.3 Commonality of American Convention on Human Rights in per cent of OAS Member States
Source : Figure created by author based on data from OAS (2009).
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 77
rights-violating regimes (except for Paraguay and Nicaragua itself)which showed that there was a growing necessity to be seen as an actorsensitive to these rights. The human rights reports of the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights started to play a more important role(Farer 1998, 59; Harris 1998, 20) and there was a growing sense of collec-tive commitment on the part of the OAS membership to become involvedin the promotion of democracy on a state-specific basis (A. F. Cooper2006, 24–25). This trend augmented when Argentina, as well as Braziland Uruguay, democratized. In the 1980s the reformers of Argentina,Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Mexico initi-ated ‘a veritable carousel of bilateral and subregional summit meetings’(Raymont 2005, 249–250) and a momentum developed which had been dormant in South America for a long time. It represented a peak of whatKacowicz calls the ‘strong, long-lasting, and under-studied tradition of formal support for democracy and human rights in the region’ (Kacowicz 2005, 62). In 1985 the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in Colombia wasadopted as an amendment to the OAS charter: in the preamble repre-sentative democracy was now called ‘an indispensable condition for thestability, peace, and development in the region’ and one of purposes of the OAS ‘to promote and consolidate representative democracy, withdue respect for the principle of nonintervention’ (OAS 1985). With this step democracy promotion became an explicit purpose of the OAS whichwas reiterated in the resolutions of the following years. In 1986, at theOAS General Assembly Meeting in Guatemala, several resolutions wereadopted which urged the concerned governments ‘to contribute deci-sively to improving the human rights situation and to strengtheningthe representative and pluralistic democratic system’ (OAS GeneralAssembly 1986).1 Besides the OAS, there was a second organization, the Rio Group – founded in 1986 by the Contadora Group of Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, and Colombia, as well as the Support Group of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay – that became active in supporting democratization. Both developments show that the right to democracywas not simply exported to the region, but developed within the regionitself (Legler and Tieku 2010; Lutz and Sikkink 2000, 255–256). Thus, inthe later 1970s, not only did democracy start its advance to the standardform of governance, but a right to democracy and human rights normsalso entered into an acceleration phase. After 1985, as Risse and Sikkink have argued, ‘we can say that the world began a process of a genuineinternational “norms cascade”, as the influence of international human rights norms spread rapidly’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 21). These devel-opments did not leave the foreign policy of democracies untouched.
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Indeed, they provided a pull on their democratic role identities which will now be discussed in the remainder of this section.
Throughout his presidency, Carter named the growth of humanrights norms and of democracy as motivations for his foreign policy.In his inaugural speech, Carter noted that the ‘passion for freedom ison the rise’ and that the ‘world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Tapping this new spirit, there can be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day of a new beginning than to helpshape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane’ (Carter 1977e). In his Notre Dame speech he argued that
we can already see dramatic, worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state. For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in theworld. … Throughout the world today, in free nations and in totali-tarian countries as well, there is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights. (Carter 1977a)
Carter saw this as the ‘wave of the future’ and ‘wanted the United Statesto be on the crest of this movement’ (Carter 1982, 144), not least sincehe also believed that in supporting this trend the US ‘interest is served’since ‘we are also strengthening our ability to compete effectively withthe Soviet Union’ (Carter 1980b). Thus for Carter it was a strategic priorityto take the lead of this wave. This was confirmed by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher who noted in 1978 at the American BarAssociation that ‘(o)ur idealism and our self-interest coincide. Wideningthe circle of countries which share our human rights values is at the verycore of our security interests’ (US Department of State 1983b, 419) andNational Security Advisor Brzezinski who claimed in 1978 that
This is the wave of the present. … It is very important to be identifiedwith it … Today, these ideas are becoming universal in their appeal,and it is, therefore, just and right, morally correct, historically well-grounded and politically useful … for the United States to carry highthe standard of human rights, for we are then in the forefront of a powerful movement … And we gain from it. (US Department of State1983b, 430–431)
The administration also gained confidence that democracy, not commu-nism, was the way of the future. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance remarkedthat ‘(o)ur belief is strengthened by the way the Helsinki principles and the
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 79
U.N. Declaration of Human Rights have found resonance in the hearts of people of many countries’ (Vance 1977) or in 1979 that Americans ‘gain confidence from this expansion of democracy which is taking place not because we force it but because of its inherent appeal’ (US Department of State 1983b, 44). Finally, the administration inferred a right to promote democracy and human rights from this wave. Carter argued at the United Nations that ‘no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreat-ment of its citizens is solely its own business’ and that, equally, ‘no membercan avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwar-ranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world’ (Carter 1977g).
This changed, however, when the Reagan administration came to power. Based on a generally suspicious attitude toward international law in general and human rights norms in particular, the administrationnever mentioned such norms in relation to its democracy promotionpolicies. In addition and also in contrast to the Carter administration,the Reagan administration displayed less confidence that the growth of democracy to the standard form of governance would be stable; democ-ratizing states were rather seen as liabilities since the United States wouldhave to make sure these were to remain on track. In 1983, Secretary of State Shultz noted at the Council of the Americas that
Latin America’s long experience with authoritarian rule is gradu-ally ending. … . In fact, 20 of 30 members of the OAS are constitu-tional democracies – and some of the others, including Argentina,Brazil, and Uruguay, are moving toward democratic systems … As the President has repeatedly emphasized, security assistance is an essen-tial shield for democratization, economic development, and diplo-macy. (US Department of State 1985b, 1245–1247)
Similarly, Reagan stated that
Either we help America’s friends defend themselves and give democ-racy a chance, or we abandon our responsibilities and let the SovietUnion and Cuba shape the destiny of our hemisphere. … In our ownhemisphere, 26 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean areeither democracies or formally embarked on a democratic transition. This represents 90 per cent of the region’s population, up from under 50 per cent a decade ago. (Reagan 1984b)
Thus, in the early 1980s, there was not yet a belief in the independentstrength of these democratizations. They were seen as positive, but also
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as a strategic liability by the Reagan administration. The same, however, increasingly applied to authoritarian regimes. When ‘dictators fell oneafter another … the administration … began to shift gears, at first imper-ceptibly – beginning with the restoration of human rights as a standardfor good relations with Washington’ (Raymont 2005, 249–250; see also Carothers 1991, 132). Only in 1987, that is, when democracies hadpassed the two-thirds threshold in the Americas, can we observe thatthe Reagan administration had taken confidence in this wave of democ-ratization, appreciating less its inherent value for Central and SouthAmerica, but rather its value as representing the victory of the United States over communism. In 1987, Secretary of State Shultz argued that
Contrary to predictions of just a few years ago, the percentage of LatinAmerica’s population living under freely elected governments has grown from 30% in 1979 to more than 90% today … All this reflects that thegreat ideological struggle that has marked this century ever since theBolshevik revolution of 1917 has essentially been decided. In the contest between the Western values of democracy and individual freedoms andSoviet-style, party-dominated centralized collectivism, the trend is in our favor, and it’s clear. … The battle of ideas will doubtless continue, butwe have the winning hand. (US Department of State 1988, 2)
In conclusion, neither growing human rights norms nor the initialadvance of democracies in South America had a normative pull on theReagan administration; democratizing states were seen as liabilities in thebeginning – as much as autocracies which were increasingly perceived as unstable. This explains why the preferred path of democracy promotionfor the Reagan administration was transition to electoral democracysteered by the United States. This was different for the Carter adminis-tration. Here a clear strategic pull to insert these norms into US foreignpolicy was observable. They are one of the explanations why democracypromotion was incorporated into US foreign policy again. Given thevariance between the Carter and Reagan administrations, however, theycannot be the sufficient factor. Rather, what might make the difference if these norms have a pull or not might be a given identity which the following section will examine.
The civil rights movement, a democratic transformation,and its spillover into US foreign policy
Americans perceive their nation as the democratic nation – ‘the standard bearer of democratic values on the stage of world history’ (Keyssar 2000,
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 81
xv). This idea was already voiced by Abraham Lincoln in his Addressat Independence Hall in 1861 when he stated that the Declaration of Independence ‘gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but, I hope, to the world, for all future time’ (Lincoln 1861). When the United States entered the world stage in the early 20th century, this self-perception had important consequences for its foreign policy, specifi-cally in times of rapid advances in American democracy itself when anincreased consciousness for democratic values often spilled over intoforeign policy. This applies for Woodrow Wilson’s policy of ‘the New Freedom’ (Grimes 1960, 394) as well as President Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ (Burley 1993) whose very logics were transported to the international level. More than anything, however, this applies to the grand last trans-formation of US democracy in the wake of the civil rights movementwhich will now be discussed.
Internal democratic values in the United States changed immensely inthe decades before 1977. The African-American civil rights movement –one of the ‘pivotal moments in US political history’ (Skocpol 2007,46) – achieved milestones in democratic improvements in the UnitedStates, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawing racial segregationin public facilities, as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965 abolishingthe literacy voting tests for African Americans and outlawing gerryman-dering. Besides its legal achievements, the civil rights movement alsohad important consequences for civic culture in the United States. It ledto an ‘explosion of moral passion’ (Patterson 2001, 210) with the totalnumber of US national associations expanding rapidly (Skocpol 2007,42). 2 The increasing rights consciousness in the United States moti-vated political activism in other issue areas such as women’s rights, gay rights, environmental rights, and human rights. Indeed, these develop-ments were examples of the Tocqueville paradox: as soon as some rights strengthened, the consciousness for remaining injustices was sharpened.Pierson observes that advocacy groups ‘were able to advance their goalsby arguing that their analogous situation warranted a similar response’(Pierson 2007, 27). This phenomenon also applied to foreign policy. Shafer even claims that ‘the substantive breakup of the old era waseasiest to recognized in foreign affairs, where the cold war consensusdisintegrated’ (Shafer 2001, 237).
The new activism in foreign policy was spearheaded by the anti-Vietnam War movement which was closely linked to the civil rights movement. 3 Soon other causes such as human rights in Central andSouth America and the fight against apartheid in South Africa followed.In the 1960s, new human rights NGOs emerged which – thanks totheir links to activists in Central and South America – could provide
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detailed information on the human rights violations of allied autocraticregimes so exposing the dissonance between the US internal democraticcharacter and its undemocratic external foreign policy which oftenviolated – directly or indirectly – democratic freedoms and human rights in Central and South America. It made a dissonance between self-image and foreign policy explicit, visible, and known. In addition, these NGOsalso became an important transmission belt to transport human rightsinto Congressional foreign policy approaches. They started to lobbyCongress in the early 1970s and represented a counterweight to business lobbyists, chambers of commerce, and lobbies that were paid by Centraland South American governments. Schoultz claims that by 1977 ‘thecombined interest groups concerned with the repression of humanrights in Latin America had become one of the largest, most active, andmost visible foreign policy lobbying forces in Washington’ (Schoultz 1981, 75). However, they did not only remain lobbies, but became activists in the parties or in Congress itself. Shafer argues that parties‘were now effectively networks of issue-oriented political activists’ andtheir support ‘was now essential to mounting campaigns and gainingpublic office: they were the party in the operational sense’ (Shafer 2001,238). Subsequently Congress became a motor for human rights legisla-tion especially after the US involvement in the overthrow of SalvadorAllende, as well as the Watergate scandal. It started to introduce human rights clauses into foreign assistance acts and became increasingly asser-tive toward the president in seeing that Congressional legislation wasnot violated.
Carter tapped into this new spirit of foreign policy when he campaignedfor infusing human rights and democratic principles into the US foreignpolicy agenda. From his perspective, this seemed not only the right,but also the smart, thing to do. It could unite the Democratic Partyand Congress behind him: the factions that were fighting for humanrights in Latin America, as well as the factions that deplored détenteand demanded a more human rights-oriented policy toward the SovietUnion, perhaps most notably Democratic Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson. Dumbrell observes that with human rights, Carter could ‘restore unityto the fragmented Democratic party coalition … Labor, blacks, women, Jewish people, environmentalists, Southerners, big-city politicos: theyall appeared to be pulling apart’ (Dumbrell 1995, 20). But they wereunited on human rights and so Carter’s human rights campaign gener-ated consensus in the Democratic Party. Furthermore, the policy reflected the rights consciousness in the US population. Carter could also win thesupport of the women’s movement, of former anti-war activists, and of
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 83
the huge new constituencies that had been created by the Civil Rightsand Voting acts and were highly conscious of the rights agenda. Infact, Carter won 94 per cent of the black vote (Dumbrell 1995, 88) eventhough, as Graham notes, ‘(c)ivil rights issues neither played a major role in Carter’s 1976 election campaign nor found a significant place onhis legislative agenda’ (Graham 1998, 204). But where civil rights didplay a major role in Carter’s campaign was in the field of foreign policy:in his support of majority rule in South Africa and his promotion of human rights in Latin America.
Already in 1973, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who would become NationalSecurity Adviser under President Carter, observed that American societyhad ‘undergone a significant change in its social values’ (Brzezinski 1973,713) and that a traditional foreign policy was ‘incapable of tapping the moral resources of the American people’ (Brzezinski 1973, 719). PresidentCarter focused his election campaign in regard to foreign policy on therestoration of American morality, because – as he said in an interview –he felt that ‘it was time for our country to hold a beacon light of some-thing pure and decent and right and proper that would rally our citizensto a cause’ (Carter 1977h). In his memoirs, Carter recalls that when hestarted to raise the issue of human rights in his election campaign, theimpressive feedback he received made him believe that ‘human rightshad become a central theme of our foreign policy in the minds of thepress and the public. It seemed that a spark had been ignited and I hadno inclination to douse the growing flames’ (Carter 1982, 145). Mainly,during the election campaign and the first year of his presidency, Carter mentioned American values as a direct trigger of his administration’sapproach to foreign policy in a majority of foreign policy speeches.
In his first major foreign policy speech at Notre Dame University,entitled ‘A Democratic Foreign Policy’, he claimed that ‘I believe wecan have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on funda-mental values’ and that ‘(o)ur policy is rooted in our moral values’ (Carter 1977e). For Carter, human rights were ‘a part of the Americanconsciousness. These kinds of commitments that I share with all otherAmericans make it almost inevitable that our country will be a leader in the world in standing up for the same principles on which ourNation was founded’ (Carter 1977f). Especially in the beginning of theCarter presidency, a spillover effect can be observed: the civil rightsagenda was transported into foreign policy and the central push fordemocracy promotion had thus come from the internal democratic transformation in the United States which was further supported bythe parallel advance of international human rights norms. Concretely,
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these norms could pull on the Carter administration since its demo-cratic identity was consistent with them.
This, however, differed in the case of the Reagan administration.The new rights consciousness in the United States had brought manytopics from the domestic to the public life – for example in the areasof women’s rights, abortion rights, sexuality, and poverty – which were not only morally heavily loaded and polarized the society (Pierson 2007,35), but also had to be guaranteed through increased state activism andsocial engineering (Pierson and Skocpol 2007, 4),4 thus anathema for many conservatives and their conception of democracy. They perceived government as the problem, not the solution, and tended more to a structural concept of democracy than to a rights-oriented one. Thishad implications for foreign policy in two respects. First, when theReagan administration did start to promote democracy in Central and South America, it focused on promoting electoral democracy instead of human rights. Secondly, by focusing on electoral components, Reagancould depart from Carter’s approach of perfecting American democ-racy through foreign policy, 5 and instead celebrate the United Statesas an ‘exemplar’ democracy again. As Ish-Shalom has pointed out, bystressing structural attributes of democracy, ‘it is easier to limit the scopeof democracy to one’s own country and not to be overly concerned about the rights of foreigners outside one’s country, that is, outsideone’s own structure of democracy’ (Ish-Shalom 2006, 461). Thus, theswitch of ‘normative caps’ regarding conceptions of democracy thattook place from the Carter to the Reagan administration also explainsReagan’s abandonment of democracy promotion in his foreign policy in Central and South America in the very beginning of his presidency. While this can all explain what pushed the Carter administration topromote democracy, it still remains unclear why Reagan incorporated democracy promotion again in US foreign policy in late 1982/early1983, when threat perceptions were abounding and Reagan was neitherpushed by the growth of human rights norms and of democracies in theinternational arena, nor by the transformation of US democratic valuesin the domestic one.
The democratic role identity strikes back
Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy had flowed from a transformation of US internal democratic identity, but it also fed back into it. With hisforeign policy, Carter had unearthed an American role identity which had been buried under Cold War politics. As Jacobo Timerman – the
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 85
Argentinean journalist and human rights activist – noted: ‘Whata human rights policy does is save lives. And Jimmy Carter’s policydid. How many? I don’t know. Two thousand? Is that enough? Butthe policy is even more important to you than to us. It builds up ademocratic consciousness in the United States’ (in Sikkink 2004, xx, italicsadded). Carter’s policy had helped to foster a consciousness regarding questions of proper conduct of foreign policy and so raised the expec-tations for his successor. In this way Reagan’s attempt to return to Cold War realpolitik was seriously hampered: it was not an acceptedpolicy option anymore. This even more so since a network of actors consisting of transnational NGOs linked to members of Congress andUS media made public the extent of human rights violations in whichReagan’s policy was complicit. At first Reagan tried to pay lip service todemocracy promotion only, but was increasingly forced to set up andimplement his own vision of a democratic foreign policy – a conserva-tive companion to liberal internationalism. This section will now, first,observe the degree to which a democratic role identity had alreadybecome robust in the United States through its institutionalization andpublic support for it, before it will turn to the actual arguing process –one of the great US foreign policy debates – in the course of which the Reagan administration was increasingly trapped into a democratic roleidentity.
The robustness of the new-found US democratic role identity
As has been pointed out before, democratic ideals had already started tofind their way back into foreign policy through the increased interfer-ence of Congress in foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s.Sikkink observes that in the 1970s ‘policy makers began to question theprincipled idea that a country’s internal human rights practices are not alegitimate topic of foreign policy and the causal assumption that nationalinterests are furthered by support of repressive regimes that violate thehuman rights of their citizens’ (Sikkink 1993, 140). The Subcommitteeon International Organizations and Movements became active inCongress and two Congressional members stood out in their commit-ment to insert human rights into US foreign policy in Latin America:Donald Fraser and Edward Kennedy.6 They were decisive in linking tran-snationally acting NGOs and local victims of human rights violationsto Congress, providing information, and shaping foreign policy debate.The instruments Congress had at its disposal for influencing foreignpolicy were cutting or suspending military and economic aid. First human rights clauses had already appeared in the Foreign Assistance
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Acts of 1964 and 1966. Congress started with legally unbinding ‘it is inthe sense of Congress’ statements. 7
After the overthrow of Allende and the Watergate scandal Congressbecame more assertive with legally binding amendments. In 1974, theJackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act was passed which denied countries that limited emigration most-favored-nation status. Mostimportantly for Latin America, in 1975 the Harkin amendment to theForeign Assistance Act was passed which determined that no assistance
may be provided … to the government of any country which engagesin consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognizedhuman rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degradingtreatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, orother flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy peoplein such country. (in Salzberg and Young 1977, 272)
While this amendment provided a much clearer definition, it stillleft some loopholes open regarding ‘consistent’ pattern, ‘gross’ viola-tions, and ‘needy people’. Such a loophole can also be found in the 1976 amendment to the Security Assistance and Arms Export ControlAct which states that it is ‘the policy of the United States that, exceptunder circumstances specified in this section, no security assistancemay be provided to any country the government of which engages in aconsistent pattern of gross violations of fundamental human rights’ (inSchoultz 1981, 254). The ‘except circumstances’ meant that the Presidenthad to certify extraordinary circumstances to Congress.
Furthermore, Congress set out to institutionalize the issue of humanrights in foreign policy by introducing the position of Coordinator forHuman Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the US Department of Statein 1976. In 1977 this position was upgraded to Assistant Secretary of State and Congress determined that AID officials had to consult withthe Bureau of Human Rights to check if a country was eligible to receiveassistance. Since 1976 the Department of State has had to submit annualCountry Reports on Human Rights Practices to Congress, and since 1977 the Secretary of State has had to report to Congress on the humanrights situations in countries receiving aid. Thus, already in the 1970ssome means to promote democracy emerged, were anchored in law, and became increasingly precise, even though loopholes still existed.
Carter further strengthened the Bureau of Human Rights andHumanitarian Affairs and increased its staff from two to twenty persons.
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 87
He appointed a determined civil rights activist – Patricia Derian – Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights to defend the new foreign policy agenda against foreign service officials, notably in the Bureauof Inter-American Affairs, which was hostile to the new human rightsagenda and did not view it as an appropriate foreign policy issue (Sikkink 2004, 144). Derian had direct access to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance, and participated in the Interagency Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance within the State Department – the so-called Christopher Group. In each bureau of the State Department, humanrights officers were appointed and all these bureaucratic changes werecompared by Mark Schneider – deputy to Patricia Derian – to acupunc-ture ‘in that each of these individual developments is a needle inserted into the decision making process’ (Schneider 1979, 263). The Bureauof Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs became the avant-garde inchanging the foreign policy culture of the State Department. Its highlydetermined personnel assumed such a high profile as the guardian of this policy that the Reagan administration at first aimed at dismantling the office altogether.
With Ernest Lefever it appointed an open opponent to a human rightspolicy to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights.The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (consisting of a conservativemajority) refused to confirm the nomination and thus protected theinstitutionalization of human rights and democratic freedoms in foreignpolicy. The Reagan administration then nominated Elliott Abrams for the position, who was committed to inserting democracy into foreignpolicy within a neo-conservative framework with a strong anti-commu-nist inclination.
Besides the increasing institutionalization of democracy promotionas a purpose of US foreign policy, the issue also received broad publicsupport. In a public opinion survey in 1974, the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs found that 67 per cent of the public believed that theUnited States should pressure countries that systemically violate basichuman rights. Sixty-four per cent believed that US interests did not justifyhelping authoritarian governments which have overthrown democraticgovernments and almost three-quarters of the sample supported theclaim that it is ‘morally wrong for the United States to support a mili-tary dictatorship that strips its people of their basic rights, even if thatdictatorship will allow us to set up military bases in that country’ (The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1975). Figures 6.4 and 6.5 visualizethe importance that the public assigned to the statements ‘helping tobring a democratic form of governance to other nations’ and ‘defending
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human rights’ with the ratings ‘very important’, ‘somewhat important’,or ‘not important’ for the years 1975–1987.
Similar data were confirmed by other polls such as the 1974 Harrisopinion poll, in which 67 per cent advocated US pressure on govern-ments that violate human rights and 62 per cent opposed US supportfor authoritarian governments that have overthrown democratic ones(Schoultz 1981, 24).
The presidents responded to this by democracy rhetoric. The followinggraph shows how often democracy/human rights (including democratic/
28% 26% 29% 30%
1979 1983 1987
1975 1979 1983 1987
Very important Somewhat important
39% 43% 42%
Very important Somewhat important
Figure 6.4 Public support for ‘helping to bring democratic form of governance toother nations’ and for ‘defending human rights’
Source: Figure created by author based on data from Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs(1975; 1979; 1983; 1987). Data for 1975 and 1987 are partially missing.
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 89
democratization) have been mentioned in the yearly State of the Union addresses (if they were not available for the inauguration year, the inaugural message was surveyed) from Presidents Harry Truman to Barack Obama.
Even though this can give a rough idea only and this rhetoric will be followed for the Carter and Reagan years in detail below, we can observe some patterns. While Truman extensively referred to democracy, this rhet-oric entered into a sharp decline with President Eisenhower. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford referred to it only sporadically. It started to grow again when the Ford presidency was heading to electionsand increased sharply when Carter became President. Except for the firsttwo years, Reagan referred to democracy extensively, as did all followingpresidents, except for Obama, who scaled down this rhetoric. So, fromthe Jimmy Carter through the George W. Bush presidencies, we see aconstant adherence to democracy rhetoric. What does this tell us aboutthe commonality of democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal? It does give us some hints that these presidents thought democracy was animportant part of the national identity which the United States wants toproject abroad. More instructive in this respect is the process of arguingon appropriate foreign policy during the Carter and Reagan administra-tions which will be observed now.
Figure 6.5 Frequency of democracy and human rights in State of the Union addresses
Source: Figure created by author based on data compiled by author. Speeches were accessed through The American Presidency Project (‘The American Presidency Project’ 2014).
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The grand foreign policy debate
Westad observed that after the dual disasters of Vietnam and Watergate, the only thing that ‘united the foreign policy elite in Washington … wasa search for political order’ (Westad 1997, 9). Vietnam and Watergatehad led to an immense crisis of trust in US politics and one of the resultswas that the consensus on foreign policy had broken down in the 1970sin ‘virtually every facet of American culture and organization: the crea-tive arts, academe, Congress, the federal bureaucracy, organized labor,business – even the military itself’ (Dumbrell 1997, 5). The old foreign policy agenda of realpolitik could not be upheld anymore and a search for a new foreign policy agenda began. This involved a high degree of ‘soul-searching’ regarding the future outlook of American foreign policyand the extent to which security interests, as well as democratic values,should be integrated into it. While the foreign policy consensus is nevertotally stable and always in flux, the observed time period was espe-cially intense in this respect. Arnson calls this debate ‘a unique one inmodern foreign policy. It occurred without a domestic consensus over appropriate foreign policy goals, particularly in dealing with the devel-oping world’s revolutions’ (Arnson 1993, 5) and represented ‘an ongoingnational search for the proper relationship between ends and means, anda definition of what interests would be worth fighting for’ (Arnson 1993,22). Carter’s and Reagan’s foreign policy agendas can each be portrayedas proposals in this arguing process.
Carter argued that our ‘policy is based on an historical vision of America’s role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our policy is rooted in our moral values which never change. Our policyis reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind’ (Carter 1977e). For him, the foreignpolicy agenda started with ‘five cardinal principles’: the commitmentto human rights as the first principle, the enforcement of bonds amongdemocracies, engagement with the Soviet Union, peace in the MiddleEast, and the reduction of nuclear proliferation (Carter 1977a). Thevery same goals continued for 1978 and 1979. 8 While from its incep-tion Carter’s new foreign policy approach was much discussed – ArthurSchlesinger argued that ‘(n)othing the Carter Administration has donehas excited more hope, puzzlement and confusion’ (Schlesinger 1978,503) – it became highly contested following the crises in Nicaragua and Iran. The most prominent attack leveled against Carter’s foreign policy came from Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a disillusioned previous memberof the Democratic Party who then joined the Reagan administration
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 91
and accused Carter of double standards. She found a striking contrast ‘between the administration’s frenzied speed in recognizing the new dictatorship in Nicaragua and its continuing refusal to recognize theelected government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia’ and argued that whileinconsistencies are a familiar part of politics in most societies, usually
governments behave hypocritically when their principles conflictwith the national interest. What makes the inconsistencies of theCarter administration noteworthy are, first, the administration’s moralism … and, second, the administration’s predilection for poli-cies that violate the strategic and economic interests of the UnitedStates. The administration’s conception of national interest borders on doublethink: it finds friendly powers to be guilty representativesof the status quo and views the triumph of unfriendly groups as bene-ficial to America’s ‘true interests’. (Kirkpatrick 1979, 42)
Similar arguments were raised by Reagan in the debate between the pres-idential candidates in 1980. Reagan argued that
Because someone didn’t meet exactly our standards of human rights,even though they were an ally of ours, instead of trying patientlyto persuade them to change their ways, we have, in a number of instances, aided a revolutionary overthrow which results in complete totalitarianism, instead, for those people. And I think that this is akind of a hypocritical policy when, at the same time, we’re main-taining a detente with the one nation in the world where there are nohuman rights at all – the Soviet Union. (Carter and Reagan 1980)
Following the crises in Iran, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, as well as theincreasing critique, Carter changed his rhetoric. In 1980, the mainte-nance of security became his ‘first concern’ (Carter 1980b). Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address represented the antithesis to his Notre Dameaddress in 1977. Even though he still mentioned human rights, the clearemphasis was on security, Soviet invasionism, the Iranian hostage crisis, and Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Increasingly, realist tones can be found in Carter’s speeches, which argued now that ‘wemust face the world as it is’ (Carter 1980e) and that in a ‘revolutionary world’ foreign policy ‘must be based simultaneously on the primacy of certain basic moral principles … and on the preservation of an Americanmilitary strength that is second to none’ (Carter 1980d).
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This new approach was also reflected in the split of the administrationbetween National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. While in the beginning of the presidency there hadbeen a consensus on foreign policy (Rosati 1987), this disintegrated after the Iranian crisis. Vance continued to represent the administration’s policies of the first years, while Brzezinski increasingly advocated a more realist policy. In the last year, Carter turned to Brzezinski’s approach,Vance felt forced to resign, and a more security-oriented foreign policyagenda emerged.
In retrospect, Carter failed to set up a stable new foreign policyconsensus. Shaken by international crises, he diverted from his ownforeign policy script. Arnson observes that ‘the years 1976 through 1980show that both Congress and two successive administrations failed toconstruct a new set of foreign policy principles to replace those buriedwith the US defeat in Indochina’ (Arnson 1993, 51). Nonetheless, Carterhad brought back a historical American conception of a democraticrole identity in foreign policy and by lifting issues of human rights anddemocratic freedoms from the level of Congressional legislation to thelevel of executive foreign policy, he did set the stage for the subsequent administration to justify its foreign policy in these terms. Even thoughCarter’s policy had been contested, the next president had to explain to the American public and Congress why and how he was divergingfrom it. Although a new consensus on values and interests in foreign policy had not yet emerged, it was clear that realpolitik was not appro-priate anymore. Democratic values had already entered the foreignpolicy consensus; what was left open was the question how extensivelythese values should be part of the foreign policy agenda. The Reaganadministration underestimated this development and – armed with theKirkpatrick doctrine – started out with an entirely realist agenda which denied democracy prominence as a foreign policy goal in Central andSouth America. However, over the course of the two presidencies, theReagan administration was increasingly trapped into this democraticrole identity. Concretely, we can distinguish four phases in this debate: (1) the denial of a democratic role identity; (2) the emergence of cheaprhetoric to please this identity; (3) the exposure of this cheap rhetoricby an emerging human rights community consisting of transnationalhuman rights activists and Congressional members; and (4) the adop-tion of a democratic role identity in the conservative version.
Initially, neither democracy nor human rights were mentioned bymembers of the Reagan administration as foreign policy goals. In hishearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Designate
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 93
Secretary of State Haig argued in 1981 that ‘(o)ur ideals must be recon-ciled with the reality we face’ (US Department of State 1984, 1), that‘international terrorism will take the place of human rights in ourconcern’ and that the new administration was ‘acting to restore confi-dence in American leadership through a more robust defense of US idealsand interests and a more realistic approach to the dangers and oppor-tunities of the international situation’ (US Department of State 1984, 33). In the beginning of his presidency, Reagan hardly spoke on foreignpolicy and, if he did, he mainly referred to development, trade, and freemarkets (e.g., Reagan 1981). Secretary of State Haig laid out the basicprinciples of US foreign policy at the American Bar Association in 1981:‘first, the restoration of our economic and military strength; second,the reinvigoration of our alliances and friendships; third, the promotionof progress in the developing countries through peaceful changes; andfourth, a relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by restraintand reciprocity’ (US Department of State 1984, 55). No reference wasmade to human rights or democracy and indeed, as was seen above,the new administration reversed Carter’s foreign policy practice. This continued in the 1982 State of the Union Speech of President Reagan.He argued that ‘(o)ur foreign policy is a policy of strength, fairness and balance. … Our foreign policy must be rooted in realism, not naiveté orself-delusion’ (Reagan 1982b). Also Haig maintained in 1982 at the UNGeneral Assembly that the fundamentals of our foreign policy ‘consistof four ideas that guide our actions: we will start from realism; we willact from strength … ; we will stress the indispensable need to generate consent, build agreements, and negotiate on key issues; and we willconduct ourselves in the belief that progress is possible’ (US Departmentof State 1985b, 31).
But Reagan soon had to realize that his realist approach neither hada majority in Congress, nor in the population, and not even in his ownparty. Reagan’s initial realpolitik ‘violated proscriptive injunctions about appropriate means and ends in US foreign policy that had replaced theforeign policy consensus existing prior to Vietnam’ (Arnson 1993, 5).Again, it was Congress who upheld democracy as a foreign policy goal.The rejection of Lefever for the post of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights was decisive in leading ‘the Reagan administration to recognizethe strength of the human rights advocates in Congress and the public’(Stueck 1998, 260) and Jacoby points out that in the bitter and highlypublicized hearings ‘it was evident that what was under review was not so much Lefever as the Administration’s decision to dismantle theCarter policy on human rights’ (Jacoby 1986, 1070). Also prominent
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human rights activists from the region were decisive in criticizing thispolicy: Jakobo Timerman, for example, spoke out against the appoint-ment of Lefever.
Congressional resistance to Reagan’s foreign policy continued to grow. In 1981, Congress required the administration to certify every half year that the human rights situation in El Salvador was improving. In1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendment limiting financial andmilitary aid to the Contras. In 1983, Congress withheld 30 per cent of aid on human rights conditions, and it also terminated economic andmilitary assistance to Chile (the Reagan administration subsequently increased the multilateral loans for Chile).9 Reagan realized that he had to build a domestic consensus for his foreign policy and thus changedcourse. Phase two started in which the administration referred to thedemocratic role identity with cheap rhetoric. In his ‘crusade of freedom’speech in the British Parliament Reagan called for ‘a major effort tosecure the best – a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation. For the sake of peace and justice, let usmove toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny’ (Reagan 1982a). From this speech onwards, democ-racy and freedom also entered the yearly State of the Union addresses. Inhis 1983 State of the Union, Reagan remarks that ‘our strategy for peacewith freedom must also be based on strength – economic and military strength. … We’re realists; we solve our problems instead of ignoringthem … But we’re also idealists … Right now we need both realism andidealism’ (Reagan 1983a). Secretary of State Shultz remarked in 1983 that three goals dominate the US foreign policy agenda:
The first goal is our commitment to a more peaceful, secure world … Toaddress this goal, President Reagan is moving decisively to restore ourmilitary strength … The second goals is to restore order and stability to the international economic system … A third goal is the President’scommitment to expanding the forces of democracy and freedom. (USDepartment of State 1985b, 365)
Initially, the administration mainly used the democracy rhetoric to solicit Congressional support for the massive aid programs to El Salvadorand the Contras. However, by starting to pay lip service to democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal, a decisive turning point was reached. Instead of the question if democracy should be promoted at all, it wasnow discussed what, how, when, and where it should be promoted. Bydeclaring democracy promotion a purpose of foreign policy, the Reagan
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 95
administration became entrapped and the third phase in the arguingprocess initiated.
Reagan had not anticipated how much his cheap rhetoric would betaken at face value. Carothers observes that after having ‘made democ-racy the stated goal of its policy … the Reagan administration soon foundthat its policy was evaluated in those terms, that Congress and thepublic pressed the administration on the status of democracy in LatinAmerica and asked what the administration was really doing to promoteit’ (Carothers 1991, 244). Various critics of Reagan’s policies, includingmembers of Congress, transnationally acting NGOs which cooperatedwith local human rights activists, and journalists, began to coalesce intoa loosely structured human rights community (Jacoby 1986, 1070) toattack the cheap rhetoric of the Reagan administration. Having declaredto be committed to democracy, the administration now had to defendits policy in these terms. In order to receive Congressional supportfor military aid to El Salvador and other nations, the administrationmostly relied on the ‘improvement argument’ – that is, that the situ-ation was not perfect, but that the countries were democratizing andthat an effort was being made by these governments to improve thehuman rights situation. But by stopping to deny human rights viola-tions by allied regimes and instead admitting them in the framework of the improvement argument, the administration was now being forcedinto extensive arguments of how far-reaching improvements, as well asactual abuses, of human rights had been, which helped human rightsactivists to publicize the extent of violations through a transnationalnetwork. Four NGOs were crucial in compiling human rights reportswith the help of local actors and bringing local human rights activists toCongress to testify: Amnesty International, Americas Watch Committee,the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, and the Washington Office on Latin America (Cleary 1997, 152). They could so not only give aconcrete voice and face to the other – the victim of human rights viola-tions – but also provide concrete ground on the basis of which Reagan’spolicy was attacked. 10
In all, this became a classic example of what Elster called the ‘civilizingforce of hypocrisy’ (Elster 1995). Phase four started in which membersof the Reagan administration by the constant repetition of democracyrhetoric started to believe that they were indeed democracy promoters.An interviewed administration official, for example, claimed that by theend of 1983, it ‘was not just that you had to have an election or thoseguys on the Hill were never going to shut up’, it was also becoming a common conviction ‘that a legitimate election was the key to the right
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kind of political outcome in El Salvador’ (in Arnson 1993, 139). Indeed,the administration started to adopt a democratic role identity, adapted to its own conservative background. Through the lengthy argumentswith Congress and the human rights community, the Reagan adminis-tration developed a conservative pendant to ‘liberal internationalism’ which Henry Nau calls ‘conservative internationalism’. Like liberal inter-nationalism, conservative internationalism includes democracy promo-tion as a foreign policy goal. With the development of conservative internationalism, a bipartisan consensus on democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal emerged, meaning that the commonality of democ-racy promotion as a shared foreign policy goal became relatively robust, even though liberal internationalists and conservative internationalistsdisagree on how this goal should be translated into action. Conservativeinternationalism prefers liberty over equality, pursues electoral democ-racy instead of human rights, relies more on the use of force, is suspi-cious of international institutions, doubts that democracy is easy toconstruct, and prefers democracy promotion through free trade insteadof aid (Nau 2008).
This last section answered why in late 1982/1983 democracy promo-tion re-entered foreign policy practice. After the breakdown of theforeign policy consensus in the 1970s, the foreign policies of Carter andReagan can be seen as proposals for a new foreign policy script. While Carter’s proposal failed to gain majority, his foreign policy did set the stage for his successor in office. It raised certain expectations with whichthe Reagan administration was confronted. Reagan’s renewed proposalof realpolitik was not appropriate anymore. The incumbent administra-tion could not ignore newly set standards of what was seen as rightfulforeign policy behavior. Subsequently, Reagan started to legitimize hispolicy with cheap talk, but was then forced to live up to his own rhet-oric by Congress (including Republicans from his own party), the press,and the human rights community. Through the arguing process, the administration became socialized into a democratic role identity and – vice versa – also influenced this role identity. It developed a conserva-tive counterpart to liberal internationalism and democracy promotionbecame a bipartisan foreign policy goal.
This leaves us with the remaining question if the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’ always works. The case studied here shows that the determi-nant for its success was a devoted human rights community which wassuccessful in bringing the voice of the other – the victims of human rights violations in Central and South America – into American poli-tics. Furthermore, once the Reagan administration had adopted their
The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity 97
specific version of a democratic role identity, the growth of democracyto standard form of governance in the Americas played a bigger role inthis identity. Indeed, the Reagan administration started to lay claim to the third wave of democratization; it now saw itself – not indigenous processes – as the driving force behind it. President Reagan stated inhis last State of the Union speech in 1988 that in ‘international rela-tions, too, there’s only one description for what … we have achieved: acomplete turnabout, a revolution. Seven years ago, America was weak,and freedom everywhere was under siege. Today America is strong, and democracy is everywhere on the move’ (Reagan 1988). The world – as Secretary of State Shultz argued in 1988 – ‘is catching on to the American way. It is not just our ship that will catch the tide, it’s awhole fleet of ships – and America is the flagship of that fleet’ (USDepartment of State 1989).
Concluding this case study, US foreign policy toward Central and South America underwent decisive changes in the last decade of theCold War. In phase I, enabled by a period of relatively low threat percep-tions and pushed by a new internal rights consciousness that was also supported by international normative change, President Jimmy Carterincorporated human rights and democratic freedoms into his foreignpolicy agenda. In phase II, when democracy promotion already hadentered foreign policy but was not a routine yet, threat perceptions still continued to affect foreign policy; when they accelerated again, Carterstarted to divert from this agenda. The Reagan administration at firstentirely abandoned Carter’s foreign policy, rejecting the extent of therights revolution within the United States itself and also being suspi-cious of international human rights norms. However, toward the endof 1982 this agenda suddenly had a comeback, high threat perceptions notwithstanding. With his foreign policy, Carter had unearthed anAmerican democratic role identity which raised expectations on foreignpolicy and so framed an emerging foreign policy debate. His successorhad to justify his foreign policy in these terms and was increasinglysocialized into a new democratic role identity, notably through a humanrights community which also brought the other into an internal discus-sion that staked out the determinants of this identity. This case study has indeed shown the crucial role of the other in activating a democratic role identity and thus moving a democracy closer from phase II (varyinguse of democracy promotion) to phase III (democracy promotion as a routine). Once the administration bought into this identity, the advanceof democracy to standard form of governance further pushed this iden-tity; the Reagan administration indeed laid claim on the third wave of
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democratization. It saw America on the crest of this movement, giving astrong input to the newly re-found democratic role identity.
This case study largely confirms the theoretical model presented inthe first chapter of this book. In phase I, only low threat perceptionsenabled the incorporation of democracy promotion into foreign policy.An evolving democratic role identity pushed for democracy promo-tion – concretely a role identity that was mainly rooted in an advancingrights consciousness in the United States, less in international normswhose effects depended on a given identity. In phase II, threat percep-tions could hinder democracy promotion to a certain degree, but theirhindering effect was limited through an evolving democratic role iden-tity that was mobilized by a devoted and networked human rights community.
The EU and Democracy Promotion in the MediterraneanRegion since the End of the Cold War
Different from the US case, democracy promotion has appeared in EUforeign policy only toward the end of the Cold War. While democracy advanced as a criterion for membership in the European Community (EC) already in the 1960s (see Chapter 9), in its development policiesthe EC focused on economic cooperation only throughout the Cold War (Risse and Börzel 2009, 49). Human rights started to appear sporadicallyas criteria for the first time in the 1980s when this indifferent approachwas hardly sustainable anymore in face of the atrocities committed byIdi Amin in Uganda and aid to the regime was suspended. The thirdLomé Agreement (1985–1989) included a statement on human dignityas an essential objective. Also, in 1985/1986 sanctions were imposed onSouth Africa and in 1989 on China, in both cases motivated by humanrights objectives. In 1987 the Parliament rejected a financial protocol for Morocco and in 1988 it delayed assent for a trade and financial agreement with Israel, both times voicing human rights concerns as thereason.
Only with the end of the Cold War, however, in 1991, did the Council make democracy and human rights promotion a goal of development cooperation. Since 1992 EU agreements include a clause that makes therespect for human rights and democratic principles an essential element.Regarding the Mediterranean region specifically, all association agree-ments in the framework of the Barcelona Process include this essentialelement clause. Furthermore, in 1994, with the European Initiativefor Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU started a democ-racy assistance program for virtually all regions of the world, includingthe Mediterranean. In the early 2000s, democracy promotion in the
7 The EU’s Approach to DemocracyPromotion and Its Ups and Downs in the Mediterranean Region
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Mediterranean received a renewed impetus. Borrowing scripts from theenlargement process, the EU set up the European Neighborhood Policywhich uses a more active, positive conditionality approach to foster democracy in the Eastern and Southern neighborhood. The EU intro-duced the Governance Facility to reward front runners in reform andalso advanced its capability for identitive democracy promotion with theestablishment of human rights and democracy subcommittee meetingswith the partner countries in the framework of the association councils.The implementation of this democracy agenda, however, proved diffi-cult and started to hit low points with the entrance into negotiationswith the Libyan regime outside of the EU’s principled framework in 2007 and the setup of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 which signaled a willingness of the EU to divert from its democratic reformagenda. This changed again with the Arab uprisings to which the EUhas reacted not only with an increase in ‘democracy talk’ but also withconcrete measures such as a revision of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), increased financial support and conditionality by settingup task forces and negotiations for Deep and Comprehensive Free TradeAreas (DCFTAs), and mobility partnerships with front runners.
This chapter starts with a section on the EU as a foreign policy actor toshortly assess its operational actorness in democracy promotion. It thenmoves to examining in detail how the substantive content of democracypromotion, as well as the types of action to promote democracy, devel-oped since the end of the Cold War.
EU operational actorness in democracy promotion
European integration started as an economic project without a foreign policy dimension. The European Community’s establishing treaty – the Treaty of Rome – did not mention foreign policy objectives, even though the EC had competences in external trade which ‘provided a de facto international role for the EC’ (Zielonka 1998, 1). ‘The EEC’s external competences forced the Europeans to define their relations with the restof the world and created external expectations about the role of the EECas a major power’ (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 42). In the 1960s the EC signed first commercial and financial agreements and a cautious foreignpolicy started to develop. In 1970 the European Political Cooperation(EPC) was created by the Luxembourg Report. It established a new foreign policy system for the EU with biannual meetings of the foreignministers and regular consultation on foreign policy. In 1973, in a delib-erate attempt to explore common foreign policy values in the wake of
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the Yom Kippur War, the nine foreign ministers formulated a documentwhich stated that ‘the time has come to draw up a document on theEuropean Identity’ to enable them ‘to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and theplace which they occupy in world affairs’ (European Council 1973). TheSingle European Act (SEA) of 1986 formalized intergovernmental coop-eration regarding foreign policy and determined the competencies of the European Council (leading), the European Commission (assisting),and the Parliament (observing) in EPC.
The Maastricht Treaty then set up the Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP) as the successor of EPC. It clarified five objectives for CFSP,one of them being to ‘develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (European Union 1992). 1 Besides the CFSP, the other two pillars were the EuropeanCommunity (EC) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Foreign policywas also conducted through these pillars, for example regarding tradeor development aid. The Maastricht Treaty introduced the followingdecision-making structure: Regarding the EC pillar, the ‘community method’ was applied, meaning that the Council decided (generally by qualified majority voting) after consultation or in co-decision with theParliament, and the Commission executed. In the CFSP and JHA pillarsthe ‘intergovernmental method’ was applied: the Council decided (inunanimity) while Parliament had a limited role and could mainly make recommendations. EU foreign policy was not only conducted throughCFSP, but cut across these pillars; economic, environmental, and devel-opment policies, for example, were part of the EC pillar.
The Amsterdam Treaty revised the provisions regarding the CFSP,appointed the Secretary General of the Council to the High Representativeof the CFSP and introduced the new troika of the High Representative,the Council Presidency, and the Commission Representative. The Treaty of Nice established the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)and incorporated it into the CFSP pillar. With the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, CFSP and ESDP merged into the Common Security and Defense Policy(CSDP) and the pillar system was abandoned with CSDP and foreignaid policy now being part of the ‘shared competences’. Nonetheless,the old policy-making methods were largely retained (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 57). Lisbon also established the office of an EU ministerof foreign affairs – the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security – and a European diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), one of whose tasks is democracy promo-tion. In sum, EU foreign policy can be characterized as ‘“multifaceted”
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(comprising the broad range of areas such as CFSP, CSDP, trade, enlarge-ment, etc.), “multi-method” (combining various policy-making methods,some with the member states and others with supranational institu-tions like the European Commission in the driving seat) and “multi-level” (entailing the national and the European levels)’ (Keukeleire andDelreux 2014, 1).
What does this complexity mean for EU democracy promotion? Starting with the utilitarian dimension of EU democracy promotion, negativeconditionality (sanctions) are decided in unanimity in the context of the CFSP. The association agreements signed in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – which can be put on hold if article 2 (human rights and democratic principles) is violated – have been ratified by all EU Member States, since they draw on both European Community and Member States’ competences in the second and third pillars. After decisions have been taken at the political level, the Commission hastaken the lead in managing the EMP and later on the Union for theMediterranean (UfM) through the Directorate General External Relationsand now the EEAS headed by the High Representative.
Positive conditionality is pursued through the European NeighborhoodPolicy (ENP) which was formed and managed by diverse Commissiondirectorates over time – DG External Relations, DG Enlargement, DG External Relations, and European Neighborhood Policy, and now by the EEAS with involvement of the Commissioner for Enlargement andEuropean Neighborhood Policy. The key documents of the ENP – the Action Plans – are drafted by the Commission in consultation with thepartner countries, transmitted to the Council for approval, and subse-quently endorsed by the Association or Cooperation Councils with thepartner countries.
Democracy assistance in turn is pursued through diverse instru-ments in the Mediterranean such as EIDHR, MEDA, ENPI, and ENIwhich are managed by the European Commission’s Directorate GeneralDevelopment and Cooperation – EuropeAid. Indeed, democracy isincreasingly mainstreamed into the EU’s development policies, as wellas related issues such as trade (managed by the Commission’s DirectorateGeneral Trade).
Finally, when it comes to identitive democracy promotion, the EU’s voice has been the President of the European Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, as well as the Commissioner forEnlargement and European Neighborhood Policy (previously also theCommissioner for External Relations). Furthermore, Council Conclusionsalso play a role in identitive democracy promotion.
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When looking at this complexity in both, decision-making and poli-cymaking, it remains puzzling how the EU has been coming forwardwith its own and relatively coherent democracy promotion policy.This – as will be seen in the following sections – has been due to the initiative of EU institutions such as Parliament, Commission, and HighRepresentative in a specific strategic, normative, and identitive setting. 2 Indeed, democracy promotion has been one of the foreign policy fieldswhere EU institutions have been clearly in the driving seat since MemberStates have been supportive of having this policy managed at the EUlevel due to its experience and specific instruments in the area, as wellas the public support these policies have witnessed among Europeans.Thus, operationally speaking, when it comes to democracy promotionythe EU is an actor in its own right. 3
The evolution of the substantive content of EU democracypromotion
Karen Smith has argued that the EU lacks ‘any agreed definitions of the term “democracy”’ (K. Smith 2003, 122). Indeed, surveying diverseEU documents – the human rights report of the Council, directivedocuments of the Council and implementation documents from theCommission – one finds an array of definitions, but what unites all of them is that they reflect a ‘fuzzy-liberal’ (Kurki 2012) understanding of democracy. Furthermore, it is possible to identify three standing pillarsregarding the substantive content of EU democracy promotion.
A first pillar is human rights. The EU sees human rights and democ-racy as mutually constitutive:
if human rights are a necessary condition for the full development of the individual, democratic society is a necessary condition for the exer-cise of those rights, providing the framework for individual develop-ment; again, human rights are a prerequisite for a democratic society,in that such a society is based on individuals’ voluntary support forthe life of the community. (European Commission 1995a)
The annual human rights reports of the Council of the European Unioninclude civil and political rights such as the freedom of expression, reli-gion, assembly; the right to life; the prohibition of torture and arbitrary arrests; the right to take part in the government of one’s country; womenand children’s rights, minority rights, refugee rights, respect for diver-sity, the rights of indigenous people and of disabled people; economic,
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social, and cultural rights; and the right to development. Since 2010,LGBT rights also are included in the reports. Thus, the EU’s definition of human rights as reflected in the human rights reports mirrors the devel-opment of the international human rights catalog. When, however,democracy is explicitly defined in EU documents on democracy promo-tion, the human rights that are mentioned are civil and political rightsonly, as, for example, in the definition of ‘deep democracy’ by which the EU means that kind of democracy
that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercisefree speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justicefrom independent judges, security from accountable police and armyforces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service – and other civil and human rights that many Europeans take for granted,such as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. (EuropeanCommission 2011a)
The second pillar is the rule of law which is continuously mentionedtogether with democracy and human rights; indeed the three concepts are assumed to be co-constitutive. Like democracy itself, the term rule of law is used by the EU in a fuzzy way (Carrera, Guild, and Hernanz 2013).EU documents on democracy promotion mention diverse issues in the area of rule of law, ‘in particular upholding the independence of the judiciary and strengthening it, and support for a humane prison system; support for constitutional and legislative reform; support for initiatives to abolish the death penalty’ (European Council 1999), as well as issues like an accountable police and armed forces or the fight against corruption.
The third pillar could be called the participation pillar which hasdeveloped over time. An essential part of it has always been electionsupport – according to the EU ‘a key element in the EU global strategy for the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the respect of human rights’ (European Council 2001a, 81). The EU seeks to foster thelegal framework of elections, provides technical and material support,trains local observers, and sends its own observer missions. Anotherlong-standing key element in this pillar has been support for civil society.In its report on the ‘Implementation of Measures Intended to PromoteObservance of Human Rights and Democratic Principles for 1995’, theCommission states, for example, that the
democratization process depends on the development of a demo-cratic culture based on pluralism, tolerance and citizen participation.
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Chapter B7–52 [EIDHR] gives ample scope to projects aimed at diver-sifying and consolidating the ‘social fabric’ typical of democracy byencouraging the exercise of democratic ‘freedoms,’ the participationof the people and the constitution of dynamic forms of solidarity.(European Commission 1997, 13)
A 1999 Council Regulation advances the ‘promotion of pluralism bothat political level and at the level of civil society by strengthening theinstitutions needed to maintain the pluralist nature of that society,including non-governmental organizations (NGOs)’ (European Council1999, 4–5). Furthermore, from 2006 onwards, the EU has started to putmore emphasis on participation through strengthening parliaments. Ina 2006 regulation, the Council and Parliament state that ‘(d)evelopingand consolidating democracy … should include democratic parliamentsand their capacity to support and advance democratic reform proc-esses’ (European Council 2006, 3). This new focus on parliaments is alsorepeated in the 2009 Council conclusions on Democracy Support inEU’s External Relations which ‘acknowledges the essential oversight roleof democratically elected citizens’ representatives. Therefore it encour-ages an increased involvement of national assemblies, Parliaments andlocal authorities in domestic policy-making’ (European Council 2009,4). Similarly, almost all Action Plans of the years 2005–2007 mention in addition to elections, freedom of association and expression, the inde-pendence of the judiciary, and the inclusion of women in the political life also the strengthening of parliamentary institutions and seeks to foster them through a political dialogue between the respective parlia-ment and the European parliament. Some reports even seek to enhanceopportunities for political parties (Jordan, Morocco, and, most of all,Tunisia).
The substance that the EU understands to be part of its democracypromotion is thus much more diversified than in the case of the Carterand Reagan administrations, even though overlaps exist in terms of civil and political rights, as well as elections and the judiciary. Todaythe EU and US scripts on the substance of democracy promotion look,however, rather similar and Amichai Magen, Thomas Risse, and Michael McFaul even argued that there seems to be a global script on the substan-tive content of democracy promotion (Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009).USAID, the main agency of the United States for promoting democ-racy abroad, lists the rule of law, human rights, elections, civil society,media, and accountable and transparent governance as the main areasto promote sustainable democracy (USAID 2011). But while similarities
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dominate the picture, there are differences regarding specific issues(the United States, for example, is more active in promoting parties), aswell as the weight given to the different ingredients (the United Statesfocuses more on decentralization and civil society than the EU whichhas a bigger focus on state capacity building (Huber 2008)).
The ups and downs of EU democracy promotion in theMediterranean region
The EU has promoted democracy through specific policy frameworksin the Mediterranean region which will be shortly introduced beforethe section will turn to the examination of the variance in the EU’s use of political conditionality, democracy assistance, and identitive democracy promotion. The first policy framework in the Mediterraneanwas the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972 which led to cooperationagreements with Israel (1975),4 Algeria (1976), Tunisia (1976), Morocco (1976), Lebanon (1976), Egypt (1977), Jordan (1977), and Syria (1977). 5 Democracy or human rights, however, did not play a role in the GlobalMediterranean Policy.
These values became incorporated only with the setup of theBarcelona Process/the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. The EMP aimed at peace, security, and stability in the region. It was aspecific European ‘security practice’ (Adler and Crawford 2006) and itsdesign mirrored the Helsinki Process, as well as the European integra-tion process itself (Bicchi 2006). Democracy promotion played a role in the initiative insofar as the partner governments had to declare in theBarcelona Declaration of 1995 to ‘develop the rule of law and democ-racy in their political systems’ and to ‘respect human rights and funda-mental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of suchrights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of asso-ciation for peaceful purposes, and freedom of thought, conscience, andreligion’ (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995). While the declarationwas not legally binding, the EU has at times used it as a normative basisto justify its own democracy and human rights policy in the neighbor-hood. 6 Furthermore, the association agreements in the framework of theEMP are legally binding. They include Article 2, holding that respect fordemocratic principles and human rights constitute an ‘essential element’of the agreement. However, the essential element clause has never been invoked by the EU to suspend an agreement with a Mediterraneancountry. The EMP’s funding instrument, MEDA, also included democracyassistance. Furthermore, at the initiative of the European Parliament, the
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Mediterranean region was incorporated into the European Initiative forDemocracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)7 through the MEDA Democracy Program which merged into the global EIDHR in 1999. EIDHR is a pure democracy assistance initiative and builds democracy bottom up bysupporting civil society. In theory, it does not need the agreement of host governments for its actions. In practice, it is difficult to supportprojects or organizations in authoritarian states against the consent of the government (Youngs 2002b, 55).
With the breakdown of the peace process in the Middle East and theoutbreak of the second Intifada, the Barcelona Process was increasinglyperceived as a failure. At the same time, the upcoming 2004 enlarge-ment led to new frontiers and neighborhoods for the EU and ideas fora new neighborhood initiative started to circulate in early 2002. High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner for External RelationsChris Patten worked out the ‘Wider Europe’ initiative from which theEuropean Neighborhood Policy (ENP) developed. Like the BarcelonaProcess, it aims at security and stability in the region, but its approachis different. It seeks to establish a ‘ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives’ (European Commission 2004a , 3), and to achieve this it focuses on ‘differentiated bilateralism’ (Del Sartoand Schumacher 2005). Multilateralism was thus pushed aside (Pace2007) and priority given to a benchmarking approach, according to which democratization and liberalization, as well as cooperation withthe EU regarding central issues such as migration, should be rewarded.Thus, in its set-up, the ENP gave more prominence to democracy promo-tion. In 2007, ENP’s financial instrument ENPI was introduced whichsubstitutes for the EMP’s MEDA program and also includes democracyassistance.
In 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy also pushed for a new Mediterranean initiative to replace the EMP. His initial proposal of aMediterranean Union was rejected by some EU Member States such asGermany and a scaled down version was agreed upon. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was then launched in 2008 and is remarkable fortwo things: first, it failed to take off. Following the flare-up of the Gazaconflict in December 2008, no high-level political meetings have takenplace. Second, the issue of political reform does not play a major role inthe UfM. Rather, it seeks to foster economic cooperation, the apparent lack of political reform notwithstanding. This was rather astonishinggiven that the Eastern counterpart to the UfM – the Eastern Partnershipestablished in 2009 – does include democracy and good governance asone of its four platforms. In the academic community, the UfM was
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criticized as sidelining democracy ‘far from the logic of the ENP’ (Tocci and Cassarino 2011, 6), as a ‘symptom of different political preferences’ signaling that the ‘political project of “constructing a Mediterraneanregion” based on democracy and human rights has been largely aban-doned amid a progressive fragmentation of efforts’ (Bicchi 2011, 14), oras ‘another nail in the coffin of the vision that infused the inceptionof the EMP in 1995’ (Kausch and Youngs 2009, 963). While the EMP and the ENP had also been criticized for their frequent failures to trans-late the declared democracy agenda into practice, what was remarkableabout the UfM is that it did not have a democracy agenda to be set into practice in the first place. Democracy promotion had hit a low point.
This changed again with the Arab uprisings. While the EU’s multi-lateral instrument – the UfM – has not been reformed or revitalized,its bilateral instrument – the ENP – has gone through a review (that had been initiated already before the uprisings) and was re-energized.The EU is seeking to improve positive conditionality by offering morefor more, focusing on three incentives: money, markets, and mobility. It has provided additional financial help to the transition states anda new financial instrument – the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) – is active since 2014. Task forces have been set up with front-runners and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) andmobility partnerships have been negotiated with them. Furthermore,the civil society component of the ENP has also been boosted and atthe initiative of Poland the EU has set up a European Endowment forDemocracy (EED).
The use of democracy assistance, political conditionality, and identi-tive democracy promotion which has been pursued within these frame-works will now be examined in detail.
In general, some 10 per cent of all EU aid goes to the area of democracy, while the bulk of aid is allocated to social and economic infrastructure(European Commission 2011b).8 In the Mediterranean region, there are two principal aid programs: the bottom-up program EIDHR and the top-down program MEDA (1995–2006)/ENPI (2007–2013)/ENI (since 2014).Figure 7.1 shows that the top-down programs receive much higherfunding which indicates that the EU focuses more on working withgovernment institutions than with civil society. Furthermore, whileEIDHR funds are committed to democracy and human rights programsonly, of all MEDA II funding about 8 per cent went to governance andpolitical dialogue (European Commission 2009), 9 and of ENPI funding
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about 8 per cent was distributed to democracy and human rights, 11per cent for good governance.10 Thus, democracy is not the primary objective of the EU’s aid strategy.11
At the same time, these data also show that democracy assist-ance is nonetheless a consolidated part of the EU’s foreign aid policy. Furthermore, with the set-up of the European Endowment of Democracy,the EU has added a new instrument to its democracy assistance withwhich it can support change in the neighborhood more flexibly, directly, and faster. This indicates that it is seeking to advance its capacity in thearea of democracy assistance since the uprisings. At the time of writing,it is unclear how much of ENI funds will be distributed to democracyassistance, even though the Commission has been outlining that withthe set-up of the civil society facility, it is willing to invest more intothis area.
Negative political conditionality
Negative conditionality is an instrument that the EU hardly applies. Theessential element clause of the association agreements has never beeninvoked in the Mediterranean context. However, Libya and to a lesserdegree Syria have been treated as ‘outsiders’ and were not able to benefitfrom all EU programs in the framework of the EMP. The EU has also used
100.74400.74 107.5107 5107.5 113.125113 12513.12 129.9129 9129.9 132.125132 12532.12 128.833128 83328.83163.402163.40263.40 139.902139 90239.90 148.4148 4148.4 123.06123 0623.06 138.75138 7538.75 119.51119.5
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EIDHR MEDA ENPI
Figure 7.1 EU assistance programs in the Mediterranean region in euro millions
Source: Figure created by author based on data from European Commission (2014). Note that ENPI did not only replace MEDA but also TACIS (the program for the East). Sixty-three per cent of ENPI went to the South, 38 per cent to the East (Missiroli 2010 , 264).
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negative conditionality at times toward the Palestinian Authority (PA)where its leverage is relatively high due to the PA’s aid dependency.
Libya was treated as an outsider when the Barcelona Process wasinitiated. After renouncing its Weapons of Mass Destruction programin 2003, Libya received ‘observer status’. This negative conditionalitypolicy, however, was reversed in 2007, when the EU started to negotiate a ‘framework agreement’ with Libya, mainly to buy Libyan cooperationin preventing illegal migration. This did not only mean that the EUabandoned its negative conditionality approach; the EU even acqui-esced to Libya’s demand for an ad hoc agreement instead of an associa-tion agreement in the framework of the EMP as it had been negotiatedwith all other Mediterranean states which signaled a willingness of the EU to divert from its principled framework. Negative conditionalitytoward Libya only started to set in again with the suspension of thesenegotiations in February 2011, when Muammar Gadhafi began to wage a civil war against opposition forces in his country. The EU imposed an arms embargo, asset freeze, and visa ban in accordance with UN CouncilSecurity Resolution 1970 (European Council 2011b ).
Syria, in contrast, did sign the Barcelona Declaration in 1995.Nonetheless, the EU was reluctant to enter into contractual relationswith Damascus. Negotiations progressed very slowly and finally wereconcluded in 2004. A few months later, former Lebanese Prime MinisterHariri was assassinated, and due to potential Syrian involvement in theassassination, the EU put the association agreement on hold as it ‘consid-ered political circumstances not right at that time’ (European ExternalAction Service 2011b ). Several EU Member States had refused to sign anassociation agreement with Syria. In 2009, when Syria showed signs of accepting the sovereignty of Lebanon, the EU aimed at proceeding withsignature. In 2011, with the violent regime response to the uprising inthe country, the EU suspended bilateral cooperation programs, froze the draft association agreement, and imposed an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze in May 2011. Further sanctions followed during the civilwar, which is still ongoing.
Besides these two cases of negative conditionality, high pressure to democratize which bordered negative conditionality has been exerted attimes by the EU on the Palestinian Authority (PA). With the Oslo Accordsand the establishment of the PA, the EU committed itself to build upthe institutional structure of a future Palestinian state. The EU and itsMember States are the biggest donor of the PA (OECD 2009) which istherefore highly aid-dependent on the EU as a key financial provider forthe functioning of the quasi-state and the provision of common goods. 12
The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion 113
This aid dependency increases the EU’s leverage on the PA: its ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997; Börzel 2009) is relatively big and comparableto its influence over EU accession states. While in the 1990s the EU waswilling to tolerate President Yasser Arafat’s authoritarian rule and human rights violations in the belief that this would keep the peace processalive, this changed in 2001/2002 when the second Intifada began andthis approach was perceived as a failure. The EU pressured Arafat into introducing the office of a prime minister, fostering the independence of the judiciary and the oversight capacity of the Palestinian LegislativeCouncil (PLC), bringing all security services under the auspices of theMinistry of the Interior, and placing all revenues under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. This policy, however, was reversed again in2006 with Hamas winning the parliamentary elections. The EU changedcourse and supported the concentration of power in the hands of thepresident with the distribution of funding to his office (Tocci 2006). Asin the case of Algeria in the early 1990s, 13 the EU displayed uneasinessin dealing with democratically elected Islamic movements, even though it should be noted that the EU did protest the detention of Palestinianministers and legislators (mostly from Hamas) by Israel and has – as RoubaAl-Fattal pointed out – repeatedly argued that it ‘cannot legally deal with Hamas unless the latter renounces violence’ (Al-Fattal 2010, 64).
While the EU has used negative political conditionality only sporadi-cally, since the Arab uprisings the EU has sought to strengthen its legalcapacity to apply negative conditionality in the framework of the revisedENP. 14 Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the EU will use negative condi- tionality more frequently. Indeed, its reaction to the Arab uprisings hasshown its continued preference for positive conditionality; the case of Egypt is indicative of this. When elected President Mohammed Morsi wasousted by the Egyptian army and violence in Egypt mounted, the ideaof suspending the association agreement and of withholding additionalfinancial support of 800 million euros was discussed, but the Councilquickly abandoned it and decided to only suspend export licenses of equipment that could be used for internal repression (European Council2013; European Commission 2013b).
Positive political conditionality
The sporadic use of negative conditionality can be explained by the EU’spreference for a partnership approach (K. Smith 2003, 110; van Hüllen 2009, 8; van Hüllen and Stahn 2009, 130). In 1991, the Council statedthat ‘a positive and constructive approach should receive priority’, withpolitical dialogue, financial assistance, and positive conditionality,
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and – only in addition to that – negative conditionality (in Hill andSmith 2000, 445). The European Neighborhood Policy is based on sucha positive conditionality approach. It includes action plans with thepartner countries that set priorities in terms of political and economicreform, as well as regarding other issues such as energy or research.Progressing countries are promised more integration, cooperation,market access, and assistance, even though the action plans are rathervague in their benchmarks, rewards, strategies, procedures, and timeta-bles (Del Sarto et al. 2007; Gordon and Sasse 2008, 301–303; Pace 2007,663; Tovias 2010, 172; Whitman and Wolff 2010, 13). So what has been implemented so far and did it respond to progress in political reform inthe partner countries?
Based on the Freedom House Indices for the Mediterranean countries,we can distinguish three groups of countries in the region: frontrunners,a middle group, and laggards. Before the Arab uprisings, three countries represented frontrunners in political reform, namely Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan (the latter until 2008 only); they were followed by a middle group which included Algeria, Egypt, the PA, and Tunisia; Syria and Libya in contrast were the most stringent autocracies (Freedom House2014). Since the Arab uprisings, frontrunners are Tunisia, Morocco,Libya, and Lebanon, followed by a middle group which includes Algeria,Egypt, Jordan, and the PA; Syria remains the least free country in theMediterranean region. The status of association that these countriesreached with the EU corresponds to these ratings only roughly as canbe seen in Table 7.1 which shows the years in which countries signed association agreements, received an advanced partnership status, as wellas when Task Forces – a new EU instrument to effectively coordinate EU aid with transition states – or negotiations for Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) and mobility partnerships were established.
Before the Arab uprisings, in line with its frontrunner status, Moroccowas the first Mediterranean country to achieve advanced partnership status in 2008 with intensified trade relations, an enhanced politicaldialogue, participation of Morocco in community agencies and programs,as well as its step-by-step alignment to the acquis communautaire – the EU’s law (legislation, legal acts, and court decisions). Countries with advanced partnership status like Morocco have priority in meeting EUofficials more often and on a higher level. In 2010, a common parlia-mentary committee was set up. Besides its advanced status, Morocco also was the first Mediterranean country to receive additional aid (28 million euros in 2007) through the Governance Facility which was establishedin 2006 to reward frontrunners in terms of political reform with an
The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion 115
initial budget of 300 million euros (European Commission 2006a). Atthe same time, advanced status remains a rather undefined instrument in terms of rewards, as well as criteria. It has, for example, been criticizedthat Morocco did not receive much from the EU apart from symbolicvalue (Kausch 2010, 4).
In contrast to Morocco, Lebanon – the Arab country with the highest status of civil and political freedoms which is often classified as a conso-ciational democracy (Andeweg 2000; Dekmejian 1978; Lijphart 1969) – does not have advanced status, but it might be considered a special casesince it is in protracted conflict.15 More controversial were the cases of Jordan which received advanced status in 2010 even though civil andpolitical rights in the country were deteriorating at the time and Tunisia which almost received advanced status just before the Arab uprisings.Tunisia represented a frontrunner in economic reforms and was alreadyrelatively more integrated in the European economy than other partnerstates, 16 but was reluctant to reform politically. While in the early andmid-2000s the EU did insist more on political reform in Tunisia, 17 thischanged in 2010, when the EU started negotiation talks with Tunisia for an advanced status despite the regime’s unwillingness to reform
Table 7.1 Status of association of Mediterranean partner countries with EU
Association agreement and association council
>Task force >DCFTA
Algeria 2006 – –
Egypt 2004 – >2012 >Negotiating since 2013
>–Jordan 2002 2010 >2012
>Negotiating since 2012 >Negotiating since 2012
Lebanon 2006 – –Libya – – –Morocco 2000 2008 >–
>Negotiating since 2013 >2013
PA 1997 – –Syria pending – –Tunisia 1998 2012 >2011
>Negotiating since 2012 >2014
Source : Table created by author.
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politically. Tunisian human rights activists asked the EU to suspend these negotiations due to the political repression they faced from thegovernment. The regime then passed a constitutional amendment which made it a criminal activity to incite ‘foreign parties not to grant loansto Tunisia, not to invest in the country, to boycott tourism or to sabo-tage Tunisia’s efforts to obtain advanced-partner status with the EU’ ( TheEconomist 2011). This move was heavily criticized within the EU humantrights community, as well as in the European Parliament. Nonetheless,negotiations continued but were eventually interrupted by the uprisingin the country. Thus, before the Arab uprisings, closer association to theEU as a reward for political reform was not used consistently.
This has somewhat improved since the uprisings. While Lebanon has still not been associated more closely with the EU, Tunisia has achievedadvanced partnership in November 2012 which means increased finan-cial and technical aid, as well as access for Tunisian agricultural prod-ucts to the single market and a liberalization of the service sector inthe context of which reciprocity is, however, absent (Dandashly 2015). Tunisia and Morocco have also signed mobility partnerships with theEU which sets the framework for negotiating visa facilitation, but alsoreadmission agreements. Tunis is also negotiating a DCFTA with the EU and a task force has been established to effectively support the Tunisiantransition through a better coordination of funding among the EU, Member States, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as internationalfinancial institutions. While Egypt declined to enter into a dialogue on a mobility partnership in 2011, during the Morsi period a common task force was set up in 2012 and negotiations for a DCFTA started in 2013.At the same time, however, the EU still treats Jordan as a frontrunneras well. A task force was established in 2012 and a mobility partnershipand DCFTA are currently negotiated. Thus, in terms of closer associa-tion, the EU has shown a tendentiously improving positive condition-ality approach since the Arab Spring, even though this is not entirelycoherent yet.
A similar trend can be found regarding the distribution of aid.Figure 7.2a–c shows the distribution of MEDA II (2000–2006), ENPI(2007–2013), and the reshuffled ENPI for the 2011–2013 period percountry in total and per capita. Total funding in all three cases did not correspond to the level of reform except in the case of Morocco.Per capita funding corresponded somewhat more to reform with animproving tendency from MEDA II, to ENPI, to ENPI 2011–2013. In allcases, Egypt, Algeria, and Syria received the lowest funding. Frontrunners
The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion 117
20431 8 136 48 56 10 9 37136 204 153
Morocco Egypt PA Tunisia Jordan Algeria Syria Lebanon
(a) MEDA II
Total in € mio Per capita in €
540 488391 340
24939 13 51 76 11 82 1176 82 249
Morocco Egypt Tunisia Jordan Algeria Lebanon Syria
(b) ENPI 2007–2013
Total in € mio Per capita in €
Morocco Egypt Tunisia Jordan Algeria Lebanon Libya
(c) ENPI 2011–2013
Total in million € Per capita in €
18 6 37 353 5 36 18107
Figure 7.2 (a) MEDA II (2000–2006), (b) ENPI (2007–2013), and (c) reshuffled ENPI (2011–2013) by country in total and per capita
Source: Figure created by author based on the following data sources: for MEDA II: EuropeanCommission (2009); for ENPI 2007–2013: National Indicative Programs 2007 and 2010 whichcan be found on the homepage of the European External Action Service (2014) except forthe PA where no National Indicative Program was available; for ENPI 2011–2013: European Commission (2012c; 2013a); for per capita calculations: population estimations of the World Factbook (CIA 2011).
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changed from MEDA II (with Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon) to ENPI (with Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco) and to the reshuf-fled ENPI 2011–2013 with Tunisia in the lead, followed by Lebanon,Jordan, and Morocco (the PA always received highest funding but canbe treated as an outlier due to the EU’s commitment to build up state institutions there).
Identitive democracy promotion
Regarding identitive democracy promotion the EU can use multilat-eral, bilateral, and unilateral tools. Multilaterally, it is mainly the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the EuroMed Civil Forum where issues such as democracy and human rights are discussed. Themeetings of heads of states and foreign ministers in the framework of the EMP and UfM concentrated on other issues in the areas of securityand economy. It should be noted that this multilateral form of identi-tive democracy promotion has not received a new input since the Arab uprisings (Huber 2013).
Bilateral dialogues are established through the association agreement.The association council meetings touched issues of democracy andhuman rights, but as the Commission noted in 2003, ‘this tends to consistmainly of general presentations by Member States or Mediterraneanpartners of their national Human Rights policies and does not lead toa discussion of substance. On the contrary, it can serve as a pretext to avoid serious discussion’ (European Commission 2003a, 13). Thus, theEU enhanced its capacity to promote democracy through discourse andestablished the subcommittees on human rights, democratization, andgovernance for the association councils to discuss these issues. Table 7.2 shows when they were set up.
Some partner countries resisted the set-up of these subcommittees,such as Egypt, which postponed the first subcommittee meeting, and Tunisia which canceled all the subcommittee meetings between 2005 and 2007. Other countries such as Morocco were relatively more open and the confidential meetings have led the country to lift its reservations against some international conventions and protocols (Kausch 2008, 8).
In terms of public unilateral speech acts, the EU has clearly preferredlauding positive developments over naming and shaming. An exampleis Egypt where the Council lauded the 2005 presidential elections which had been partially competitive as ‘an important step towards political reform’ and encouraged the regime to ‘to build on what has been achieved in preparing for future elections, including the forth-coming parliamentary ones’ (European Council 2005). However, when
The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion 119
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), as well as other opposition groups, gained considerably in the parliamentary elections and the regimepostponed local elections, increased the power of the president, and arrested leaders of the MB, putting them on trial in military courts without access of observers and imprisoning more than 200 of them(Human Rights Watch 2007), European criticism has been ‘conspicu-ously weak, and co-operation with Egypt has proceeded uninterrupted’(Youngs 2009, 909).
With the Arab uprisings, the EU admitted mistakes. EU Commissioner for Enlargement – Štefan Füle – stated that ‘Europe was not vocal enoughin defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region.Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimeswere a guarantee of stability in the region’ (Füle 2011). During the uprisings, the EU became more outspoken in reminding partner coun-tries of international human rights norms. The Council, for example,urged the ‘Egyptian authorities to respect and protect human rightsincluding freedom of assembly and freedom of expression’ (EuropeanCouncil 2011a) and High Representative Ashton called upon Syria ‘touphold the right to peaceful assembly and to abide by internationalstandards’ (Ashton 2011). Thus, when the EU did denounce humanrights violations, it connected them to international norms. Whenelected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was ousted by the Egyptianarmy, High Representative Catherine Ashton called upon all parties to‘rapidly return to the democratic process, including the holding of freeand fair presidential and parliamentary elections and the approval of
Table 7.2 Association council meetings and human rights and democracy subcommittees
Association agreement and association council
meetings sinceHuman rights
Algeria 2006 2010Egypt 2004 2008Jordan 2002 2005Lebanon 2006 2007Libya – –Morocco 2000 2007PA 1997 2008Syria Pending –Tunisia 1998 2007
Source : Table created by author.
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a constitution, to be done in a fully inclusive manner’ (Ashton 2013).Ashton also traveled to Egypt in an attempt to broker between the sidesand met Morsi in prison. Nonetheless, this rather soft approach had noimpact on the Egyptian army as neither the association agreement noraid was put on hold by the Council.
So what conclusions can be taken regarding variance in the extentof EU democracy promotion since the end of the Cold War? While theEU more often than not fails to promote democracy coherently, it has been and is incorporating this agenda to some degree into foreign policywhich is an interesting phenomenon and some turning points can beobserved in this respect. First, democracy promotion started to enter theEU’s foreign policy agenda in the Mediterranean in the early 1990s only with the EMP and its financial instrument MEDA, as well as EIDHR. Butwhile democracy assistance has been a consolidated, albeit rather minor,part of EU democracy promotion in the region ever since, politicalconditionality and identitive democracy promotion were hardly used.The EU aimed at changing this in the early 2000s with the creation of the ENP, a governance facility to reward reform, as well as the set-up of human rights and democracy subcommittees. So we can observe a push for the democracy agenda in the early 2000s which was also reflected inmore pressure toward dependent regimes like the Palestinian Authorityor Tunisia. From the mid-2000s onwards, however, the EU showed clear signals of diverting from its democracy agenda. It entered into negotia-tions for a ‘framework agreement’ with Libya outside of its principledframework and replaced the EMP with the UfM where democracy doesnot play a role. It also started to negotiate an advanced partnership with Tunisia, the opposition of Tunisia’s local human rights community tothis notwithstanding. A final turning point came with the Arab Spring with the EU somewhat improving its record in terms of democracyassistance and positive conditionality, less, however, in terms of identi-tive democracy promotion and negative conditionality. How can theseturning points be explained?
In the early 1990s, all of a sudden Europe felt freed from the Cold War. As the European Council argued, following ‘the fall of the Berlin Wall, it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights’ (European Council 2001b). However, rather than a stable order, the end of the Cold War meant that the security environment was changing. Galia Press-Barnathan has suggested that in a unipolar system threat perceptions become more fluent and less stable, because they ‘cannot be fully deduced from the system’s structure; they are influenced more than they were in the bipolar system by geographic variations, differentperceptions of intentions, various domestic factors, and ideology’ (Press-Barnathan 2006, 273). New conflicts like the one in the Balkans becameunlocked and the European Union had to deal with new types of secu-rity threats. High Representative Solana argued that there had been a
radical change in the strategic environment of Europe followingthe disintegration of the Soviet Union. We no longer face the threat of massive conventional and non-conventional attack on NATOnations. Instead, we are confronted by a range of risks that threaten the stability of Europe, but which fall short of threatening our very existence. (Solana 2000a)
Facing such a new environment, the EU adopted the European SecurityStrategy (ESS) in 2003 which identified five key threats to EU security:terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regionalconflicts, state failure, and organized crime including illegal migration.All key threats mentioned in the ESS accelerated in the 2000s in theMiddle East, making it the most important geo-strategic area for the
8 The EU’s New SecurityEnvironment
122 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
EU in this time period. While during the 1990s the region seemed tohave become more stable and even hopeful in light of the Oslo Accordsbetween Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) andthe Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty, this changed in the first decade of the millennium with the flaring up of conflicts in the region over which theEU could exert relatively little influence.
The acceleration of key threats in the Mediterraneanin the 2000s
In the early 2000s the Israeli-Palestinian conflict revived with the secondIntifada and the Gaza conflict, as well as the 2006 second Israel-Lebanonwar. While the EU sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as vital for regional and its own security1 and has been the main payer of Palestinian state-building as envisaged in the Oslo Accords, it has played only a limited role in the conflict due to Israeli hesitancies (Harpaz and Shamis2010) and with the United States remaining the key player in thisrespect. Nonetheless, the EU made some steps forward in heightening itsmediating role through its inclusion in the Middle East Quartet and hasalso improved its capacities in conflict management through missionssuch as the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah (2005–2007), its police mission for the Palestinian territories based in the West Bank since 2005 (EUPOL COPPS), and a strong European participation in the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon. Nonetheless,much remains to be done for the EU to heighten its profile in this area(Asseburg 2009; Mueller 2013).
A further conflict scenario opened up with the US-led invasion of Iraqin 2003 in which the EU was even less of a player, paralyzed by an internal split (Lewis 2009). The war, as well as the insurgency, sectarian and crim-inal violence that resulted from the breakdown of the state following theinvasion has led to approximately 120,000–130,000 civilian deaths as of March 2014 (Iraq Body Count Project 2014). The war did not only makeIraq a failed state (Flibbert 2013) but led to a wave of refugees, mainly toSyria and Jordan, thus destabilizing fragile ethnic balances in the imme-diate neighborhood. With the Syrian civil war, the situation in the region has been aggravated even further, with the death toll in Syria passing 100,000 according to the UN in July 2013 (BBC 2013) and more than 2 million refugees who have mainly moved to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq (Refworld 2013) with destabilizing spillover effects in all coun-tries. When evidence was found that chemical weapons had been used inthe outskirts of Damascus, the conflict loomed to turn into a regional war as the United States threatened military action. With the EU once again
The EU’s New Security Environment 123
divided on the issue (Tocci 2013, 2), the key actor in preventing such an escalation was Russia which provided Washington with a face-saving exitoption with the Syrian accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Where the EU has succeeded in playing a more crucial role is inthe latent conflict on the Iranian nuclear file. In 1998, the EU estab-lished a Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran which mainly focused onenergy, trade, and investment. Negotiations for a Political Dialogue Agreement and for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement started in 2002, the same year in which Iran announced plans to construct nuclearpower plants.2 The evolving crisis led to the breakdown of talks in mid-2003, but the EU3 group (France, Germany, United Kingdom) ledby High Representative Javier Solana formed and brokered the TeheranAgreement – a major diplomatic achievement for the EU. The EU keptits diplomatic momentum on the Iranian nuclear file despite US hesi-tancies to this role until 2005. In 2006 the group became the EU3+3 (US, Russia, China), but negotiations broke down and a period of sharp-ening sanctions started peaking in late 2011 and early 2012 when Iranthreatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in reaction to severing US sanc-tions. Since the election of Hassan Rouhani as President in Iran in 2013, tensions have eased and a new round of negotiations between Iran andthe EU3+3 chaired by High Representative Catherine Ashton started.
While these conflicts were largely confined to the Middle East, themajor challenge for the EU in North Africa was illegal migration whichstarted to accelerate in the 2000s as can be seen in Figure 8.1 and which
Figure 8.1 Illegal migration arriving in Spain, Italy, and Malta (1993–2006)through the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean routes (2008–2013)
Source: Figure created by author based on the following data sources: 1993–2006: de Haas(2008), 2008–2013: Frontex (2014).
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has been securitized by the EU. The EU has reacted to the phenomenonnot only with the set-up of Frontex – the European agency for border security in operation since 2005 – but also with rather extraordinary means which are calling the EU’s own funding values and norms into question, such as pressuring the partner states into signing readmissionagreements, so placing the burden ‘on countries less able than its ownmembers to bear the strain of repatriating migrants’ (Rees 2011, 244).With the Arab uprisings, migration from MENA has further accelerated.Additionally, other security concerns have strengthened again, notably the collapse of law and order across Libya and the wider Sahel regionwhich leads to opportunities for terrorism, criminal networks, and armssmuggling in the region (Cristiani et al. 2014; Huber, Dennison, andLeSueur 2014).
Parallel to the flaring up of all these conflicts and security concerns inthe region throughout the 2000s and indeed perceived as a direct resultof these, threat perceptions in the EU of terrorism, Islamic fundamen-talism, and migration increased. As Federica Bicchi has pointed out,
Migration, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism linked to Islamicfundamentalism were the three themes that monopolized the debateabout Euro-Mediterranean relations at the turn of the decade. Themilitary and economic dimension of security thus dropped to thebottom of the agenda while social security (migration) and politicalaspects of security (Islamic fundamentalism and its terrorist spin-offs)climbed to the top. (Bicchi 2007, 131–132)
A period started in which the other – fundamentalist Islam, but also political Islam and Islam per se in the neighborhood as well as throughmigration in Europe – was increasingly represented as a security threat,as the following section will show.
The representation of the other as a security threat
Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum have pointed out that Islam hashistorically been the other for Europeans, ‘first through the Arabs, thenthrough the Ottoman Empire. This has shaped the Christian element inEuropean identity leading to a tension between, on the one hand, an essentialist and static and, on the other, a more inclusive and dynamic understanding of European identity’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, 536).But while Islam was historically othered by Europeans through repre-senting the other as inferior (Said 1979), what changed in the 2000s was
The EU’s New Security Environment 125
the increasing association of Islam with fundamentalism and terrorismso representing the other as a security threat.
While Islamic fundamentalism was already perceived as a challenge inthe 1990s when the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) hijacked anAir France airbus in 1994 and bombed the 1995 Paris Metro in 1995, thiswas mainly seen as a French problem (Joffé 2008, 155). The full secu-ritization of the phenomenon on the European level came with 9/11 (Bicchi 2007, 143) and was then further strengthened with the bomb-ings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. In 2001, the EuropeanCouncil concluded that
Terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe. … The elev-enth of September has brought a rude awakening. The opposingforces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism,racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts,poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed forthem. (European Council 2001b, 21)
In 2002, 82 per cent of Europeans named terrorism as their numberone fear (European Commission 2003c, 3). In 2008, High RepresentativeSolana in his report on the European Security Strategy noted that prolif-eration by states and terrorism which the ESS saw as the potentiallygreatest threat to EU security, ‘has increased in the last five years’ (Solana2008, 3) and that terrorism ‘remains a major threat to our livelihoods’ (Solana 2008, 4). Furthermore, terrorism became associated with theissue of migration. Besides perceiving increased migration as a problem per se, in wake of the 9/11 attacks which had been partially planned inEurope, migrants were increasingly securitized and seen as ‘transmis-sion trains of violent ideologies of conflict’ (Joffé 2008, 159; see alsoThränhardt 1996). Solana, for example, pointed out that ‘the MiddleEast is increasingly present in our city centres, not just on the other sideof the Mediterranean. Violence and instability in the Middle East has knock-on effects on the streets of Europe’ (Solana 2005a, 2).
However, not only migrants within Europe were increasingly repre-sented as threats, but authoritarian regimes in the region tried to takeadvantage of the increasing Western fear of Islamic fundamentalismby also presenting political Islam in their own countries as a security threat, thus seeking to justify human rights violations against a variance of actors associated with political Islam and beyond. Since the West hasshown a tendency to perceive Islamists as monolithic – a worldview that‘has been perpetuated in part by some Muslim groups (mainly Islamists)
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who themselves construct a unitary Islamic landscape’ (Bayat 2007, 2) –authoritarian regimes were rather successful with their promotion of the view that transnational terrorism was an ‘emanation of the violencethey claimed was inherent in political Islam’ (Joffé 2008, 155).3 Whilethe EU has not securitized political Islam on the same level as its MemberStates (Bicchi and Martin 2006), its contacts to political Islam in theregion were highly limited until the Arab uprisings when the MuslimBrotherhood and affiliated movements made headway in elections inEgypt, Tunisia, and Libya.
In all, we can conclude this section by the assessment that EU democ-racy promotion indeed started in the early 1990s when threat percep-tions were relatively low. This enabled democracy promotion, even though it does not explain what pushed for democracy promotion atthe time. Threat perceptions also explain double standards in EU democ-racy promotion, notably in respect to political Islam. However, threatperceptions did not appear to have an independent effect on foreignpolicy. Democracy promotion received a push in the early 2000s, that is exactly at a time when threat perceptions were rising. Furthermore,threat perceptions were constantly high throughout the 2000s and cantherefore also not explain variance in the use of democracy promotionin this time period. What then explains these variances?
This chapter observes the internal and external roots of the EU’s demo-cratic role identity, as well as the crucial role the other plays in acti-vating it. It argues that the formation of this identity was not only usefulfor the EU to create attachment to the Union, but it also formed inthe 1990s in a euphoric international environment where democracy became a zeitgeist. In wake of the successful enlargement process this identity skyrocketed but subsequently entered a bumpy road since it wasnot activated by the other in the Mediterranean region – a situation thatmight change again with the Arab uprisings.
The EU internal dimension: democracy promotionfor identity creation
Democracy is clearly one of the shared values of European citizens, possibly the primary one. All European Member States are democracies and thecharacterization of the EU as a democracy is today commonly shared byEuropeans (Diez Medrano 2009, 97). However, democracy has not been anestablished value of the integration project from the very beginning. The Treaty of Rome did not mention democracy as a principle of the European Community or its Member States – to be exact, it did not mention democ-racy (or human rights) 1 at all. It became a principle through a politicalprocess. Concretely, we have to distinguish two related but nonethelessdistinct processes here: first, how democracy became a core criterion formembership in the EU in the 1970s which was institutionalized in the1990s; and, second, how democracy became a core criterion for the func-tioning of the EU itself in the 1990s but still suffers from deficits.
9 The Formation of a DemocraticRole Identity, Its Hype, andSubsequent Stumbling
128 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy
Democracy as a criterion for membership in the European Community emerged already in the 1960s (Thomas 2006). When the EC faced theapplication for membership of autocratic Spain, the issue had to bediscussed, and was most controversially so. While some Member Stateslike France and Germany promoted Spanish membership its regime typenotwithstanding, the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as socialist parties, trade unions, and Spanish opposition groups were opposed, arguing thatSpain’s membership was morally untenable. The Birkelbach Report on the political and institutional aspects of accession to or association withthe Community was commissioned in 1961 and while ‘recognizing thatArticle 237 had opened the EEC to “any European state”’, Birkelbachand his colleagues used the preamble’s reference to ‘liberty’ and its aspiration to ‘ever closer union’ as the basis for arguing that the treatyimposed strict political conditions on membership (Thomas 2006, 1198).Democracy was increasingly seen as a precondition for membership: in1967, the European Community suspended its association agreementwith Greece (signed in 1961) as a reaction to the military coup in the country (Russett, Starr, and Kinsella 2009, 327). The 1970 LuxembourgReport declared that membership in the European Community was opento democracies only. It stated that a ‘united Europe should be based on a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man and bringtogether democratic States with freely elected parliaments. This unitedEurope remains the fundamental aim’ (European Council 1970). In 1978 the Council declared that democracy and human rights are essen-tial elements of membership of the European Communities (EuropeanCouncil 1978). In 1993 the European Council spelled out the associationcriteria for the first time, including democracy.2 The formulation of these criteria was – as pointed out by Ulrich Sedelmeier – ‘in itself a crucialaspect of identity creation. By defining and spelling out the criteria formembership, the EU explicitly articulated the fundamental characteris-tics that it ascribed to itself’ (Sedelmeier 2003, 7). The 1997 AmsterdamTreaty then also set up measures to protect democracy in Member States.It included a provision according to which a Member State that deviatedfrom core values could be sanctioned. The provision was for the firsttime applied in February 2000, when Jörg Haider’s extreme right-wingFreedom Party joined the Austrian government.3 Concerted sanctions were imposed on the Austrian government by the European MemberStates in accordance with articles 6 and 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, and while these were stopped in September 2000 when it became clear thatthis measure had increased support for the extreme right in Austria andother European countries, they had nonetheless confirmed what was ‘to
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be considered politically acceptable in the Union’ (Leconte 2005, 622).Thus, democracy as a core criterion for membership in the Union canbe considered as established and rather robust. The same, however, does not apply to democracy as a core principle for the functioning of theUnion itself.
Indeed, it took the EU a while to even mention it as such. While the1973 document on European Identity stated generally that principlesof representative democracy, rule of law, social justice, and respect forhuman rights ‘are fundamental elements of the European Identity’(European Council 1973), it was only in 1978 in a Declaration on Democracy by the Council that ideals of democracy were mentioned inconnection to the functioning of the EC itself, namely in relation to thefirst upcoming election of the European Assembly (European Council1978). In 1983 the Solemn Declaration became somewhat more specificin outlining the Council’s determination to promote democracy withinthe EC on ‘the basis of the fundamental rights, recognized in the consti-tutions and laws of the Member States, in the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and the European Social Charter’(European Council 1983, 1). This terminology was repeated in theSingle European Act (SEA) of 1986 (European Community 1986, 2).The Maastricht Treaty was the first treaty that explicitly expresses thedesire ‘to enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions’ (European Union 1992). The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was the first treaty which mentions democracy as a founding value. Itstates that the ‘Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democ-racy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States’ (EuropeanUnion 1997) and the Lisbon Treaty is the most extensive treaty so farin determining how to improve democracy at the EU level (EuropeanUnion 2007). So, while we can say that in the observed time perioddemocracy represents an established founding value of the EU since itis anchored as such in EU treaties, it is nonetheless still salient as hasbeen and still is evident in the ongoing debate on the EU’s democraticdeficits led not only by the European and national parliaments, but alsoby intellectuals and academics, parties, civil society organizations, socialmovements, and citizen platforms.
Content-wise, this debate has been so encompassing that it can hardlybe summarized. The EU has deficiencies in representation and accounta-bility as it is ‘legitimated not as a government of citizens, but as a govern-ment of governments’ (Scharpf 2009, 3). The European Parliament doesnot have direct control over governing bodies (Mair and Thomassen
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2010, 23), and in addition to this many decisions are prepared in an EUbureaucracy that is far removed from European citizens. Karen Smithhas pointed out that ‘much EU decision-making takes place behindclosed doors in deals struck between national and Commission offi-cials, sometimes with considerable input from interest groups, and withlittle democratic oversight by either the EP or national parliaments’(K. Smith 2003, 123). While the Lisbon Treaty has improved this situ-ation, one of the biggest challenges remains the curtailed power of national parliaments (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Bellamy andKröger 2012; Sprungk 2013; I. Cooper 2012). Furthermore, the EU lacksrepresentativeness with European parliamentary elections not raising much interest among Europeans as reflected in low voter turnout.Election campaigns have not always been truly about EU topics (Hix1999; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002), and it has also been questioned if there is a European public sphere. Jan Zielonka believes that ‘(p)olitical discourses are largely confined to national public spaces with little signof a truly European public space emerging with the progress of Europeanintegration’ (Zielonka 2006, 133). Thomas Risse, however, rejects that and argues that ‘we can observe the Europeanization of public sphereswhenever European issues are debated’ (Risse 2010, 5).
In face of these internal problems with democracy, EU externaldemocracy promotion seems almost paradoxical. The ‘wide discrep-ancy between internal union practice and external policy objectives’(K. Smith 2003, 123) is puzzling indeed, but could actually be the very reason for democracy promotion. Through democracy promotion inforeign policy, the EU ascribes democracy as a value to itself and the EU citizen can ‘experience the proclaimed common values and princi-ples applied’ (Lucarelli 2006, 13). While this cannot substitute for theinternal institutional reform process, it can accompany it and serve as ameasure to foster a common European identity and increase support forthe EU among those Europeans who still reject the integration project.4 Keohane maintains that democracy promotion reinforces commonEuropean values, makes ‘Europeans feel good about themselves and theEU’s role in the world’, and serves ‘as the moral equivalent of nation-alism, reinforcing internal cohesion and a sense of European self-esteem’ (Keohane 2002, 746). Thus, democracy promotion could be a purely instrumental internal ‘nation-building’ policy within a specific identity framework.
In this logic, democracy promotion should be important throughoutthe observed time period, but the rationale for it becomes even morepressured at critical junctures when the EU as a democratic project
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stands at a crossroad. A critical juncture for the EU as a democratic project would be a moment of ‘definitional’ change when foundationalstructures of the EU are altered with gross effects for democracy in theEU and with public debates emerging questioning the EU, specificallyin light of its democraticness. At such junctures we could expect a push for democracy promotion in foreign policy to strengthen a European identity through a shared goal that ascribes democracy as a value to the EU. Two such critical junctures for the EU can be identified: the formal establishment of the EU through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, deep-ening the EU at an unprecedented level but also bringing a ‘constraining dissensus’ on the EU to the fore, and the run-up to ‘big bang’ enlarge-ment in 2004 widening the EU by including more new Member Statesand people than any other enlargement but also fostering fears of thefuture governability of the Union. 5
The Maastricht Treaty was established in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, and the reunificationof Germany. This was a period of hope, but also great uncertain-ties. The Maastricht Treaty recalled ‘the historic importance of theending of the division of the European continent and the need tocreate firm bases for the construction of the future Europe’ (European Union 1992) and put cooperation on a new level in areas such as the common foreign and security policy, justice, and home affairs. Italso implemented the European Monetary Union. This new level of cooperation made democratic reform of EU institutions and decision-making urgent, especially since the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindbergand Scheingold 1970) of Europeans for an elite-driven project had ended and turned into a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 5). The first sign of this was that the Maastricht Treaty was rejected in a referendum in Denmark and almost in France. At stake was an alienation of Europeans by an intruding but demo-cratically unaccountable European bureaucracy and an acceleratingintegration process which they were insufficiently informed about.In light of this, the Council argued in 1995 that Europeans ‘more than ever, feel the need for a common project. And yet, for a growing number of Europeans, the rationale for Community integration isnot self-evident. … . (T)here is a growing sense of public disaffection’(European Council 1995). Among the responses to this challenge, the Council suggests to improve democracy at the EU level and to increase the EU’s capacity for external action. Thus, from the very beginning,the idea that external action can play a decisive role in fostering a common European identity was present (Anderson 2008). Over the
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course of time EU institutions would become even more concrete asto how such an identity could be fostered.
While the EU sought to enhance democracy in subsequent treaties – the Amsterdam Treaty gave more power to the European Parliament by extending the co-decision procedure (by Council and Parliament)to more policy fields – the EU did not fully succeed in tackling theinstitutional reforms necessary to prepare the Union for the upcoming 2004 ‘big bang enlargement’ of ten (plus two) new Member States. Itwas unclear if the EU would still be governable in an enlarged Union,let alone how it should represent the citizens of all EU Member Statesdemocratically. The 2000 Nice Treaty was so limited in scope that theEuropean parliament, as well as the Belgian and Italian Parliamentsthreatened to reject it. In face of the urgency of the matter, a Europeanhigh-level debate on the constitutional future of Europe commenced,triggered by a speech of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2000)in May 2000 on the future of Europe in which he proposed a European Federation. Responding keynote addresses by French President JacquesChirac (2000), Italian President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (2000), and BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair (2000) followed. Also European intellectualssuch as Jürgen Habermas (2001), the Commission (Prodi 2001), andthe European Parliament (2000) joined in the debate. In an extensivemedia analysis, Hans-Jörg Trenz has shown that this was one of the fewpan-European medial debates on a common issue of principled char-acter, reflecting an identitive self-determination (Trenz 2005, 298–298). The future of the EU as a democratic project was positively contested in Europe’s public space. The 2001 Laeken Council has to be seen inthis context. It not only set up the Convention on the Future of Europeto tackle the comprehensive issues of treaty reform and democracy inthe Union, but also explicitly mentioned democracy promotion as aninstrument to foster a common European identity. Arguing that the ‘image of a democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matchescitizens’ wishes’, the Laeken Presidency Conclusions put the instrumentof democracy promotion abroad on an equal footing with that of demo-cratic reform itself: ‘The European Union derives its legitimacy from thedemocratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers andinstruments it possesses. However, the European project also derivesits legitimacy from democratic, transparent and efficient institutions’(European Council 2001b, 20–22). This is also supported by a WhitePaper published by the Commission shortly before the Laeken Councilmeeting and aimed at improving democratic governance within theUnion. It argues that
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The objectives of peace, growth, employment and social justicepursued within the Union must also be promoted outside for them tobe effectively attained at both European and global level. This respondsto citizens’ expectations for a powerful Union on a world stage.Successful international action reinforces European identity and the impor-tance of shared values within the Union. (European Commission 2001,27, italics added)
Similar argumentations can be found in the speeches of Javier Solana inthe early 2000s. In 2000, he pointed out that the
defense and promotion of the values … are at the heart of Europeanhistory and civilization. We believe in the value of tolerance, democ-racy and respect for human rights. This must be an integral part of our policy-making process. Because values are our crucial link withthe people on the street, who want to understand why we take thisor that decision, and whose support we need at all times. (Solana2000b)
In 2002 he argued that ‘CFSP is the EU policy with the highest popularsupport … Europeans may differ on a lot of things, but not on the strongconviction that Europe has to be the safe haven of democracy andpeace’ (Solana 2002, 4). Thus, in the early 2000s specifically, the EU sees a democratic role identity in foreign affairs as useful for fostering a common internal European identity. Democracy promotion as a shared foreign policy purpose served the European project. We can thereforesay that there was an instrumental and deliberate part in the formationof this specific EU role identity. It developed as part of a rationalization process in a specific identity setting. At the same time, it also developed within a particular international normative context which did not onlymake this role identity appropriate, but – due to the EU’s perception of its own contribution to the international growth of democracy – led toa downright hype of this identity in the early 2000s.
The international dimension: the growth of democracy and its pulls on the EU
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Europe celebrated the ‘historic importance of the ending of the divi-sion of the European continent’ (European Union 1992). The declineof communism made some believe that the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama
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1989) had come, that all states were to become democratic and an era of democratic peace was due to begin. The ‘third wave of democratization’(Huntington 1991) cascaded in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. Larry Diamond termed this ‘the greatest transformation of the way states aregoverned in the history of the world’ (Diamond 2008b, 6) and democracy became a zeitgeist: it came – as Amartya Sen argued – to be seen as ‘the “normal” form of government to which any nation is entitled – whetherin Europe, America, Asia, or Africa’ (Sen 1999, 1). To demonstrate theimpact of these developments on the EU, its identity and foreign policy, this section is in two parts: it first follows the growth of democracy andof human rights norms/a right to democracy on three levels – in Europe, the Arab world, and worldwide – before it moves to the EU’s perceptionof these developments and its own role in it.
While democracy has been consolidated in Western Europe since the1980s, Figure 9.1 below shows the status of democracy in the EU neigh-borhoods: Eastern Europe/Eurasia and MENA. In the Eastern Europe/Eurasia region, democracy started its advance in the 1990s, passed the 30 per cent threshold in 1994/1995, and the 40 per cent threshold in 2000.
Parallel to the growth of democracy in Europe, democratizing statesalso acceded to the European human rights regime based on the EuropeanConvention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedom by the Council of Europe which entered into force in 1953. The Convention also established an effective third party mechanism:the European Court of Human Rights. Through its interpretation of theConvention, the European Court of Human Rights specified those rightsand made them comparable to a highly developed fundamental rightssystem (Herdegen 2002, 326). Figure 9.2 shows the status of ratifica-tion of the Convention. Of the states in Europe, only Belarus is a non-member; at the time of this writing, the European Union is currently inthe process of assessing it as an International Organization.
Middle East and North Africa
In the Middle East and North Africa democracy has never passed the10 per cent threshold since it fell below it in 1975. Nonetheless, Figure 9.1also shows a cautious liberalization process in the early 2000s which was short-lived and declined from 2007 onwards after political Islamhad been increasingly successful in relatively democratic elections Iraq,Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority in the 2005/2006 periodand governments of countries such as Egypt or Jordan tightened their
The Formation of a Democratic Role Identity 135
grip on the opposition again. Nonetheless, a desire for democracy in the Arab world was apparent in opinion surveys. In its 2006 survey, the ArabBarometer showed that an average of 90 per cent of respondents believedthat it would be good to have a democratic system of governance in their country, and an average of 86 per cent of respondents found thatdemocracy is the best system of governance (Jamal and Tessler 2005, 98). In addition, the 2005 Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, the 2008 breadriots and strikes in Egypt, and the 2009 Green Revolution in Iran were
Free Partly free Not free
Free Partly free Not free
Figure 9.1 Freedom House Index for (a) Eastern Europe/Eurasia and (b) Middle East/North Africa by number of countries, 1991–2014
Source : Figure created by author based on data from Freedom House (2014).
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the first signs of a trend which cascaded in the 2011 Arab uprisings. Atthe time of writing, significant democratic advances were achieved in Tunisia and possibly Libya which, however, struggles with establishinga monopoly of power in the country. In the other MENA states that experienced major protests – Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria – authoritarian regimes have suppressed or adapted to the uprisings (Heydemann andLeenders 2012). Other states, like Morocco, Jordan, and Algeria, weresuccessful in preventing large-scale protests from evolving in the firstplace (Volpi 2013). Nonetheless – and indeed similar to the third wave of democratizations that ‘reinforced the view that respect for human rightsand democratic principles was not an exclusively Western phenomenon and could and should be promoted abroad’ (K. Smith 2001, 188) – theArab uprisings have powerfully dispelled an argument championed bySamuel Huntington, namely that ‘individualism, liberalism, constitu-tionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, … often have little resonance in Islamic … cultures’ (Huntington1993, 40).
Regarding human rights norms in the Middle East and North Africa,in 1994 the Organization of the Islamic Conference adopted the CairoDeclaration on Human Rights in Islam, naming sharia as the basis of human rights. As a result, the document was internationally widely
Figure 9.2 Status of ratification of the European Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Source : Figure created by author based on data from Council of Europe (2009).
The Formation of a Democratic Role Identity 137
criticized and in 2004 the Arab League adopted a Charter on Human Rights which refers to the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR, but also mentions the Cairo Declarationon Human Rights and falls short of internationally accepted humanrights standards.6 The Charter is presently signed by 59 per cent of theArab League member states.7 The Arab Human Rights Committee estab- lished in 2009 is not obliged to issue public reports on member states’compliance with the Charter, and there is no Arab Court of Human Rights, even though the Arab Spring has led to some movement in thisarea; Bahrain has recently proposed the establishment of a Court to theArab League.
On the worldwide level, democracy passed the 30 per cent threshold in1989 and the 40 per cent threshold in 1994/1995 as could be seen inFigure 6.3. Figure 6.3 also shows that from 2009 onwards, the third wavestagnated around the 45 per cent threshold. Indeed, many researchersstarted to speak of a democratic backlash (Burnell and Youngs 2009; Diamond 2008a; 2008b; Youngs and Emerson 2009) as the so-calledcolor revolutions did not take off, the Arab world was seen as a ‘bastion of autocracy’, and some of the most populous and influential statesin the world, namely Russia and China, remained autocracies. While
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure 9.3 Signatories Arab League Charter on Human Rights in per cent of member states
Source : Figure created by author based on data from Arab League (2014).
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democracies are in general better performers than autocracies, theyare nonetheless outrun economically and in terms of welfare by a fewsuccessful autocracies such as Singapore and Malaysia (Saxer 2009,3) which made these states another model to follow. At the same time, democracy started to deteriorate in some respects in Western democra-cies themselves as a result of the new security agenda after 9/11 (Bigo2010) and protests in Western democracies formed as these states increasingly lost their capacity to pursue independent economic and social policies in times of globalization (Crouch 2004; Castells 2010).
Regarding the growth of the norm of democracy in international law,developments up to the end of the Cold War were already discussed inthe US case. Before the breakdown of the Soviet Union, democracy per sewas not an international norm; rather several democratic rights and principles as part of the human rights family belonged to internationalnorms. This is still the case, only that democracy itself is becoming anexplicitly pronounced right in this family. In the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, in the wake of which the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was established, the GeneralAssembly declared that ‘(t)he international community should supportthe strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world’(United Nations General Assembly 1993, Para. 8). In his seminal articleon the emerging right to democratic governance Thomas Franck has argued that democracy is emerging as a right per se rooted in the right to self-determination (Franck 1992, 53). The idea of a ‘right to democ-racy’ implies that democracy is on its way to turn into an ‘entitlement’,meaning that it is transforming now into an international rather thana solely domestic affair. References to democracy started to cascade in resolutions of the UN Security Council in the 1990s. Gregory Fox pointsout that ‘(f)rom 1993 through 2000, the Council referred to “democ-racy” in fifty-three resolutions, all of them favorable’ (Fox 2004, 69). TheSecurity Council even authorized coercive interventions in Haiti (1994)and Sierra Leone (1998) after elected leaders of two UN-monitored elec-tions were overthrown. It also authorized the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya (2011) when Colonel Ghaddafi violently suppressed upris-ings which called for an end to his autocratic rule.
In light of these developments, Michael McFaul (2004) even claimedthat democracy promotion itself is becoming an international value.This is, however, questionable. It was precisely in 2003 when the Iraq intervention was justified ex post by the Bush administration asdemocracy promotion that the legitimacy of democracy promotion was
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increasingly questioned worldwide and in the Arab world specifically. While the interventions in Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Libya were author-ized by the UN Security Council and were interventions in countriesin the midst of civil war, the invasion of Iraq was – as pointed out by Whitehead – ‘of a different order of magnitude. … To suspend the sovereignty of such a state was to bring into question the integrity of national political institutions across half the world’ (Whitehead 2009,226). Whitehead has argued that the Iraq war was a ‘pivotal case’ whichundermined the international consensus on democracy promotion andalso damaged the legitimacy of democracy promotion by countries andinternational institutions which had not participated in it. Democracypromotion became associated with occupation, war, and torture.
What would these developments in Europe, MENA, and worldwidemean for the EU? To discuss this, we can distinguish three periods from an EU perspective: first, the euphoric 1990s in which the democracyand human rights norm grew in Europe and worldwide; second, theeven more euphoric early 2000s in which democracy in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood passed the 40 per cent threshold and in which a liber-alization trend also was initiated in the Mediterranean neighborhood;third, a more challenging period that starts with the Iraq war in 2003 when democracy promotion loses international legitimacy and furtherdeteriorates when liberalization in MENA is driven back in 2005/2006and enters into a worldwide stagnation period in 2008. This periodmight have ended with the 2011 Arab uprisings.
In the first period, we see a clear pull of international normativechange on the EU. Already in 1988, the Rhodes European Council statedthat among the EC’s commitments are ‘to demonstrate solidarity to the spreading movement for democracy and support for the UniversalDeclaration on Human Rights’ (European Council 1988). Similar rhet-oric accelerates in the 1990s. The Commission argued in 1995 that the
European Union’s activities fall within the general framework consti-tuted by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, complemented by the International Pacts on civil andpolitical rights and on economic, social and cultural rights. Theseactivities are also based on the commitments engendered by the maininternational and regional instruments for the protection of humanrights. (European Commission 1995b, 9)
The EU deduced a right to promote human rights and democraticfreedoms from growing human rights norms. Furthermore, we can
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also find a moral pull on the EU from the growing norm of democracy. In the early 1990s, there is continued reference to a duty to promote human rights and democratic freedoms. The 1991 Luxembourg Councilfor example welcomes ‘the advances in democracy in Europe andthroughout the world’ and argues that in face of violations of humanrights the ‘Community and its member States undertake to pursue theirpolicy of promoting and safeguarding human rights and fundamentalfreedoms throughout the world. This is the legitimate and permanentduty of the world community and of all States acting individually andcollectively’ (European Council 1991). It further argues that ‘differentways of expressing concern about violations of rights … cannot beconsidered as interference in the internal affairs of a State and constitute an important and legitimate part of their dialogue with third countries’(European Council 1991). Similarly, in the resolution of the Council on human rights, democracy, and development in November 1991, it states that ‘human rights have a universal nature and it is the duty of all states to promote them’ (in Hill and Smith 2000, 444). 8
Thus, in the early 1990s, we can observe a confidence pull and a moralpull on the EU. In light of the growth of democracies and of democraticrights, democracy promotion became an appropriate policy (the EUconceived a right to do so) and a moral policy (it conceived a responsi-bility to do so). It was therefore in this international normative contextthat the ground for the formation of a democratic role identity of the EU was laid. Indeed, in 1995 the Commission stated that in ‘an inter-national environment in which the universal nature of human rightsis increasingly emphasized, the European Union has gradually come todefine itself in terms of the promotion of those rights and democraticfreedoms’ (European Commission 1995b, 7).
This identity then skyrocketed in the early 2000s due to the EU’sperception of its own contribution to this development. The enlarge-ment process had been such a successful EU endeavor that it boostedthe EU’s forming democratic role identity. EU institutions gaveeuphoric statements on the contribution of the EU to democracy and a stable world order. Romano Prodi, then President of the EuropeanCommission, stated that ‘the current enlargement is the greatest contribution to sustainable stability and security on the European continent that the EU ever made. It is one of the most successful andimpressive political transformations of the twentieth century’ (Prodi2002). Commissioner for Enlargement Günther Verheugen pointedout that ‘(d)uring the past fifty years the European Union contributed decisively to transform a large part of our continent, previously raged
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by devastating wars and nationalist divisions, into an area of peace, freedom, integration and prosperity’. Inspired by this ‘greatest success story in the second part of the 20th century’, he proposed to expand this ‘area of stability and prosperity’ to the neighborhood by ‘promotingour shared values, including those of rule of law, democracy and human rights’ (Verheugen 2003, 3–4). Also, High Representative Javier Solana argued that in face of the ‘amazing success story’ of the enlargement,democracy promotion seems ‘voluntary, cost-effective and extraordi-narily successful’ (Solana 2005b, 1). The European Council for its partasked if Europe does not ‘have a leading role to play in a new worldorder, that of a power able both to play a stabilizing role worldwide andto point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’ (EuropeanCouncil 2001b, 21). The confidence that the enlargement process had instilled in the EU in respect to its own capacities boosted its demo-cratic role identity. The EU started to perceive a unique role for itself for democracy and – connected to this – stability in world politics. Aggestam (2004) has shown that at the end of the 1990s a consensushad emerged among France, Britain, and Germany that the EU shouldbe an ‘ethical’ power. EU politicians increasingly spoke of the EU as a ‘global civil power’ (Prodi 2000) or as a ‘pole of attraction’ (Prodi 2002). This role identity was even reflected in a revived academic discourseon the concept of Europe as a civil or normative power triggered by an article of Ian Manners (2002).9
Thus, the EU’s democratic role identity forming in the early 1990sand being boosted in the early 2000s explains the incorporation of democracy promotion into EU foreign policy in the early 1990s and therenewed push for it in the early 2000s. The enlargement process instilleda certain path-dependence into European foreign policy (Sedelmeier 2006, 126). Democracy promotion did not only receive a boost, but the scripts of EU democracy promotion were modeled after the enlargementprocess (Kelley 2006; Gebhard 2010). What then happened to this roleidentity in the third period and what explains that democracy promo-tion showed declining tendencies up until the Arab uprisings? Whilethe EU’s democratic role identity which formed in the 1990s and early 2000s seems relatively robust – it is institutionalized as well as commonlyshared – the following section will argue that it was not activated by theother. Thus its implementation in practice remained weak and full of double standards, which eventually lead to the first signs of negativebackfiring on the democratic role identity just before the Arab uprisingswhich might change this situation, even though their long-term impacton the EU’s democratic role identity remains to be seen.
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The robustness of the EU’s democratic role identity and the crucial role of the other in activating it
The EU’s democratic role identity has become relatively robust both in terms of institutionalization, as well as commonality. Democracy promo-tion as a shared social purpose of the EU in foreign policy is legallyenshrined in EU treaties. The Maastricht Treaty states that ‘(t)he objec-tives of the common foreign and security policy shall be: to safeguardthe common values, fundamental interests and independence of theUnion; … to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, andrespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (European Union1992). Also the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the Nice Treaty of 2000, andthe Lisbon Treaty of 2007 confirmed democracy as a general objective of foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty states that the
Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the prin-ciples which have inspired its own creation, development and enlarge-ment, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy,the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rightsand fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principlesof equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the UnitedNations Charter and international law. (European Union 2007, 14)
However, while enshrined in the treaties, this goal is rather unspecified, meaning that there is a wide range of interpretation available to EU institutions in how exactly democracy promotion should be put intopractice. Most active in specifying this script have been two institu-tions: the European Parliament and the European Commission. ThomasRisse and Tanja Börzel have pointed out that Parliament has ‘been thesingle most vocal and most prominent promoter of human rights poli-cies among the EU institutions. In its annual debate on human rightsand monthly “emergency decisions”, it has constantly hammered theCommission and the Council of Ministers to promote human rights and democracy worldwide and to put the EU’s money where its mouth is’ (Börzel and Risse 2004, 25). It has also been active in reminding EU insti-tutions to specify the democracy promotion script. In 2011, for example,it urged for the clarification of a list of political criteria which must befulfilled in order to obtain advanced status (European Parliament 2011).The European Commission has not only turned the general goal of democracy promotion into concrete policy scripts but has also acted asa guardian of the shared purpose of democracy promotion itself, since
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it has a vested interest in maintaining its own role and expertise in the area (Magen 2006, 504).
In terms of commonality, democracy promotion as a shared purpose in foreign policy receives broad public support among Europeans. A 2005survey of the German Marshall Fund found that ‘(a)sked if it shouldbe the role of the EU to help establish democracy in other countries,an overwhelming majority of European (74 per cent) agreed’ (GermanMarshall Fund 2005, 13). Similar results were found by Eurobarometer in2006 and 2007 with 87 per cent and 82 per cent respectively supportingthe development of democracy-based relations between the EU and itsneighbors (European Commission 2006b; 2007). In December 2011,against the backdrop of the euro crisis and the Arab Spring, 84 per centof Europeans supported development aid and a strong focus of EU aidon good governance and human rights (European Commission 2012c). Democracy promotion clearly is a shared goal and European citizensexpect the EU to include democracy promotion in foreign policy.
The democracy rhetoric of the Council Conclusions generallyresponds to this public support. Figure 9.4 shows how often democracy/human rights (including democratic/democratization) are mentionedin Council Conclusions. The figure shows that democracy and human
Figure 9.4 Frequency of democracy and human rights in Council Conclusions, mean by year, 1989–2013
Source: Figure created by author based on data compiled by author. Council Conclusions wereaccessed through European Council (2014) and Online Archive of European Integration at the University of Pittsburgh (2012).
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rights are constantly referred to in the Council Conclusions, but the surge of democracy talk happens in the 1990s and early 2000s. After2006 it starts to drop decisively, hitting low points in the 2008 to 2010 period. Only with the Arab uprisings does it increase again, but not deci-sively. This means that the surge of the EU’s democratic role identity wasthe 1990s and early 2000s. Afterwards, the role identity is still present inthe discourse of the council, but it recedes in the background exactly ata time when the Mediterranean partner regimes drive back their liber-alizing tendencies of the early 2000s and when democracy in generalenters into a worldwide stagnation period. Thus the EU’s role identity had no one to tango with; it was not activated by the other.
The centrality of the other in activating a role becomes even clearer when we compare the case of EU democracy promotion in theMediterranean to the enlargement process, as well as to the US case studyin this book. Regarding the enlargement process, Frank Schimmelfennighas shown how Central and Eastern European governments exposedinconsistencies between ‘on the one hand, the EU’s standard of legiti-macy, its past rhetoric, and its past treatment of applicant states’ and,on the other hand, its policy toward them (Schimmelfennig 2001, 48).They shamed the EU into compliance with its own enlargement policy.Similarly in the US case discussed above, not only did human rightsactivists through transnational networks enter into a sustained public debate on democracy promotion with the Reagan administration, butalso a cascading third wave of democratization in South America brought new leadership to government which reminded the Reagan administra-tion of its democratic role identity. In contrast to this, in MENA the autocratic partner regimes preferred not to activate this role identity of the EU. Furthermore, no transnational civil society networks have beencomparatively active over the Mediterranean. While some human rightsgroups from the region could at times bring human rights and democ-racy issues to the attention of European media – a case is the struggle of Tunisian human rights groups against advanced partnership status to Tunisia elaborated in Chapter 7 – no sustained foreign policy debate on the issue emerged in the EU. The only community that repeatedlykept the issue of EU double standards alive was the academic commu-nity (Tocci 2006; Pace 2007; Khasson, Vasilyan, and Vos 2008; Seeberg 2009; Youngs and Emerson 2009). This was, however, not sufficient inshaming the EU into compliance with its rhetoric.
As a result, from 2007 onwards, the EU increasingly deviated fromdemocracy promotion in practice. This confirms the argument of thisbook that if a democratic role identity is not activated by the other, it
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will not hinder the effect of threat perceptions on foreign policy anddemocracy promotion will be limited in practice. Furthermore, whiledemocracy talk on the part of the EU continues (even if to a lesser extent than in the 1990s and 2000s as evident in Figure 9.4), when we examinespeeches of EU representatives more concretely, we see deviations from a democratic role identity also in rhetoric which confirms the argumentmade in the theory part of this book that if a democratic role identity is not sustained in practice, this will backfire negatively on this identity aswell. In 2007 Solana begins to refer to a stagnation of the third wave. Hepoints out that the story of democracy is being written ‘unfortunatelynot along the lines that we expected. It is not that the principal trendhas been interrupted; rather, a separate trend is emerging. It is not neces-sarily the opposite, but we have to bear it in mind if we are to under-stand what is going on around us’ (Solana 2007a, 3). And while Solanahad argued in the early 2000s that the EU wa respected in the world forits values such as democracy (Solana 2000b), he now stated that
not all our values are universally shared. And not all we hold dear isuniversally admired. … foreign policy must be based on interests, butalso on values. This is especially true in the case of the EuropeanUnion. It would not be credible if our foreign policy were not based onour own values. But it would not be wise to ignore the fact that projecting our values may pose problems abroad. We cannot take it for granted that the rest of the world, that is to say the greater part of humanity, regards our values as theirs too. (Solana 2007b, 5, italics added)
The crucial role of the other in reactivating the EU’s democratic roleidentity becomes once more obvious with the Arab uprisings. EU repre-sentatives suddenly did not only feel obliged to acknowledge their pastmistakes, Füle argued that too ‘many of us fell prey to the assumptionthat authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism – and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult tobuild’ (Füle 2011); but EU institutions also speak again of the EU’s ‘proudtradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic regimesto democracy’ (European Commission 2011d) and the universality of European values. In 2011, High Representative Catherine Ashton statesthat the
European Union is sometimes accused of trying to ‘export’ so-called European values to other countries. I reject that accusation. The
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rights to free speech, freedom of assembly, justice and equality arenot European rights: they are universal rights. We must never fall into the trap of believing that people in Africa, Asia or Latin Americaare less passionate about their rights. (Ashton 2011)
Furthermore, transition states like Tunisia have started to show tenden-cies to shame the EU into compliance with its own rhetoric (Euractiv2011), but the concrete dynamics that will evolve in this respect and theimpact they will have on the EU’s democratic role identity will have tobe observed in the coming years.
To conclude and summarize, this case study has shown that the EU incorporated democracy promotion into its foreign policy in the early1990s, enabled by relatively low threat perceptions and pushed for byan international normative context in which the EU formed a demo-cratic role identity which was also useful for fostering attachment to theUnion itself. Thus, similar to the US case, low threat perceptions enableddemocracy promotion in phase I, but then lost their independent effect.In phase II, when democracy promotion started, they could not explainthe variance in EU democracy promotion in the 2000s. Rather, theireffect depended on the strength of the EU’s democratic role identity. This role identity skyrocketed in the early 2000s in the face of thehighly successful enlargement process whose logic was transported tothe Mediterranean neighborhood despite increasing threat perceptions.However, when this role identity was not activated by the other – incontrast to the US case – threat perceptions could make their influencefelt on EU foreign policy again; democracy promotion entered into ashaky period, starting to revert back to phase I. This might end againwith the Arab uprisings, whose effect on the EU’s democratic role iden-tity, however, will have to be observed in the long term.
Turkey and Democracy Promotion in the MediterraneanRegion since the Early 2000s
While democracy promotion was a pronounced part of US and EU foreign policies in the 1990s, Turkey’s foreign policy rather looked likea ‘normative anachronism’ (Robins 2003, 380) in the immediate post-Cold War period. In contrast to the United States and EU, the end of theCold War led to high uncertainties for Turkey. Not only did Turkey’s role as a bulwark against communism end – thus making Turkey initiallyuncertain about its future role in the Western alliance – but Turkey’s neighborhood disintegrated: states around Turkey collapsed and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, in the Gulf, and in the Caucasus becameunlocked. In the Middle East, new geopolitical realities were created bythe unipolar moment of the United States (Mastanduno 1997) which meant that Turkey’s arm’s-length approach to the Arab world was nolonger pursuable. The 1990 Gulf War which revived Turkey’s Kurdish problem in its relations with its neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Iran – presented Turkey with increased security challenges that heralded in a period of activist Turkish foreign policy.
This activism took two forms. While in the early 1990s Turkish President Turgut Özal sought to secure greater regional economic stability andgenerate better political relations through a ‘liberal approach in foreignpolicy which advocated … increasing regional economic links anddependencies’ (Canan 2009, 29), upon his sudden death this was substi-tuted with a unilateral confrontational approach which almost brought the country to war with Greece in 1996 and Syria in 1998. It was char-acterized by frequent military incursions into northern Iraq, by flagranthuman rights violations against Turkey’s own Kurdish population, andby tensions with Iran and Russia. Indeed, in the 1990s Turkey’s overall
10 The Emergence of DemocracyPromotion in Turkish Foreign Policy
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approach to its neighbors was – as Juliette Tolay and Ronald Linden have pointed out – ‘characterized by confrontation, mistrust, and the use of threats and force’ (Linden and Tolay 2012, 2).
At the same time, and in addition to this unilateral and confronta-tional activism, a multilateral and bound activism started to emerge mainly in the Balkans with Turkish mediation attempts and its participa-tion in peacekeeping and stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.This policy further strengthened under Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (inoffice 1997–2002) who initiated dialogues with Syria and Greece and did not only believe that Turkey ‘shared in the European culture which upholds democracy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality and secularism’, but also changed Turkey’s foreign policy toward the MiddleEast, focusing on historical and cultural aspects of Turkey’s relationship with the region, Turkey’s multicultural identity, its role as a model for the region, and improvement of relations and reconciliation with theMiddle East (Terzi 2010, 42).
As the Justice and Development Party (AKP) entered power in Turkey, this approach grew and substantiated. The AKP did not only make the EU the prime reference point of its foreign policy in the 2002–2007 era – thegolden period in EU–Turkish relations when the accession perspective was credible (Öniş 2014, 3) – but also boosted its activism in the MiddleEast without compromising its relations with the West. In an approach termed ‘zero problem with neighbors’, relations with Syria, Iran, and Iraqwere normalized; Turkey tried to act as a mediator between Israel and Syria,as well as Israel and Hamas;1 it scaled up its engagement in multilateralregional platforms; and it intensified and diversified economic interac-tions with neighboring regions. Turkey signed free-trade agreements withMorocco (2004), the Palestinian Authority (2004), Syria (2004), Tunisia(2004), Egypt (2005), Jordan (2009), and Lebanon (2010). 2 Agreements toabolish visa requirements were signed with Syria (2009), Jordan (2009),Libya (2009), and Lebanon (2010). Furthermore, to institutionalize polit-ical relations at the prime ministerial level as well as the ministerial level in various areas such as economy, trade, energy, infrastructure, agriculture,internal affairs, water and environment, education, science, and tourism,Turkey set up High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils with Iraq (2008),Syria (2009), Lebanon (2010), Egypt (2011), Tunisia (2012), and Libya(2014) and a Quadripartite High Level Strategic Cooperation Council among Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (2010). As a result, trade with the region accelerated remarkably. Exports to the Middle East rose from8 billion USD in 2004 (12 per cent export ratio) to 35.6 billion USD (23per cent export ratio) in 2013. Imports to the region increased from 4
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billion USD (4 per cent import ratio) to 22 billion USD (9 per cent importratio) in the same period (Turkstat 2014). Liberalized visa policies also led to a sharp increase of entries from the Middle East and North Africa into Turkey from ‘a little more than 270,000 in 1995 to more than 1.5 millionin 2011’, representing an increase of about 470 per cent (Kirisci 2012a,6). Indeed, not only did Turkish foreign policy increasingly approximate EU ‘integration tactics for post-Second World War peace in Europe as a model for strengthening long-term stability and healing the divisions of the Middle East’ (International Crisis Group 2010, i), but comparing Turkey’s policy in the region with the EU’s neighborhood policy, it increasingly looked as if Turkey was ‘doing the European Neighborhood Policy for the EU’ (Tocci 2012). Maybe even more surprising was that this policy continued and intensified after the EU anchor faltered and the EUno longer represented the prime reference point of Turkish foreign policy in the post-2007 period (Öniş 2014, 5).
Democracy promotion has also played a role in this new foreign policy approach, but variance in this respect has been remarkable. In the early2000s, democracy promotion has been mainly pursued through a coop-erative approach which relied on communicative identitive means thatstressed the role of Turkey as a model and did not harm Turkey’s broaderapproach to regional integration.3 From 2007 onwards, the democracyagenda in Turkish foreign policy declined, but with the Arab upris-ings, Turkish democracy promotion has been on the rise again, eventhough – as this chapter will argue – through a totally diverse approach, namely a confrontational one based on naming and shaming as well aspolitical conditionality which frequently opposed or harmed Turkey’s ‘zero problem with neighbors’ policy. The following section will now first dissect the substantive content of this newly emerging Turkishdemocracy agenda, before variance in the use of democracy promotionin Turkish foreign policy will be observed in detail.
The substantive content of Turkey’s democracy promotion
While the United States and the EU have anchored democracy promo-tion as a foreign policy principle in law and several sets of foreign policydocuments seek to define the substantive content of this principle,neither applies to Turkey. Democracy promotion is not institutionalizedin Turkish foreign policy; there is no comparable ‘democracy promo-tion industry’, and as a result the substantive content of democracy isnot defined. The Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) – Turkey’s development aid agency – does not have an
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explicit democracy/human rights program as the United States and EUdo. Its main project areas are education, health, water and sanitation,cultural cooperation, restoration, shelter and housing, agriculture, aswell as administrative and civil infrastructure. Nonetheless, projectsunder the latter heading look rather similar to what the EU and UnitedStates call democracy assistance; they include areas such as the improve-ment of public and civil infrastructures of central and local government,police training, capacity building of NGOs and of media and communi-cations infrastructure (TIKA 2014).
Furthermore, principles such as ‘representation, participation,accountability, effective civil society, rule of law and decentralizedadministration’ (TIKA 2012, 36) are included into TIKA’s approach.Similar principles are also mentioned by other foreign policy institu-tions. On its homepage, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs high-lights that
Thanks to this foreign policy vision, Turkey is today considered as a country that not only safeguards but also disseminates humanrights, democracy, rule of law and social equity. Turkey’s deep-rooted tradition of statehood and democracy, its advantages emanatingfrom geography and history, its young and educated populationand dynamic economy plays a key role in the success of this policy. (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014b)
Similarly, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President AhmetNecdet Sezer, Foreign Minister and then President Abdullah Gül, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu frequently mentioned the conceptsof democracy, human rights, rule of law, gender equality, participa-tion, and a functioning market economy together as values that Turkeyspreads in the region (Erdoğan 2004b; Gül 2003a; 2005a; 2007; Sezer2004; 2005; Davutoğlu 2011a; 2011b). Erdoğan, for example, argued that‘gender-equality, supremacy of law, political participation, civil society, and transparency are among the indispensable elements that are theimperatives of democratization. All these principles must be embracedand developed in order to support democratization’ (Erdoğan 2004b).This mirrors rather closely what the United States and the EU presentas the substantive content of democracy promotion – an approach with which Turkey is intimately familiar, since it has been and is applied toTurkey itself through the EU accession process.
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Variance in the use of democracy promotion
First instances of democracy promotion emerged in Turkish foreign policy already upon the very end of the Cold War. With the collapseof the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new Turkic republics in Central Asia, Turkey ‘enthusiastically propagated the idea of Turkey as a model for the new republics’ (Robins 2003, 274) to establish Turkish leadership ambitions over the belt of Turkic states, in confrontation with Russia and supported by the United States and Europe (Canan 2009; Bal1998; 2000). This approach was, however, not welcomed by the elites inthese newly independent states which perceived it as a threat to theirpower. Specifically, after the overthrow of the regime in Tajikistan in 1992 which led to a civil war in the country, elites in the new repub-lics re-established their close relations with Russia to secure their powerand Turkey had to retreat to a more pragmatic approach which wouldfocus on cooperation in terms of trade or energy, not democracy (Robins 2003, 289). But while this first attempt at democracy promotion came toa fast end, it nonetheless anticipated the democracy promotion agendawhich Turkey would adopt in the early 2000s. The following sectionswill now observe the use of democracy assistance, identitive democracypromotion, and political conditionality by Turkey from the early 2000suntil today.
Democracy assistance – even if not named as such – has been a practicepursued by the Turkish International Cooperation and CoordinationAgency (TIKA). TIKA has been established at the initiative of Turgut Özalin 1992 within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs mainly to support the newly independent Turkic states. As Güner Özkan and Mustafa Turgut Demirtepe have pointed out, the ‘international environmentin which TIKA was born was one that promoted Turkey’s experience and determination regarding democratization, a free market economy and Westernization efforts as a model for the newly independent Turkicstates in the Caucasus and Central Asia’ (Özkan and Turgut Demirtepe2012, 648). However, as pointed out above, this approach failed to takeoff, notably also since TIKA remained heavily under-funded in thisperiod as Figure 10.1 shows.
This changed in the 2000s when TIKA was restructured. Pinar Ipek has distinguished three periods in TIKA activities: an early period from1992–2001, a transition period from 2001 and 2004 when TIKA wasbrought in line with OECD-DAC standards, and a late period from 2004
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to 2010 when both the volume, means, and geographic scope of TIKAexpanded (Ipek 2013, 7–8). While initially most aid focused on theCentral Asia/Caucasus region, in the later 1990s much aid shifted to theBalkans. Since 2004, amounts allocated to the Middle East, North andsub-Saharan Africa are increasing. Figure 10.2 shows how the MiddleEast and North Africa (MENA) have become the main recipients of aidsince the Arab uprisings.
In terms of projects, several areas fall under democracy promotion,mainly under the headings of development of administrative and civilinfrastructure, as well as the strengthening of the communications
Figure 10.1 Total Turkish official development aid (ODA) in million US dollars
Source : Figure created by author based on data from OECD (2014).
2010 2011 2012
Figure 10.2 Turkish official development aid (ODA) in million US dollars by recipient region
Source : Figure created by author based on data from OECD (2014).
Democracy Promotion in Turkish Foreign Policy 155
infrastructure. Projects include the advancement of legal systems,training of the judiciary, parliamentarians, and police forces, as well asequipment support for news agencies, training of journalists, and theestablishment of news studios. In 2011, these issue areas received about10 per cent of all bilateral assistance (in 2012 about 9 per cent), thusthese numbers compare rather closely to the percentage which the EUlocates of all development aid to the area of democracy assistance. Alsosimilar to the EU, this amount is heavily state-based. NGOs and theprivate sector received well below 1 per cent of all aid (TIKA 2011; 2012). Besides aid given through TIKA, Turkey has also contributed to OSCEelection-monitoring missions and has assisted elections in Palestine andYemen (Kirisci 2012b).
In conclusion, it can be said that democracy assistance projects arepart of the Turkish aid strategy, even though they are not named assuch. Projects do not only look similar to EU democracy assistance, butthe amount of all ODA assigned to such projects and its state bias aresimilar to the EU’s democracy-assistance approach. Furthermore, Turkish development aid is continuously increasing since the early 2000s andhas become a consolidated part of Turkish foreign policy.
Identitive democracy promotion
While democracy assistance has grown steadily since the early 2000s,identitive democracy promotion has gone through some decisive vari-ance. Initially, Turkey has mainly presented itself as an ‘example’,‘model’, or ‘inspiration’ – an indirect approach of democracy promotionby mimicry which would not endanger Turkey’s larger policy of regionalintegration based on partnership with autocratic regimes in the Middle East.4 As Erdoğan pointed out, the ‘greatest strength of those societies thatrepresent modern values is the attraction they create’ and ‘(o)ur democ-racy and modernity as well as the network of external relations … havebeen inevitably making Turkey an example, a model as well as a partner’ (Erdoğan 2004b). This model approach was closely connected to Turkey’seconomic success, its own democracy representing ‘work in progress’(Kirisci 2012b), and the impressive support shown for Turkey’s model in the Arab world as the annual TESEV surveys of public opinion in the Arab world have shown (see Figure 10.3). In the speeches of the prime minister, foreign ministers, and presidents, it is mainly in the 2002–2006 period (and then again from 2011 onwards) that references can be foundthat portray Turkey as a model, inspiration, or example.
Besides presenting itself as a model, Turkish politicians also usedpersuasion in this initial period to promote democracy, always in line
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with Turkey’s broader foreign policy approach in the region (Aydin-Duzgit and Keyman 2014). The call for democratic reform was not raisedpublicly in bilateral meetings with autocratic partner regimes. Instead,Turkey typically used multilateral settings to urge for reform and pursued a rather communicative way of persuasion here. In his speech at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Teheran in 2003,Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, for example, always spoke interms of ‘we’ and ‘us’ when he argued that
We need to attempt to determine the issues and shortcomings thatcontinue to hamper our progress at home. We have a spiritual heritage of peace, harmony, tolerance and affection. It should strengthen ourinspiration for achieving freedom, peace, prosperity and democ-racy. … We must act with a refreshed vision – a vision in which good governance, transparency and accountability will reign, the funda-mental rights and freedoms as well as gender equality are upheld, andthere would be no place for blunting rhetoric and slogans. In short,we should first put our house in order. (Gül 2003c)
Similarly, at the fifth Jeddah Economic Forum in Saudi Arabia in 2004,Prime Minister Erdoğan stressed the importance of self-criticism in theMuslim world and received standing ovations from women present atthe meeting when he stressed the necessity of gender equality. In 2004,
2010 2011 2012
Figure 10.3 Turkish ODA in million US dollars by MENA country, 2010 versus2012
Source : Figure created by author based on data from OECD (2014).
Democracy Promotion in Turkish Foreign Policy 157
when the meeting of the OIC took place in Istanbul, Turkey inserted issues such as gender equality and democratic reform into the discussionagenda. That this was not perceived as offensive on the side of partnerregimes became clear when Turkish diplomat Ekmeleddin İhsanoğluwas elected Secretary General of the OIC. Nonetheless, this identitive democracy promotion agenda lost steam and in the 2007–2011 period,as Emiliano Alessandri and Meliha Altunişik have pointed out, the AKPgovernment ‘largely dropped this discourse in its relations with Arab/Islamic countries’ (Alessandri and Altunişik 2013, 5).
This has changed again with the Arab uprisings. Almost immediatelythe role of Turkey as a model was evoked again. Prime Minister Erdoğanstated that
with its democracy, strong economy and its peaceful and active poli-cies on global issues, Turkey is a model for all peoples who work toprotect their countries and future. Turkey is a source of inspiration forpeoples who start off to build a country where they can look to the future with confidence. (in Trend 2011; see also Republic of TurkeyMinistry of Foreign Affairs 2012; Gül 2011)
However, what changed this time was that besides this indirect iden-titive approach to democracy promotion, Turkey now also confronted autocratic regimes in the region with public naming and shaming, thusundermining its previous ‘zero problems with neighbor’ policy.
While in the very beginning Turkey had not responded to the uprising in Tunisia, in Egypt Erdoğan was first among his NATO peers to demand Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down, calling upon him to ‘takethe necessary steps to satisfy the Egyptian people’s demands first without providing an opportunity for those who have dark scenarios for Egypt.Demands for freedom cannot be postponed and cannot be neglected’(in Today’s Zaman 2011). Turkey did not only call for a democratic transition from the interim government, but during his visit to EgyptErdoğan also spoke out for a secular state on Egypt’s Dream TV which was perceived as an affront by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Arabiya News2011). Nonetheless, when the Muslim Brotherhood entered power, theAKP government established close relations with newly elected PresidentMohamed Morsi and when he was ousted from power in an army-ledcoup, Turkey – in stark contrast to the EU and especially the United States – was outspoken in naming and shaming the coup at the expenseof its relationship with the army-led regime. Foreign Minister Davutoğlustated that ‘it is unacceptable that a democratically elected governmentwas overthrown by illegitimate means, even more, with a military coup’
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and called for the immediate release of Mohamed Morsi from deten-tion (Hürriyet Daily News 2013a). In Libya, Turkey initially was cautious about explicit support and reluctant to participate in the NATO interven-tion, but when Turkey came under serious criticism for this stance fromboth its Western partners, as well as the oppositional forces in Libya, itchanged course and started to support the intervention (Öniş 2012, 52). In Syria, Turkey first reacted cautiously to the uprisings and engaged in private bilateral talks to urge the regime of Bashar al-Assad to respondto the uprisings with reforms. When al-Assad did not respond, Turkeybegan to call openly upon him to step down and entered into a confron-tational relationship with the previous ally. These speech acts have alsobeen accompanied by a rather consistent application of positive and negative political conditionality – a democracy promotion instrument which has also entered Turkey’s approach with the Arab uprisings.
Before the Arab uprisings, Turkey did not use political conditionality aspart of its democracy promotion approach which has led several authorsto conclude that it did not promote democracy at all (Öniş 2014). Its‘zero problem with neighbors’ policy was at times paraphrased as a‘zero problem with dictators’ (Akyol 2011) policy as Turkey had set up deepening relations with regimes such as Syria’s that were rewardedwith visa-free travel regimes, astonishing increases in bilateral trade, orinstitutionalized political cooperation through the High Level StrategicCooperation Councils despite their autocratic character. Also the distri-bution of Turkish ODA reflected geopolitical imperatives rather than a democratic conditionality approach. In 2010, the main recipients in MENA were Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Lebanon, Iran, and Syria – that is, Turkey’s direct neighbors instead of frontrun-ners in terms of democratic reforms
This picture has, however, changed decisively with the Arab uprisings. Leading ODA recipients in the region in 2012 – besides Syria which ‘skews’the statistics since it includes the massive aid which has gone to the refu-gees coming to Turkey – were now Egypt and Tunisia, closely followedby the OPT. Besides aid, Egypt also received a 2 billion USD loan, Tunisia a 500 million USD loan, and Libya a 250 million USD loan. High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils were set up with Egypt in 2011, Tunisiain 2012, and Libya in 2014. Following the military coup in Egypt, Turkey downgraded diplomatic relations with Cairo in November 2013.
The starkest change has, however, taken place toward Syria. As aresult of the improved political relations with Syria and thanks to the
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visa and free-trade agreements, by 2010 Turkish-Syrian trade had risento 2.5 billion USD from 796 million USD in 2006 (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014a). Syria had also been an important passage country for Turkish trucks on their way to Jordan and the Gulf, and had become an important partner in terms of cooperation on theKurdish issue. These economic and security interests notwithstanding,after failed attempts to persuade al-Assad to reform, Turkey switchedstance and suspended all agreements between the countries in August2011. Turkey has taken in a massive amount of refugees from Syria – as of March 2014 close to one million Syrian refugees entered Turkey(Refworld 2013) – and security in the border regions has decreased.
In face of the negative conditionality applied toward Egypt and Syria,Turkey has become accused of pursuing sectarian politics (rather thandemocracy promotion) in the region. This thesis is, however, hard tosustain. First, this negative conditionality has been matched by a simi-larly consistent positive conditionality approach which suggests thatTurkey has taken a principled stance for the uprisings in the region ratherthan a sectarian one. This argument is also reinforced by the supportTurkey has shown for the largely Shiite uprising in Bahrain (Ennis andMomani 2013). Secondly, as Zia Öniş has pointed out, the AKP govern-ment’s past approach to the region had been to set up good relationswith the Muslim world as a whole, not only its Sunni parts. Turkey’s reaction to the uprisings have rather shown that ‘Turkey has become a major supporter of political change and democratization in the era of the Arab revolution’ (Öniş 2014, 1) and – in comparison to the UnitedStates and the EU – a more principled one.
In conclusion, this section has found puzzling variance in Turkey’s democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa. Besidesdemocracy assistance that has become a consolidated even if notoutspoken instrument throughout the observed time period, democracypromotion emerged in the early 2000s mainly through a cooperative approach that relied on communicative-identitive means in presentingTurkey as a model and pursuing persuasion through communicativespeech acts typically in multilateral platforms. This approach, however, lost steam in the 2007–2011 period. With the Arab uprisings, democ-racy promotion revived again, but in different form. Turkey’s response –initially cautious – soon changed to pro-activism (Öniş 2012, 51) andTurkey did not only present itself as a model, but confrontationalspeech acts as well as a principled positive and negative conditionalityhave entered its democracy promotion approach. What explains thisvariance?
While the end of the Cold War heralded in a zeitgeist of democracy and human rights in Europe, Turkey’s experience of and reactions to this‘geopolitical earthquake’ (Davutoğlu 2013a, 2) were quite diverse. Not only was its role as a bulwark against communism in the Western secu-rity alliance suddenly gone and the future of NATO and Turkey’s place init uncertain, but also its immediate security environment deteriorated. New conflicts emerged in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and in Iraq, whilethe conflict with the PKK flared up and Turkey increasingly perceivedthe Middle East as the number one source of security threats to Turkey (Altunişik 2004). Thus, in the 1990s as Europe was focusing on democrati-zation and human rights in foreign affairs, Turkey’s foreign relations withthe region became highly securitized. The reverse happened – as Davutoğlu has pointed out – after the second ‘security earthquake’ of 9/11 when the basic global conceptual framework changed to revolve around theconcept of security (Davutoğlu 2013a, 2), while the accelerating democra-tization process in Turkey helped the country to de-securitize its relations with its neighbors (Davutoğlu 2013a, 4). Even though Turkey’s security environment remained troubled throughout the 2000s and beyond withthe Iraq war, the Intifada, the conflict surrounding Iran’s nuclear file, andthe Syrian civil war, Turkey’s threat perceptions nonetheless decreased.
The 1990s – The uncertain Western alliance, fighting ‘Two and a Half Wars’, and the externalization of a domestic ‘threat’
The 1990s set out with uncertainties for Turkey regarding its place in the Western alliance. While Turkey actively participated in the Gulf War coalition to ‘demonstrate its strategic importance to Europe and
11 The De-securitization of ForeignPolicy
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the United States in a post-Cold War environment’ (Larrabee and Lesser 2003, 134), the end of the Cold War nonetheless meant that this previ-ously ‘security producing relationship’ deteriorated for three reasons: notonly did the security establishment consider the Copenhagen criteria athreat to its security culture, specifically regarding the Kurdish questionwhere European interference was seen as an undermining of Turkey’s security, but NATO transformed from a collective defense organization to a global security organization while the EU was reluctant to offer Turkey ‘a legitimate place in the emerging EU security and defense struc-tures’ (Oğuzlu 2007, 51–52).
At the same time, Turkey’s own regional security environment deteri-orated with the wars in the Balkans, the Abkhazia conflict, the Chechenwar, and the Iraq war. The Iraq war specifically fueled Turkey’s confron-tation with the PKK by providing ‘a logistical and political openingfor the PKK to operate across porous borders with Iraq, Iran, and Syria’(Larrabee and Lesser 2003, 135). The Turkish army reacted with a coun-terinsurgence strategy that led to the internal displacement of aboutthree million Kurds according to human rights organizations (B. Ayata and Yükseker 2005, 15). As Turkey increasingly focused on internal threats – the 1992 National Security Policy Document named separa-tism and terrorism as the main security threats – these threats becameentangled with Turkey’s conflictual relations with Greece and Syriaas manifested in the notion of Turkey fighting ‘two and a half wars’. Robins has pointed out that the suspicion ‘of co-operation among someof its neighboring states, together with the perceived exploitation of the Kurdish issue and in particular the PKK-led insurgency by a range of outside actors’ helped to explain why security issues remained so para-mount in the 1990s (Robins 2003, 205). Turkey came to the brink of war with Greece in 1996 over the Imia/Kardak crisis and with Syria in 1998 when Ankara warned Damascus of an incumbent military action if Syria continued to host PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
Furthermore, domestic instabilities exacerbated external problems.Throughout the 1990s, Turkey suffered from government instabilitieswith ten different coalition governments being formed within ten years.The National Security Council (NSC) benefited from this lack of politicalconsensus and unity in the coalition governments (Gözen 2004, 44).The 1990s represented the ‘golden age of the military’s involvement in domestic and foreign policy’ (Canan 2009, 56). This domestic contextled to a focus on security themes in foreign policy in general and in the second half of the 1990s in particular as political Islam became anincreasingly important force in Turkish political life. This was perceived
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as a threat by the security establishment to its Kemalist ideology – athreat that became increasingly externalized leading to a high securitiza-tion of relations with the Islamic world.
The Islamic world had been othered by the Kemalist elite since the1920s when Turkey was created in the shattering of the Ottoman Empire. 1 Islam, which had been the base of legitimacy and identifi-cation during the Ottoman Empire, was excluded from the new stateidentity since Turkey was to become a modern and secular European nation-state (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 5). As a result, relations with the two most relevant others for Turkey – Europe and the Arab world – were redefined. The Arab world was seen as backward, inferior, and as the past which Turkey wanted to leave behind (Robins 2003, 100); Europe andthe West, in contrast, turned into ‘a civilization to join’ (Bozdağlıoğlu2003, 163). Furthermore, the notion of the ‘uncivilized, backward Arab’was reinforced by another stereotype – the ‘untrustworthy Arab’ whohad revolted against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (Aykan1993, 92). This stereotyping was matched on the side of the other bythe image of the ‘brutal, imperialist Turk’ (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 113) anda traitor to the Arab world throughout the Cold War, with Turkey firmlyrooted in the Western alliance and pursuing relatively good relationswith Israel (Bengio 2010).
The process of ‘othering’ the Arab world was, therefore, alwaysconnected to external as well as internal dynamics. Internal dynamicsstarted to change already in the 1970s when a fragmentation of the Kemalist secular bloc became visible and the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’emerged ‘as a new state-fostered ideology to de-politicize Turkish society and achieve a new societal consensus’ (Yavuz 1998, 30). While theTurkish-Islamic synthesis initially remained in the domestic realm, thischanged in the 1980s under the leadership of Turgut Özal who trans-ported the Turkish-Islamic synthesis into foreign policy by emphasizing ‘the historical legacy of the Ottoman past and flourishing Islamic cultureas a source of the “soft power” of the modern Turkish state’ (Murinson 2006, 950). Foreign policy now started to become a policy field wherean internal identity struggle between Turkey’s ‘two gravitational ideolo-gies’ (Robins 2003, 138) was pursued. This identity struggle aggravatedin the 1990s since Turkey had to define its own new role in the emerging world order, but escalated in the second half of the 1990s when the Islamic Welfare Party became the largest party in the Turkish Parliamentand could enter a coalition government in 1996 under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. His policy of seeking closer relations with the Islamicworld in his ‘Islamic Opening’ – notably through a new multilateral
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Developing-8 (D-8) initiative which brought together Islamic middlepowers including Iran as an explicit alternative to Turkey’s relationswith the West (Taşpınar 2012, 130; but see also Robins 1997) – rang alarm bells in Turkey’s security establishment.
In this climate, the process of ‘othering’ sharpened from presentingthe other as inferior to a security threat. In the second half of the 1990s, the security establishment began to define Islamic fundamentalismtogether with PKK terrorism as the main threat to security in Turkey(Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 137; see also Bilgin 2005, 188) whereby Islamicfundamentalism was perceived as an internal as well as external threat – a perception notably directed against Iran which was not only seen as meddling with Turkey’s Kurdish issue, but also ‘as posing an existentialthreat to the organizing ideology (secularism) of the Turkish state and asattempting to undermine the domestic legitimacy of the secular govern-ment’ (Aras and Polat 2008, 505). A diplomatic crisis between Turkeyand Iran emerged in 1997 which triggered a chain of dynamics thateventually led to an indirect military coup against Erbakan’s coalition government in Turkey – arguably the peak in internal–external threatperception dynamics which would change decisively with the rise of theAKP to power.
The 2000s – democratization and de-securitization
In terms of objective threats, security became increasingly scarce inTurkey’s immediate environment in the Middle East throughout the 2000s as has already been elaborated in Chapter 8 in the EU case study:the Israeli-Palestinian and Israel-Lebanon conflicts turned violent again,the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the US War on Terror increased instability in the whole region, the conflict surrounding Iran’s nuclearfile accelerated, and the Syrian civil war further destabilized the wholeregion. As the EU case study has shown, this led to increasing threatperceptions in Europe regarding the region which now moved into thecenter of Western security policies. For Turkey, in contrast, this meant that its strategic importance for the United States and Europe increasedand its rooting in the Western alliance was at high demand, especially in the United States. Furthermore, Turkey – in stark contrast to the UnitedStates and Europe – perceived the region as less threatening. Two devel-opments were decisive for this decrease in threat perceptions: the EUaccession process that triggered a transformation process that curbed the influence of the military on foreign policymaking and helped tode-securitize foreign policy, and the rise to power of the Justice and
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Development Party (AKP) and its new foreign policy approach whichled to improved relations of Turkey with its neighbors until the Arab uprisings in 2011.
In 1999, the Helsinki European Council recognized Turkey as a candi-date country. This not only provided an important identity anchorage(Walker and Tocci 2012), but also triggered a democratic transforma-tion process in the country in the course of which the power of the NSC was decisively reduced in compliance with the Copenhagen criteriathrough a constitutional change in the composition and functions of the NSC. While the number of military participants was reduced, morecivilians participate now in the council which meets less frequently andwhose meetings serve as recommendations to the government only.Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy Document prepared by theNSC is still classified and not adopted by the Parliament (Terzi 2010,62–63). This has helped to pave the way toward a more civilianizedforeign policy (Aydin and Acikmese 2007, 269). Furthermore, foreign policy issues have become subject to public debate. These debates arenot only characterized by an array of new participants – politicians, civil society actors, the business community, and think tanks – but also by the new channels in which they are taking place (Yavuz 1998, 20) and by their substance: discursive spaces have opened in which previouslytaboo issues of foreign policy such as Islam, civilian-military relations, Cyprus, the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish question (Kirisci 2010, 6) are now being discussed.
Equally important for the de-securitization of Turkish foreignpolicy toward the region has been the rise of the AKP and its newforeign policy ideology which has displayed neo-Ottoman tendencies.Neo-Ottomanism is a term which has been introduced by the Turkishjournalist Cengiz Candar to describe the intellectual movement in Turkey which advocates the pursuit of an ‘active and diversified foreign policyin the region based on the Ottoman historical heritage’ (Murinson 2006,946). In foreign policy practice, neo-Ottomanist tendencies could befound in the foreign policies of Turgut Özal, the Welfare Party under the Premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, as well as the AKP, even though each of these actors has used neo-Ottomanism in diverse ways. The AKP’s foreign policy can be placed in the neo-Ottoman paradigm insofar as itis ‘at peace with the imperial and multinational legacy of the country’,and ‘allows Islam to play a greater role in building a sense of sharedidentity’ (Taşpınar 2012, 129). Thus, in contrast to the Kemalist camp,it does not perceive Islam as an existential threat to its own identity soenabling the AKP government to set up good relations with countries
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such as Iran. At the same time, and in contrast to the Welfare Party inthe 1990s, the AKP has adopted a form of neo-Ottomanism which has not replaced the representation of Islam as a threat with Europe or theWest as a threat; instead, it has embraced the Islamic world as much asthe West (Taşpınar 2012, 130). In 1994 Abdullah Gül claimed that ‘ouropposition to the European Union is based on the idea that we are froma different culture, we have a different identity and a different economic structure than European countries’ (in Robins 1997, 85); in 2004 asForeign Minister, in contrast, he stated that it ‘is the common values, joint vision and mutual interests that keep Turkey and the EU together.These values, vision and interests … . require us to work together for our common good’ (Gül 2004a).
As a result, starting from the end of the 1900s and especially with theadvance of the AKP to power, Turkey succeeded in de-securitizing itsforeign policy and setting up good or even flourishing relations with its neighbors in Greece, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and the Kurdish RegionalGovernment (KRG) in Iraq. It could abandon its position as a passivebystander in regional conflicts and turn into an active mediator inLebanon and Israel-Palestine. It could furthermore take some steps forwardregarding the Kurdish question and the Cyprus conflict. Thus, as Özlem Terzi has pointed out, at a time when instabilities in Turkey’s region were rising in the 2000s, it is nonetheless ‘for certain that Turkey does not perceive the same amount of threat from the region as it used to in the1990s’ (Terzi 2010, 140). Some rise in threat perceptions could, however, be noticed in the wake of the Syrian civil war, when relations with Syria, Russia, and Iran deteriorated, Turkey has had to cope with a large influx of refugees, and when violent border incidents with Syria increased.
In concluding this section, as in the US and EU cases, Turkey adopted democracy promotion in the early 2000s when threat perceptions weredecreasing. Thus, low threat perceptions enabled democracy promo-tion initially also in the Turkish case, even if they did not trigger it. Furthermore – and again similar to the US and EU cases – threat percep-tions then lost their independent effect on foreign policy. We can neitherfind an increase in threat perceptions in 2007, when Turkish democracy promotion became less enthusiastic and started to decrease, nor can wefind a decrease in threat perceptions in 2011 when democracy promo-tion was on the rise again. To the contrary, threat perceptions were actu-ally increasing due to the Syrian civil war in this period. What thenexplains this variance in Turkish democracy promotion? What is it that triggered it in the early 2000s, contributed to its decline in 2007, andpushed for it again in 2011?
In contrast to the United States and EU which both began to form their democratic role identities in an international context where normsof human rights and waves of democratization made unprecedented advances in the 1980s and 1990s, the same has not applied to Turkey. AsPhilip Robins has pointed out, in the 1990s Turkey was not part of the‘normative euphoria which swept through Europe’ (Robins 2003, 13). Even when Turkey did start to build its democratic role identity fromthe early 2000s onwards, this has not happened in reference to interna-tional norms or waves of democratization; when observing the speeches of Turkish politicians, these are hardly presented as a reference point of Turkey’s evolving democratic identity. Rather, this identity has been builtalmost exclusively in relation to the two historically most relevant ‘coun-terparts’ of Turkey: the West and the Islamic world. This might be theresult of Turkey being one of the few countries in the modern period thathave – as Hakan Yavuz has pointed out – ‘had their identity contested asbitterly and interpreted as variously as the Republic of Turkey’ with inter-pretations ranging ‘from those that perceive it essentially as being either Western or Islamically oriented to those that view it as a “pivotal state” or a “country torn apart”, incorporating perhaps contradictory aspects of both civilizations’ (Yavuz 1998, 19). Having its identity debated so inten-sively internally, as well as externally, Turkey might have more need than other countries to have its identity confirmed by the other.
This chapter is in three parts. It first follows the evolution of Turkey’s internal democratic type identity which was extremely salient in the2000s; the second part examines the role which mainly the EU, but alsothe United States, has played in the evolution and activation of Turkey’s
12 Turkey’s Evolving Democratic Role Identity and Its Activation throughTwo Relevant Others
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democratic role identity; the third part discusses how the Islamic worldas the second-most relevant other and target of democracy promotionhas influenced and activated Turkey’s democratic role identity.
The internal dimension: an extremely salient democratic type identity
Turkish democracy is still in a process of consolidation. While it hasbeen an electoral democracy since the 1950s – albeit with two military coups in 1961 and 1980 in the wake of which the involvement of theNSC in the running of the state was institutionalized and strengthened(Kostovilis 2007, 55) – according to Dahl’s definition of democracy used in this study, Turkey still suffers from a range of democracy defi-cits. Figure 12.1 shows the Freedom House ratings for political rightsand civil liberties in Turkey up until 2013. While the 1990s showed a marked decline in both areas, in the early 2000s the situation improvedconsiderably, even though civil liberties have suffered again from 2012 onwards, mainly due to the AKP government’s clamp down on media freedom in the country.
Two periods can be broadly distinguished in terms of democratic consolidation in Turkey in the 2000s which correspond to the ups and downs in the Turkish accession process to the EU. In 1999, the HelsinkiCouncil decided to recognize Turkey as an equal candidate and in 2002 the Copenhagen Council decided to open negotiations which startedin October 2005. This period has been called the ‘golden age of democ-ratization’ (Öniş 2013) as well as the ‘golden age of Europeanization’
Political rights Civil liberties
Figure 12.1 Freedom House Index (Political Rights and Civil Liberties) for Turkey, 1972–2013
Source: Figure created by author based on data from Freedom House (2014) in which ‘1’ signi-fies most free, ‘6’ least free.
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(Öniş and Yilmaz 2009, 13), in which several major reform packages andlaws were passed in compliance with the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. Notonly was the role of the military in politics diminished, but the criminalcode was revised, the death penalty abolished, freedom of expressionimproved, and individual rights strengthened. This democratizationperiod had its beginnings under the coalition government of BülentEcevit, but accelerated decisively when the AKP came to power, since it had an additional incentive for garnering EU support. The indirect mili-tary coup in 1997 had led to a decisive rethinking among Islamic socialand political actors in Turkey who began to see the EU and its democrati-zation agenda as crucial allies to contain the threat posed by the military to elected Islamic parties in power. Furthermore, by adopting a pro-EUstance and the EU discourse on democracy and human rights, the AKPcould expand its electorate beyond the votes of Islamists and so form astable single-party government. Once in power, the AKP has passed more pro-EU legal reforms in its first three years than ‘most of the secularistgovernments in Turkish history’ to ‘clearly prove its democratic and pro-Western credentials to critics who believed the party still secretlynurtured an Islamic agenda’ (Taşpınar 2012, 131). And so, while thisshift toward the EU’s democratization agenda was initially motivated by tactical considerations, in the ‘process of interacting with Europe, a newaccommodative cognitive map of Islamic identity has emerged’ (Yavuz 2006, 225) in which liberal democratic ideals were appropriated into theAKP’s identity (S. Ayata 2004, 263). The understanding of democracydisplayed by the AKP closely mirrored the liberal concept of democracyembodied in the EU’s Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, based on their anal-ysis of the AKP’s party program and 2002 and 2007 election platforms,William Hale and Ergun Özbudun found that the AKP displays a liberal rather than conservative concept of democracy, ‘more pluralistic than majoritarian’, as well as ‘passive-secularist’ as opposed to the active secu-larism of the Kemalist elite (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 21–24).
However – and even though the Erdoğan government continued toargue within this framework of liberal democratization and humanrights – from 2007 onwards, the democratization drive lost speed. This happened at the same time as the accession process had come to a virtualstandstill. 1 In this period, not only did Euro-sceptics gained ground in the AKP (Öniş 2007, 253; Kaya and Marchetti 2013) – as mirrored in the AKP’s recent move to leave the European People’s Party (EPP) andjoin the Eurosceptic Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists(AECR) instead – but the EU could no longer represent a counterbalanceagainst an intensifying polarization between the AKP and the Kemalist
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elite in Turkey. In 2007, through its so-called e-intervention the militarysought to prevent the election of Abdullah Gül to President and thejudiciary attempted to close down the AKP in the same period. Bothmoves ‘represented existentialist threats to the party at the peak of itspower and may have influenced the mind-set of the party leadershipto take a tougher line on the opposition to avoid similar existentialist threats in the future’ (Öniş 2013, 104). Instead of a previously more‘appeasing’ strategy toward the opposition, the AKP turned to a moremajoritarian understanding of democracy and ‘attempts to consolidateTurkish democracy have begun to be replaced by steps toward a highlycentralized executive democracy in which the state still holds primacyover society’ (Aydin-Duzgit and Keyman 2012, 3). The government engaged in more confrontational strategies against the Kemalist elitewhich led to some moves forward in terms of democratic consolida-tion in the area of civil-military relations and the judicial sector, butalso some moves backward, notably regarding freedom of expressionwhich has deteriorated considerably since 2007. In the annual ratingsof Reporters Without Borders, Turkey dropped from place 101 in 2007 to place 154 out of 180 countries, being classified as ‘one of the world’s biggest prisons for journalists’ (Reporters Without Borders 2014, 8). Thus this polarization within Turkey’s political system remains the biggestchallenge to Turkey’s democracy besides the issue of the opening up of political space for minorities – notably the Kurds – where the AKP govern-ment has pursued some initiatives such as the eventually failing Kurdish(later Democratic) Opening in 2009 or the current peace process.
The implications of these developments for the democratic type identityin Turkey have meant that throughout both time periods – the early 2000s, as well as the 2007–2013 period – this identity has been unset-tled and extremely salient. In the first period, however, this salience was anchored within the EU accession process which could provide somedegree of trust and a common denominator, while this was lost in the second period when the debate became highly confrontational witheach side deeply questioning the democratic credentials of the other.This salience can somewhat be ‘quantified’ through Figure 12.2 whichshows the frequency of the mentioning of the issue of democracy in thePresident’s annual message to the Turkish Parliament. It is dominatedby peaks in the early 2000s (the years of substantial democratic reforms)and in the 2009–2013 period (corresponding to the polarized debate onTurkey’s internal democratic identity).
How does this correspond to variance in democracy promotion? Thesurge of democracy promotion in the 2003–2005 period indeed coincides
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with the period that the government was implementing an array of liberal democratic reforms and displayed a liberal democratic identity in its party program and election platform with which it sought to proveits democratic credentials to a wide array of the Turkish electorate. Thusthe AKP government had an incentive to promote democracy abroadto prove its democratic credentials within Turkey (as well as to the EU which will be discussed in the next section). This also made sense, espe-cially as the Turkish public was favorable to such a foreign policy. TheTransatlantic Trends surveys of the German Marshall Fund have shown that when asked the question if their country should support democracy even if it was likely that these countries would elect Islamic fundamen-talist leaders, in 2006 54 per cent of Turkish respondents agreed (similarto 53 per cent of American respondents) (German Marshall Fund 2006,15). In 2011, 44 per cent of Turkish respondents agreed that it should be their country’s role to promote democracy in the Middle East andNorth Africa (again similar to 43 per cent of American respondents) with50 per cent agreeing that it is more important to promote democracythan stability (German Marshall Fund 2011, 33). Furthermore, in a 2010 TESEV survey, 72 per cent of Turks supported the concept of Turkey as a political model for the Arab world (80 per cent as an economic model and 82 per cent as a cultural model) (Akgün et al. 2010, 23).
In contrast, democracy promotion lost speed in 2007, that is, exactlyin the period that the confrontation between the AKP and the Kemalistelite intensified, leading the AKP to engage in more confrontational, attimes autocratic, strategies rather than proving its democratic credentials.While democracy promotion grew again during this confrontational
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Figure 12.2 Frequency of democracy in the President’s annual message to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (2003–2006 Ahmet Necdet Sezer; 2007–today Abdullah Gül)
Source: Figure created by author based on data compiled by author. Speeches were accessedthrough Presidency of the Republic of Turkey (2014).
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period in 2011, this was mainly motivated by external, not internal,developments even though the renewed surge in democracy promotionfrom 2011 onwards remained deeply connected to Turkey’s democratictype identity as will be seen below.
The external dimension I: Turkey’s democratic role identity and its Western partners
The previous section has already shown how deeply connected theevolution of Turkey’s internal democratic type identity has been to its relations with the EU. Besides this, however, this relationship has alsoaffected Turkey’s external democratic role identity more directly, a trendthat has also been reinforced by Turkey’s relations with the United States. Both – the EU and the US as the ‘West’ – represent one of the two mostrelevant others in Turkey’s identity and, as this section will argue, havebeen decisive in activating Turkey’s democratic role identity in foreign policy in the early 2000s.
Europe, as Meltem Ahiska has pointed out, ‘has been an object of desire as well as a source of frustration for Turkish national identity in a long and strained history’ (Ahiska 2003, 351) that goes back to the1839 Tanzimat reforms, the Crimean War when Turkey became part of the European system but not community (Yavuz 2006, 230), and whenits identity was framed through a projection of the West to guarantee the construction of a new, modern society in Turkey (Ahiska 2003, 366).As a result, the affirmation of this identity through the relevant object of desire – Europe – has been crucial. Maybe more than for any other EU accession candidates, the accession process – the ‘question of inclu-sion or exclusion’ (Müftüler-Bac 1997, 11; Yavuz 1998, 35) – has deeply affected Turkish identity.
Seen from this perspective, the entire accession process has been prob-lematic for Turkey from the decision of the 2002 Copenhagen Councilonwards. As ‘Turkey sought closer relations with the EU, its differencesfrom Europe were more forcefully articulated (active Othering)’ and‘EU-Turkey relations increasingly got embedded in an identity discourse,which situated Turkey as an outsider’ (Rumelili 2007, 113). A debate in the EU on Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ started which showed that theimage of the ‘Turkish other’ is still deeply enshrined in Europe’s collec-tive memory (Neumann 1999, 39–64) as it became increasingly clearthat the EU treated Turkey as an outsider to Europe. The debate had been kicked off in 2002 by the then President of the Convention on theFuture of Europe, Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, who stated in an interview
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with Le Monde that ‘Turkey is not a European country’ (BBC News 2002). As a result of the big media response to this statement, conservative and right-wing parties in states such as France, Austria, Holland, andGermany understood the political ‘value’ of the issue and politicizedit in electoral campaigns (Insel 2012; Visier 2009). The idea of a ‘privi-leged partnership’ was formulated and subsequently became the policyof newly elected conservative governments in Germany and France.Thus, already during the ‘golden period of Europeanization’ in the early2000s, a discourse which othered Turkey intensified and contributed tothe faltering of the accession process later on.
Despite – or maybe due to – this exclusionary discourse, the AKP government has tried to prove the ‘Europeanness’ of Turkey not onlythrough adopting the EU’s democracy and human rights discourse inter-nally as shown above, but also in its external policies even though theadaption process has been more diffuse in this respect since no criteriaand conditionality has been set up by the EU in this area. The initiativehas, therefore, come from Turkey itself. Indeed, the AKP has engaged ina certain form of matchmaking between EU foreign policy norms and itsown neo-Ottoman foreign policy ideology which mirrors a process whichAmitav Acharya has called ‘norm localization’ and which describes how‘local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with theagents’ cognitive priors and identities’ (Acharya 2004, 239). This type of congruence building means that norms are not simply copied or ‘down-loaded’, but at least partially reconstructed.
In the case of the AKP, its main foreign policy architect – AhmetDavutoğlu – has actively borrowed EU foreign policy norms and recon-structed them in a way that has made them compatible with a neo-Ottoman foreign policy agenda. Besides calling Turkey a ‘civil-economic power’ (Davutoğlu 2010b) – thus directly playing into the ‘Civilian Power Europe’ paradigm – the five operative principles of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy (Davutoğlu 2010b) represent a matchmaking of the EU’s five CFSP objectives as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty founding theEuropean Union (European Union 1992, 7) with neo-Ottomanism. 2
According to Davutoğlu, this foreign policy approach, which approxi-mates the EU’s, makes Turkey and the EU sit in the same boat. It makes them part of the ‘same club’:
Turkey seeks to establish peace, stability and security in the MiddleEast; to further integrate the Balkans with the Euro-Atlantic commu-nity; to bolster democracy and peaceful resolution of conflicts in theCaucasus and Central Asia; … So does the EU. The proactive diplomacy
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pursued by Turkey to attain these objectives in fact complements the EU’s policies to the same ends. … . We share the same history. We share the same geography. We share the same vision. We share the same values: democracy, human rights, rule of law. Turkey and the EU row in the same boat, through tough waters at times but surelytowards the same direction of global peace and stability. (Davutoğlu2010a, 14)
Thus, by developing this foreign policy identity, Turkey is laying claimon being part of the European ‘club of democracies’, especially since thisforeign policy identity also includes a democratic role identity expressedthrough Turkey’s participation in democracy promotion. This particular democratic role identity has not only developed through norm localiza-tion on the part of Turkey, but has concretely been activated by the EU,especially in the early 2000s when the EU’s own democracy promotionagenda was at a high. In 2004, for example, then Commissioner forEnlargement Günther Verheugen stated that
It will be one of the most important questions whether we willbe able to organize relations between European countries and theIslamic world, based on tolerance and understanding, or whetherthere will be conflict between us. Turkey can play a crucial role, as acountry with a strong Muslim population, at the same time a country that shares our values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. (Verheugen 2004)
Similarly, Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten argued in 2003 that ‘Turkey is a bold demonstration of how democratic devel-opment can be combined with moderate Islam. As such, the country ought to serve as a beacon to the rest of the Muslim world’ (Patten 2003). Also politicians of EU Member States reflected such ideas. In2003, during his visit in Turkey, for example, Volker Rühe, then head of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the German Parliament, arguedthat ‘Turkey is a model of democracy and modernism. Modern Islam will also be an example to Europe and that model will bring peace andtranquility to the world’ and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröderstated in the same year that ‘Turkey has a democratic structure. I believe that this will continue to be an obstacle to Islamic fundamentalism’ (in Goren 2004, 33).
Turkey jumped on this train. In several speeches conveyed in Europe, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül highlighted the value of the Turkish
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model for the EU’s own democracy agenda in the Mediterranean. In2003, he stated in London that
There is a growing awareness and call for reform in the Muslim world.There are also positive steps in this direction. I have contributed to this call recently on various occasions. I have been able to speak as a representative of the government of a Muslim country that is success-fully undertaking major political, social and economic reforms toattain higher standards of democracy and modernity while preservingits identity. For my Party, it is a mission to prove that democracy, civil rights and liberties, respect for the rule of law, civil society, account-ability, market economy, transparency, and gender equality can alsobe basics of a Muslim society. (Gül 2003a) 3
This evolving democratic role identity of Turkey was, however, not onlydeveloped in relation to and activated by the EU, but also reinforcedby the United States which has been equally important in activatingthis identity; indeed Turkey–EU–US relations can maybe best be seen as triangular (Larrabee and Lesser 2003, 160; Tocci 2011), especially inthe field of democracy promotion, where dynamics have been mutuallyreinforcing.
In contrast to Turkey’s relations with the EU that have been deter-mined to a large degree by democracy and human rights considerations especially since the 1990s, the US–Turkish relationship has been moreheavily focused on shared security issues (Larrabee and Lesser 2003, 159). While this has initially led to fears that the significance of thisstrategic relationship would decline with the end of the Cold War, the contrary has been the case with the US shift of its geostrategic focus tothe Middle East in the 1990s and early 2000s. Not only has the signifi-cance of the strategic partnership increased, but it has also taken on avalue-based dimension in the early 2000s (Taspinar 2007, 194). With the US democracy-promotion agenda on the rise in the Middle East in theearly 2000s, Washington conveyed the message to Turkey that its geos-trategic importance for the United States was based exactly in Turkeyrepresenting a model for the Islamic world, specifically also since withthe AKP an Islamic party was in power. Already in 1999, Richard Perle(Chairman of the US Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee from2001–2003) stated that the ‘Turkey that looms large in world politics isone which serves as a role model for other states with Muslim popula-tions, a modern state that does not seek to define itself by its oppo-sition to the non-Muslim world’ (Perle 1999). This rhetoric picked up
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especially in the early 2000s. In 2002, Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitzargued that
to win the war against terrorism we have to reach out to the hundredof millions of moderate and tolerant people in the Muslim world,regardless of where they live … Turkey is crucial in bridging the dangerous gap between the West and the Muslim world. In the United States we understand that Turkey is a model for those in the Muslimworld who have aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity.Turkey gives us an example of the reconciliation of religious belief with modern secular democratic institutions.
In the same year, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice called Turkey an ‘excellent model, a 99 per cent Muslim country that has great importance as an alternative to radical Islam’, while President GeorgeW. Bush stated that Turkey ‘provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of modern and secular democracy’ (all in Taspinar 2007, 195–196).
Turkey has responded to this expectation, but – as in the case with the EU – two issues are noteworthy in this respect: first, by developinga democratic role identity, Turkey has laid claim to being part of the club of Western democracies. Secondly, Turkey has localized its democ-racy promotion agenda which has developed in deliberate differentiation to the US approach which the AKP government did not fully support.Most instructive regarding both issues has maybe been Prime MinisterErdoğan’s speech at Harvard University in 2004. In it, he argued that the ‘Turkish example demonstrates the invalidity of the exception-alism paradigm’ – so rejecting the claim that a Muslim state cannot be part of the ‘club of democracies’; he also outlined more explicitlythat Europe and the United States are part of the same community of shared democratic values, that his government has carried the Turkish democracy to ‘highest universal norms’, and that Turkey is now also‘ready to do its fair share to promote democratization in the MiddleEast and facilitate such a momentous transformation. Turkey can make valuable contributions to that effect. Foremost, Turkey is an establisheddemocracy at the intersection of Europe and the Middle East’ (Erdoğan2004a). Thus, not only through its internal democratization, but alsothrough its external democratic role identity was Erdoğan laying claimto being part of the Western community of shared democratic values. At the same time, Erdoğan outlined that Turkey had its own approach topromoting democracy. While he argued that he joined in the belief that
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democratization in the Middle East was ‘the real issue in this era’, healso said that he takes ‘the debate on the method of promoting democ-racy seriously’ and highlighted the necessity of a gradual approach based on domestic social consensus and a multilateral and comprehen-sive approach which takes the security environment in the region intoconsideration (Erdoğan 2004a).
Similarly, then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül repeatedly argued inspeeches in the United States that ‘our bonds with the United States arebased on values. Values of democracy, freedom and market economy’(Gül 2003b), so putting Turkey and the United States in a shared value community, and also highlighting Turkey’s value to the US democ-racy promotion agenda by arguing that Turkey ‘is a gift to the World. Because the Turkish experience shows that Islam is compatible with democracy, and because it inspires other Muslim societies as well’ (Gül2006) or that the United States and Turkey cooperate in encouraging‘democratic reform and modernity in the Broader Middle East’ (Gül 2004c). At the same time, while always stressing Turkey’s commitment to democracy, Gül also criticized Washington’s approach. In reference to the Greater Middle East Initiative, he argued that if ‘we don’t take thereins … and prefer to cover up and ignore [our problems], then others will try to solve them their way and interfere in our affairs … And thisinterference will take place in the wrong way because they don’t under-stand our sensitivities, our habits, our cultures and our social structure’(Al Jazeera 2004).
Thus, in the early 2000s, we can witness how Turkey developed a democratic role identity in foreign policy through its relations with theEU and the United States who sought to activate Turkey’s democratic role identity in a period in which their own democracy agenda was at ahigh. Turkey responded to this activation, so highlighting – on its part –its belonging to the Western club of democracies, but also pointing outits own approach in this respect. Turkey did not simply copy the EU and the United States, but developed its own agenda in a process of local-izing or matchmaking.
When the West, however, began to turn away from democracy promotion after the 2005/2006 period, this activation of Turkey’s demo-cratic role identity through the EU and the United States died down.The Turkish model was hardly mentioned any longer and democracy promotion did not necessarily seem an entry card into the Western club of democracies anymore. Following the 2006 period, Turkish politiciansless and less evoked Turkey’s role as a model in speeches any longer. Thedemocratic role identity was not activated and thus indeed less and less
Turkey’s Evolving Democratic Role Identity 177
translated into foreign policy practice. It did, however, rise up again in 2011, this time not evoked by the West, but by the second-most relevantother in Turkey’s identity – the Islamic world.
The external dimension II: Turkey’s democratic role identity and its Islamic partners
During the Cold War, despite some fluctuations, in general Turkey was rather reluctant to get involved in the Middle East and North Africa(Altunişik 2004) – a position which ‘betrayed a perception of the Arabworld as complex, unstable, impenetrable and unintelligible. It rein-forced the notion of the Arab World as being different from Turkey’(Robins 2003, 100). In the 1990s, as was seen in Chapter 11, Turkey mainly saw the region as a source of security threats which changed inthe later 1990s and especially with the advance of the AKP to power whenrelations with the region were redefined based on the AKP’s own form of neo-Ottomanism. But while this laid the basis for a de-securitization of Islam as the other as had been pointed out above, this does not meanthat this new approach has been free of othering. Neo-Ottomanism ‘hasa powerful ethnic Turkish amplitude by positioning Turkey at the centerof a new imperial project to “lead” the Muslim world’ (Yavuz 1998, 23).This implies that the Muslim world needs to be led by and is not equalto Turkey. Indeed, the AKP’s foreign policy practice of presenting Turkeyas a model, example, or inspiration for other countries in the Muslimworld implies that these countries are backward and inferior to Turkeywhich perpetuates the same idea Kemalist reformers had in the 1920sexcept that the AKP has pursued an activist approach of changing theother rather than turning away from it.
Nonetheless, in contrast to the Cold War and the 1990s, the AKPgovernment has been relatively successful in garnering support in theArab world. Figure 12.3 shows the annual TESEV ratings on the percep-tion of Turkey in the Arab world which displays comparatively positive views of Turkey, its role in the region, as well as the model it represents.
While the figure also shows a drop in support since the Arab uprisings, support for Turkey still figures high when compared to the percentageof respondents in the Arab world who hold a positive view of the EU (34 per cent) or the United States (30 per cent) (Akgün and Gündogar 2013). Furthermore, the drop has mainly been due to falling supportin Syria (and since 2013 also in Egypt).4 This general support for Turkey as a model was further reinforced by active calls from political actorsin Spring states on Turkey’s democratic role identity. To legitimize their
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parties domestically and internationally, Ennahda in Tunisia, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, evoked Turkey as a model. Shortly after winning elections in Tunisia, Rached Ghannouchi – the leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda Party – stated that ‘Turkey is a model country for us interms of democracy’ (Hürriyet Daily News 2011a) and Mohammed Badie,the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, similarly argued that ‘Turkey is a model’ for the countries in the region (Hürriyet Daily News2011b). Also the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has relatively long-standing relations with the AKP, initially calling upon the AKP to act as a medi-ator in the country, but increasingly calling on Turkey to intervene moreforcefully in Syria (Carnegie Middle East Center 2012). These calls clearly reactivated Turkey’s democratic role identity. As Davutoğlu pointed out
Turkish foreign policy is guided by our democratic values as well as our interests. … Turkey has always been encouraging the administrationsto address the legitimate expectations of their people and undertake
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
77780 8080 80
Positive view of Turkey
Turkey is a model for Arab countriesTurkey should play a bigger role in the Arab world
Figure 12.3 Annual TESEV ratings on the perception of Turkey in the Arab world
Source: Figure created by author based on data from Akgün et al. (2010; 2011; 2012; 2013;2014).
Turkey’s Evolving Democratic Role Identity 179
the necessary reforms. However, now, given the home-grown andirreversible march toward more democracy in the region, Turkey has stepped up its efforts to support this process. (Davutoğlu 2012)
Turkey’s democratic role identity – initially developed through its rela-tions with the EU and the United States – strengthened decisively. Itdid not only interpret the uprisings as a call for Turkish support, but as a call to become the very leader of a movement toward democracy in the Muslim world. This could, as Walker has pointed out, shift‘Turkey’s self-perception as being on the periphery to the understanding that the country is in the very center of important historical develop-ments’ (Walker 2012, 24). After a sweeping victory in the 2011 elections, Erdoğan, for example, stated that
I greet with affection the peoples of Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut,Amman, Cairo, Tunis, Sarajevo, Skopje, Baku, Nicosia and all other friends and brother peoples who are following the news out of Turkey with great excitement. … Today, the Middle East, the Caucasus and theBalkans have won as much as Turkey … Sarajevo has won today just asmuch as Istanbul, Beirut has won as much as Izmir, Damascus has wonas much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem have won as much as Diyarbakir. … We will become much more activein regional and global affairs. … We will take on a more effective role.We will call, as we have, for rights in our region, for justice, for the rule of law, for freedom and democracy. (in Güsten 2011)
Similarly, Davutoğlu claimed that
Turkey would henceforth lead the movement for change in the MiddleEast. We will continue to be the leader of this wave. … There is a new Middle East and we will be its owner, leader and servant. … Irrespective what others say, the new order’s leader and spokesperson will beTurkey. (in Barkey 2012, 5)
Turkey’s intensifying role understanding of being not only a democ-racy promoter but the leader of a regional democratic wave also becameobvious in statements addressed at the EU and the United States. AsTurkey in the early 2000s responded to their expectations of its partici-pating in democracy promotion, it now turned the tables and expressedits expectations toward the EU and the United States. In an article inForeign Policy magazine in 2013 Davutoy ğlu, for example, argued that
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the ‘partnership between the United States and Turkey is value-based,founded upon universal principles of fundamental rights and demo-cratic norms. Turkey promotes these values in its neighborhood andencourages its Western partners to uphold them as well’ (Davutoğlu 2013b,italics added), while Erdoğan became even more explicit when he statedin a reaction to the ouster of Morsi that this has been a ‘test of sincerity and the West failed the class again. There is no such thing as a “demo-cratic coup” … . Especially the European Union disregarded its own values once again by not calling the army’s coup a coup. I want them toread the EU acquis communautaire. Democracy does not accept doublestandards’ (Hürriyet Daily News 2013b).
The harsh words chosen by the Prime Minister also reflected anotherfact, namely that Turkey’s external democratic role identity was deeply influenced by the high salience of the internal democratic identity inTurkey at a time when the Gezi protests were shaking Turkey. The publicdebate in Turkey on Gezi and the coup in Egypt and the Turkish reaction to it became deeply intertwined. By likening the Gezi protests to themilitary coup in Egypt and speaking out forcefully against the coup, the AKP evoked a powerful, undemocratic past of military coups in Turkeyto delegitimize the Gezi protests while restoring its democratic creden-tials by presenting itself as a victim of anti-democratic forces in Turkey(Gursel 2013). The opposition also sought to use the coup on its partto delegitimize the democratic credentials of the AKP government. Themain opposition leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), stated that even though the intervention of the Egyptianmilitary was unacceptable, the Egyptian case also showed that those ‘who govern the country have to lend an ear to everyone’s demands. Toremain indifferent to these demands, to not see them and say “I havethe majority of votes; I can do what I like” is no longer valid in our day’ (in Idiz 2013). With the democratic type identity once more highly salient, foreign policy became a domain where internal identity ‘fights’ were pursued; internal and external politics intertwined.
This case study has shown that Turkey incorporated democracy promo-tion into its foreign policy in the early 2000s. As in the US and EU cases,this move from phase I (no democracy promotion) to phase II (varying use of democracy promotion) was enabled by low threat perceptions. Itwas also pushed for by the drive of the new AKP government to proveits democratic credentials to a broader electorate as well as to the EU andthe United States who – representing an important other for Turkey’sidentity – actively contributed to the development and activation of a Turkish democratic role identity in regional affairs. Also in this case the
Turkey’s Evolving Democratic Role Identity 181
role of the other has come out as crucial in phase II. When the EU andthe United States both increasingly turned away from their democracyagenda in the Middle East and North Africa from 2006/2007 onwards,Turkey also de-emphasized the theme in a time that the AKP govern-ment displayed increasing autocratic tendencies. Turkey’s democraticrole identity was, however, once more activated from 2011 onwards, this time by the second important other in Turkey’s identity – the Arabworld. Turkey perceived the Arab uprisings as a chance to bolster itsregional leadership role. This renewed push for democracy promotionwas again supported by internal politics, as the AKP government wasfacing widespread domestic protest and foreign policy became a domain in which the outlook of Turkey’s own democracy became contested.Finally, a last interesting finding of this case study has been that the activation of Turkey’s democratic role identity through other democ-racy promoters has led to a different type of democracy promotion byTurkey, namely one compatible with its broader regional policies, while its activation through the target countries has led to a more principledand less cooperative approach.
Democracy promotion is a complex foreign policy phenomenon whichhas been analyzed in the book from an identity and strategic perspec-tive. What have we learned from the three case studies in comparativeperspective? How does this study contribute to IR theory generally andto the democracy promotion literature specifically? And what can weexpect for the future of democracy promotion?
The comparative discussion of the case studies is pursued from twoangles, questioning first if the EU as a non-state actor has been compa-rable to the United States and Turkey, the state actors, and, secondly, if all three actors have been comparable given that the case studies took place in diverse time and area settings. Regarding the first issue, therehave been important differences among all three actors, but these havenot been determined by whether they are a state or not. For example, allthree actors have struggled with their democratic identity, even thoughthe EU and Turkey are more comparable here to each other than to the United States. Both have seen a democratic role identity as useful toproject a democratic image internally and externally. In the US case, in contrast, a raised awareness for civil rights spilled over into foreign policy. When it comes to the effect of international norms of democracy, the EU has been more comparable to the United States, less to Turkey. Both the United States and the EU perceived a pull from growing humanrights norms and the third wave of democracy sweeping through theirrespective neighborhoods. However, in the case of norms the mecha-nism differed: Carter displayed a strategic pull to put the United States ahead of these norms and increase its soft power; Reagan voiced a confi-dence pull, feeling that the third wave of democracy was the victory of liberalism over communism; and the EU portrayed itself as a principledactor arguing for a duty to promote democracy, thus displaying a moral
pull. The Turkey case was more complicated: in the 1990s when Turkey displayed a highly securitized foreign policy identity, the third wave didnot influence its foreign policy. However, with its foreign policy identity changing decisively under AKP rule, Turkey also displayed a strategic pull: it perceived the Arab uprisings as a chance to bolster its regionalleadership role. Thus, an already developing democratic role identityseems to be a condition for growing international norms of democracyto have an augmenting effect on this identity.
Secondly, despite the differences of the cases in time frame and area of democracy promotion, the three cases can be compared in terms of democracy promotion phases. This book has discussed three genera-tions of democracy promoters at those points in time when a democ-racy agenda (re)entered their foreign policy: the United States in thelate 1970s and 1980s, the EU after the end of the Cold War, and Turkeysince the early 2000s. It could be confirmed in all three cases that inphase I (no democracy promotion), democracy promotion started only when threat perceptions were low: in the United States during détente,in the EU after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and in Turkey as a new govern-ment saw its neighborhood through a de-securitized lens. In all threecases, threat perceptions lost their independent effect on foreign policyin phase II when democracy promotion had started. In the Turkish casethey did not have any effect anymore as the new AKP government didnot perceive its neighborhood as threatening; in the US and EU cases,threat perceptions had hindering effects which could, however, be thwarted when the relevant other – the target of democracy promo-tion – called on and so activated the US or EU democratic role identity.
Indeed, the role of the other has appeared as a decisive factor in allthree cases in phase II. In the US case, South American activists throughtheir links with US American civil society actors could participate inthe foreign policy debate in the 1980s during the course of which theReagan administration was socialized into a democratic role identity;as a result the United States was pushed toward phase III (democracy promotion as a routine). The EU case was characterized more by the lack of an activation of the EU’s democratic role identity through theother. When this identity was at a high in the early 2000s, the partnercountries in the region regressed in terms of democratization and civilsociety actors did not have the relevant networks in the EU to maketheir voices heard. The EU’s democratic role identity was not activated,started to step into the background, and threat perceptions could maketheir influence felt on EU foreign policy. Thus, the EU was tendentiously pushed toward phase I (no democracy promotion). In the Turkey case,
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the democratic role identity was activated by two diverse others: theWest in the early 2000s and the Arab world during the Arab uprisings.Pushed by two diverse others, Turkey moved toward phase III, but, curi-ously, the effect of these two diverse others varied: the activation of aTurkish democratic role identity in the early 2000s by the West led toa more cooperative approach of democracy promotion, the activation through the Arab uprisings to a more confrontational one.
In sum, both hypotheses of this book could be confirmed. Threat perceptions constrain democracy promotion, while a democratic role iden-tity – rooted internally in a democratic type identity and externally in interna-tional norms of democracy – enables and pushes for democracy promotion. Ademocratic role identity can limit the hindering effect of threat perceptions ondemocracy promotion if the other is successful in mobilizing it.
How do these findings contribute to IR theory in general and to the study of democracy promotion in particular? Regarding the first ques-tion, this book shows that interests and identity both matter for foreignpolicy, but how much they matter is largely dependent on the roleplayed by the significant other. IR students have explored the role of the other in fostering or disrupting threat perceptions as well as certainidentities; however, this could be pursued with even more rigor, specifi-cally in the study field of democracy promotion where the role of theother has so far been largely neglected. Furthermore, this book alsopresents a theoretical contribution to the constructivist IR literature onidentity from an inside-out perspective: an internal democratic-typeidentity can have an effect on role identity through four mechanisms:the anchoring, imitation, substitution, and spillover mechanisms. Anadditional value of this book is its contribution to the constructivistliterature on international norms which usually focuses on the effect of norms on non-complying states. This study showed that internationalnorms also influence complying states through three diverse mecha-nisms: a strategic, a moral, and a confidence pull.
Regarding the literature on democracy promotion more specifically,this book presents an added value to the emerging comparative litera-ture on the issue (Tocci 2008; Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009; Carothers and Youngs 2011; Börzel, Dandashly, and Risse 2015) as it seeks to repre-sent another step toward a more comprehensive conceptualization and theorization of democracy promotion. Identity has been raised as anexplanatory factor in the literature on democracy promotion (Manners 2002; Nau 2000; T. Smith 1994) which has, however, tended to portray the United States and EU as ‘sui generis’ cases. This study showed thatthey are not exceptional in this respect. Identity has mattered for all
democracy promoters studied here; what differed was the way and theconditions under which identity influenced foreign policy, and thecontribution of this study to the literature lies in highlighting thesepathways. It also introduced international norms to the research fieldof democracy promotion, where they were hardly present. Growinginternational and regional norms of democracy foster democratic roleidentities and the emerging literature on democracies and their roleidentities (Aggestam 2004; Mitzen 2006b; Sedelmeier 2006) could takeinternational norms, as well as the crucial role of the other, better intoaccount.
This study has also contributed to the more realist-leaning literatureon democracy promotion. It has confirmed that democracy promotionis adopted when there is no significant threat in the global balance of power (Peceny 1999, 37), but has also conditioned this argument sincethreat perceptions have an independent effect only in the initial phaseof democracy promotion. At the same time, this finding should be quali-fied. This study has dealt with dilemmatic cases of democracy promotionwhere it is a potentially risky policy. The logic of democracy promotionchanges fundamentally when pursued toward unfriendly autocraticstates. In this case threat perceptions should not hinder democracypromotion, but could rather provide a rationale for democracy promo-tion. In such cases, as Benny Miller has convincingly shown for USdemocracy promotion, threats do not hinder democracy promotion, butinstead have an effect on the means of pursuing it (Miller 2010, 27).
What does this book, finally, mean for the future of democracy promo-tion? First, the Turkey case study has shown that the field of democracypromotion will increasingly be populated by democracies outside of theWest. Their approach to democracy promotion might, however, look different – Turkey has, for example, localized the EU’s foreign policypractice in coherence with its own identity. Second, much will alsodepend on the fate of the Arab uprisings: the growth of democracy tothe standard form of democracy, as well as the agency coming from tran-sition states in activating international democracy support, is crucial.Third, much will also depend on the perception of the Arab uprisings bydemocracy promoters. Currently, the EU and the United States perceivethem through an increasingly securitized lens with hindering effects onforeign policy (Dandashly 2015; Huber 2015; Noutcheva 2015). Fourth,this study has held the capability factor constant: all observed democra-cies had the political, economic, and military capabilities to promote democracy in their neighborhoods. Democracies might, however, divertfrom democracy promotion in the face of a change in the international
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power structure. A decline in the power of democracies would neces-sarily imply a weakening of their ability to promote democracy. One could argue, for example, that Obama’s initial avoidance of democracypromotion was related to questions of capabilities, such as the rise of China, the economic crisis in the West, or the failures of the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions. Fifthly, the promotion of liberal democracy mightalso be challenged by emerging powers such as China or Russia. Mannersand Tocci have pointed out that non-democratic states display combina-tions of normativity in their foreign policy behavior as well, but normsand normative foreign policy behavior is interpreted differently (Tocci and Manners 2008).
The future of democracy promotion will also depend on democra-cies solving the controversies that surround this policy. Democracypromotion, as has been pointed out in the introduction of this book,has become the focal point of ‘democracy and its critics’. Is democracypromotion a mere fig leaf covering realpolitik? Is it a democratic foreignpolicy or a new form of colonialism? This study shed some light onthese controversial questions. It showed that democracy promotion isnot a fig leaf for realpolitik. In the US case, for example, democraticvalues spilled over into foreign policy through the rights revolution andthe development of a democratic role identity was the result of a hardfight of human rights activists in and outside of the United States. Thischanged foreign policy and diverted it away from realpolitik, rather thanpresenting a fig leaf for it. The challenge for democracies today ratheris to stake out how to accommodate their democratic aspirations withsecurity interests. But while democracy promotion might not be a figleaf for realpolitik, it can serve as a fig leaf for democratic shortcomings.Democracy promotion often seems more concerned with the demo-cratic self than with the other. The EU used democracy promotion toproject a democratic image inside of the EU; the AKP government triedthe same. Also, the debate on a proper foreign policy under the Carterand Reagan administrations was more about the self and the questionwhat US democracy should look like than about the other. In the debatessurrounding democracy promotion, the United States, EU, and Turkeyhave all displayed a substantial degree of ‘democratic narcissism’. Not only did Ronald Reagan celebrate the United States as an ‘exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope’ (Reagan 1981), but also the European Council stated that Europe ‘as the continent of humane values, theMagna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diver-sity’, needs ‘to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples’
(European Council 2001b). Similarly, Ahmhet Davutoğlu stated in theface of the Arab uprisings that Turkey will be its ‘owner’, ‘leader’, and‘spokesperson’ (in Barkey 2012, 5). It is this rhetoric that might makedemocracy promotion look missionary or even colonialist to the other.One is reminded of Pericles’s Epitaphios – the famous funeral speech – in which Thucydides lets the Athenian leader proclaim that ‘our city as awhole is the school of Hellas’ (Thucydides 1972, II. 36–41). Focusing onthe self as a model proved highly problematic as Athenians forgot todeal with their own democratic shortcomings which contributed to thedisintegration of Athenian democracy in the long term.
1 Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists
1. The Athenians, as Meier points out, had no one to emulate. ‘They were there-fore unaware of the possibility of democratic government before they created it themselves’ (Meier 1990, 29). The concept of the demos controlling the state appeared as early as 463 BCE in Aeschylus’s play Supplices (Aeschylus 2009, 603–604, 699–701), that is, one year before the Aeropagus was over-thrown and Athens transformed into a radical democracy.
2 . This is mirrored in the constitutional debate in Herodotus’s Histories (Herodotus 2003, written between 450–420 BCE), Pseudo-Xenophon’s treaties (Pseudo-Xenophon 2008, written between 446 and 441 BCE), Thucydides’s Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 1972, written after 431 BCE), as well asrEuripides’ play The Suppliants (Euripides 2004, written about 424 BCE).
3 . In the relatively well-documented case of Erythrae (about 453 BCE), for example, Athens arrived with a fleet, expelled the tyrants who sympathized with Persia, imposed a democracy modeled on Athens with a council of 120members who were elected by lot, and installed an Athenian garrison in the city.
4 . In her seminal volume on Imperial Liberalism, Jennifer Pitt argues that the ‘Revolution’s most threatening legacy was … instability in France’s very iden-tity as a nation. The French, first in undertaking the Revolution and then in commemorating it, persistently fooled themselves about its novelty and its significance, and thus about their own national identity’ (Pitts 2005, 193).
5 . Nonetheless, with the end of the colonial period and the emergence of demo-cratic states in former colonies, contemporary democratization theory has identified ‘colonial experience’ as one of the factors fostering transition to and consolidation of democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Lipset 1994; Hadenius 1992; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Clague, Gleason, and Knack 2001). But rather than being a direct result of the British export of representative institutions (as, e.g., claimed by Ferguson 2003), democracy could gain ground in former colonies since local political elites used the colonial power’s own democratic standards to delegitimizecolonial rule on the one hand and legitimize their own rule in democratic terms on the other (Emerson 1974, 242–243; R. B. Collier 1982, 32–33). Thus, instead of a direct legacy of an empire that was largely based on undemo-cratic structures, democracy was the result of a diffusion of democratic ideas through the empire, their adoption through local agents and the concurrent exposure of British rule as undemocratic in Britain and the world.
6 . This can also be read as an Orientalist approach, since it excluded a majorityof non-Western states from the League of Nations (Kamel 2015). It should be noted that many of Wilson’s viewpoints and policies have been disquali-fied by history. His administration reinstated the practice of racial segregationwhich had been abolished by Abraham Lincoln in 1863 at the federal level.
Wilson was also convinced that racial segregation was not humiliating andthat it had been adopted for the benefit of black Americans.
7. About 98 per cent of this amount went to top-down technical assistance for state institutions, specifically to central governmental agencies, rule of law, and local government. A notable difference between Japanese and Westerndemocracy promotion is that the actual implementation is not outsourced, but pursued by Japanese governmental ministries and agencies (Ichihara 2013).
8 . A neighborhood is what the democracy promoter perceives, identifies, and defines as its neighborhood, usually a group of states in a bordering regionwhich is perceived as sharing more or less similar cultural patterns, as well as geopolitical necessities (Panebianco 2010, 189).
9 . For an overview on the compartmentalization of EU foreign policy, seeKeukeleire and Delreux (2014) and Woolcock (2012).
10. With the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the EU has also acquired military capabilities. In 2003, in the peacekeeping mission in theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the EU actually engaged in its first military mission and has, as Howorth points out, by 2010 ‘embarked on atotal of 27 missions in 16 countries on three continents’ (Howorth 2011, 207). Keukeleire and Delreux have pointed out that ‘‘(c)onsidering that European security and defense cooperation has been a taboo for severaldecades, the EU’s record with regard to civilian and military operations looksquite impressive’ (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 184).
2 What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum
1 . An example are the unintended side effects of the US-led intervention in Iraq, such as the strengthening of anti-war movements in other Arab coun-tries which formed some of the foundations of the social movements that later drove the so-called Arab Spring, notably in Egypt (Beinin and Vairel 2011). Another example could be humanitarian aid which aims at immediate relief, but might effectively also promote democracy.
2 . Again, an example is the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003 which was ex post justified as democracy promotion by the Bush administration. It cannot classify as democracy promotion, since the declared goal of the United Statesin the run-up to the war was security-oriented, namely the destruction of weapons of mass destruction. Democracy promotion did, however, come in after the war through USAID, for example.
3 . The republican view – influenced by diverse thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emma Goldman, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil, Carole Pateman, and Crawford Brough Macpherson, as well as today’s theory on social move-ments – perceives the human being as a homo sociologicus who – in contrast to the homo oeconomicus – does not act in order to maximize utility, but whosebehavior is led by norms and whose interpretation of reality is shaped by ideas. Carol Pateman (1985: 171) has argued that free and equal persons as imagined by liberal theory rarely exist in practice. The republican model of democracy focuses on positive rights and the obligations of democratic citi-zens, the common good, and the principle of equality. A democracy is seen
as a solidarity community that seeks to achieve mutual understanding and consensus. Opinion- and will-formation is value-oriented and takes place through an ethical political discourse in the public sphere on the basis of acommon normative background. Its key features are direct participation of citizens in the regulation of key institutions of society, a party system account-able to its membership (participatory parties), and an open institutionalsystem to allow for variance (Held 2006: 206–216).
4 . Deliberative models – thinkers include Jürgen Habermas, John Elster, andJoshua Cohen – see democracy as ‘an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members’ (J. Cohen 1997: 67). It could be framed as a via media between liberal and republican democracy, seeing thehuman being neither as a rational and utility-maximizing homo oeconomicus ,nor as a solely norm-guided homo sociologicus, but as a reasoning and reflexive person capable of communicative action in which the power of the better argument rules. The outcome is – ideally speaking – ‘fact-regarding’, ‘other-regarding’, and ‘future-regarding’ (Offe and Preuss 1991: 156–157). Thus central are not the aggregated preferences of the individual, but rather the well-informed will-formation itself which takes place in the parliament, as well as the informal networks of the public sphere. Civil society is seen as the very basis of autonomous public spheres that are distinct from the economic as well as administrative sectors. The ‘communicative structures of the public sphere comprise a far-flung network of sensors that in the first place reactto the pressure of society wide problems and stimulate influential opinions’ (Habermas 1996: 29). Thus, in difference to conceptions of republican democ-racy, civil society is autonomous from the state, the constitution, and the fairrules of the game provided by the state are central, and public opinion chan-neled democratically into the administrative sectors does not rule by itself, but provides directions to the political system.
5 . The denominations of the three types of democracy promotion are borrowed from Amitai Etzioni’s three types of integrating power (Etzioni 2001).
6 . They consist of the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary dimensions, that is, of saying something, acting in saying something, and bringing about something through acting in saying something (Habermas 1984: 1: 289).
3 Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument
1. Commercial liberalism concentrates on gains and losses of groups in societythrough transnational economic exchange, ideational liberalism deals with social values and identities, and republican liberalism focuses on different forms of domestic representation (Moravcsik 1997, 515).
2. See also Chomsky (1991), Gills et al. (1993), and Smith, Steve (2000). 3. Norms inform decisions as to what one ought to do, while values inform deci-
sions as to what conduct is most desirable. Thus, norms are about behavioral expectations and values about preferences regarding certain goods (Habermas 1995, 114–115). In the context of democracy promotion, human rights are norms closely associated with democracy, while democracy per se would be avalue that is preferred to autocracy.
4 . On this discussion see Mansfield and Snyder (1995; 2002) and Ward and Gleditsch (1998; Gleditsch and Ward 2000). Narang and Nelson (2009) reject the view that democratizing states are more war-prone. They might be rather prone to civil war as discussed by Hegre (2001) and King and Zeng (2001).
5 . See also Abdelal et al. (2009, 27–29) and Klotz and Lynch (2007, 70). 6. This differentiation was proposed by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1991)
who argue that in the social world there are two stories to tell. Using theterms of ‘Erklären’ and ‘Verstehen’ of Max Weber, they show that on the one hand social action can be causally explained from an outsider’s perspec-tive, as in the natural sciences; on the other hand, social action can be understood interpretatively from within, following an hermeneutic-like approach.
4 The Return of Democracy Promotion to US ForeignPolicy
1. Apart from Central and South America, human rights also became part of US foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and the USSR where Carter abandoned the policy of détente by criticizing human rights violations and supportinghuman rights activists like Andrei Sakharov. Also, in South Africa the Carteradministration supported the fight against apartheid and for majority rule.In stark contrast to this, however, Carter did not incorporate human rightsprinciples in his policy towards the Middle East and Asia. He set up a newrelationship with China notwithstanding its human rights violations. He failed to promote democracy and human rights in South Korea, where his administration continued military aid despite massive human rights viola-tions. Similarly, Carter was criticized for continuing good relations with the Iranian Shah just before the revolution, the latter’s negative human rights record notwithstanding.
2. Reagan continued a focus on human rights in his relations with the USSR, but abandoned Carter’s support for the fight against apartheid in South Africa. Similar to Carter, human rights and democracy played no role in his foreign policy in the Middle East.
3. The reports published during the Reagan administration were repeatedly criticized as biased in language by Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and theLawyers Committee for International Human Rights (Carleton and Stohl 1985, 218).
4. In his 2010 National Security Strategy, US President Barack Obama, forexample, defined ‘free and fair electoral processes, strong legislatures, civilian control of militaries, honest police forces, independent and fair judiciaries, afree and independent press, a vibrant private sector, and a robust civil society’ (Obama 2010) as key democratic institutions.
5 . Apart from bilateral aid cuts, the Carter administration also started to block multilateral loans to human rights–violating regimes: 18 in 1977, 29 in 1978, 30 in 1979, and 21 in 1980. The affected countries included aboveall Argentina, but also Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Schoultz 1981, 295).
5 A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America
1 . This was justified by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1979 by claiming that through ‘extending our friendship and economic assistance, we enhance the prospect for democracy in Nicaragua. We cannot guarantee that democracywill take hold there, but if we turn our backs on Nicaragua, we can almost guar-antee that democracy will fail’ (US Department of State 1983b, 1297–1298).
2 . Note that this represents the monadic version of the democratic peace theory, that is, that democracies are more peaceful, which is not supported by empir-ical evidence, while the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory, that is,that democracies do not wage war against one another, is rather established in IR theory today (Müller and Wolff 2004).
3 . The idea that Latin American societies were inherently undemocratic had along trail. A prominent example of it is the George Kennan report on LatinAmerica (Kennan 1950).
4 . While democracy was named as a motivation for the invasion, it does not seem to have been the decisive one. Secretary of State Shultz claims in hismemoires that the intervention was ‘a shot heard round the world by usurpersand despots of every ideology. The report was sharp and clear: some Western democracies were again ready to use their military strength they had harbored and built up over the years in defense of their principles and interests’ (Shultz 1993, 340). The United States sought to restore its international standing after a parallel attack on its embassy in Lebanon and to roll back commu-nism (Kryzanek 1995, 74). After the successful invasion, utilitarian democracy promotion did come in. The United States provided financial support for elec-tions, albeit mainly to US-friendly candidates. In the two years following the elections, Grenada received 48 million USD in 1984 and 11 million in 1985 in assistance (USAID 2009).
5 . Reagan framed the support for the Contras and covert US military action likethe mining of the harbor Corinto by the CIA as democracy promotion. He portrayed the Contras as a democratic resistance and called them ‘the moralequal of the US Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French Resistance’ (Reagan 1985a). But instead of promoting democracy, actions undertaken by the Reagan administration extirpated democratic processes in Nicaragua. In 1984 the Sandinistas conducted elections which were accredited as fair by international observers including Jimmy Carter, but as a ‘sham’ bythe Reagan administration, since they had taken place under martial law and with the main opposition not participating (due to pressure from the United States). The Reagan administration claimed that the Sandinista failure to pursue democratic elections increased their mistrust towards them and made negotiations impossible. Posing democracy as a precondition for negotiations,rather than an outcome of it, helped the Reagan administration to circumventthe peace efforts of the Contadora group (Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela). Carothers argues that given ‘the considerable pressure in Latin America and the United States for the administration to support these multi-lateral processes, the democracy issue was very useful as a way of putting theadministration’s fundamental rejection of any negotiated accord in principled terms’ (Carothers 1991, 101). In 1987, even though the Sandinista regime formally agreed to a process of democratization in the Esquipulas II agreement
brokered by Costa Rican President Óscar Arias, the Reagan administration did not endorse it. Hence, it is hardly feasible to frame the case of Nicaragua as an instance of coercive democracy promotion.
6 The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity andIts Activation in a Grand Foreign Policy Debate
1 . On a more detailed analysis of the role of the OAS in promoting democracy, see Adams (2003, chapter 5).
2 . Also the New Right adopted the model of the civil rights movement and increased its civic participation in American politics through a massive grass-roots mobilization (Berlet 1998, 25).
3 . The civil rights movement itself had an international character. MartinLuther King ‘wove together African American dreams of freedom with global dreams of political and economic equality’ and ‘referred to the American civil rights movement as simply one expression of an international human rights’(Jackson 2007, 1).
4 . This included increased social spending, legislation such as the Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, the Fair Housing Law, the Education Amendment, theEducation for all Handicapped Children Act, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, as well as jurisdiction such as – maybemost famously – the Roe v. Wade decision by the US Supreme Court on theissue of abortion.
5 . Carter’s self-critical stance, which had found its peak in Carter’s ‘crisis of confidence’ speech (Carter 1979a), was perceived as ‘masochism’ (Kirkpatrick 1979) or ‘appeasement’ (Podhoretz 1977) by many conservatives.
6 . They became especially active after the overthrow of democratically elected Salvador Allende in Chile. Schoultz reports that ‘(f)ive years after the 1973 coup, Senator Kennedy’s face still reddened visibly and his voice rose severaloctaves at the mention of Chile’ (Schoultz 1981, 186).
7 . In the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, for example, there appeared a state-ment that it is ‘the sense of Congress that sales and guaranties … shall not be approved where they would have the effect of arming military dictatorswho are denying social progress to their own people [later: who are denying the growth of fundamental rights or social progress]’ (in Schoultz 1981, 251–252).
8 . In his State of the Union address in 1978 Carter again states that a ‘year agoI set five goals for United States foreign policy in the late 1970’s and early1980’s: to reassert America’s moral leadership; to strengthen our traditionalties with friends and allies; to work toward a more just international system;to promote regional reconciliation; and to preserve peace through prepared-ness and arms control. These goals continue to underlie my agenda for 1978’ (Carter 1978). In the 1979 State of the Union address he argued for ‘four broad objectives: to buttress American power on which global security and stability depend; to strengthen our relations with other nations throughout the world in order to widen the spirit of international cooperation; to deal construc-tively with pressing world problems which otherwise will disrupt and even destroy the world community we seek; to assert our traditional commitment
to human rights, rejoining a rising tide of belief in the dignity of the indi-vidual’ (Carter 1979b).
9. Another important legislation in this respect was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which was vetoed by President Reagan and in turn over-ruled by Congress. Nonetheless, it should also be mentioned that Congressplayed an ambiguous role. Even though the House of Representatives was held by a democratic majority (the Senate by a conservative majority between the years 1982–1987), Congress did approve an increase in security assistance by 300 per cent between 1980 and 1984 (Forsythe 1988, 55).
10. Juan Mendez, for example, a human rights activist from Argentina, testified to Congress, introduced Argentinian human rights leaders to congressmen,and even assisted in drafting legislation (Méndez 2011, 59).
7 The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion and Its Ups and Downs in the Mediterranean Region
1. The others are ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen internationalsecurity, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the ParisCharter; to promote international co-operation’ (European Union 1992).
2. Note the similarity to the US case where in a specific identitive, normative, and strategic setting, the initiative has similarly come from Congress, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and the President.
3. On an elaborated discussion of this issue, see Noutcheva (2015). 4. It should be noted here that Israel is not included in the analysis of EU
democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, since the EU sees Israel as ademocracy – it states that the ‘EU and Israel share the common values of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and basic freedoms’ (European Commission 2004b, 1) – and believes that the most contentiousissue of EU–Israel relations is the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, not political or economic reform (European External Action Service 2011a). For an extensive assessment of Israeli democracy, see Arian et al. (2010) and on the issue of Israel as an ethnic democracy, see Smooha (2002), as well as Peled (1992) andKimmerling (1999).
5. First agreements with the Mediterranean countries had been signed in the 1969–1972 period. On a comprehensive overview of European foreign policy making towards the region over time, see Bicchi (2007).
6. The Commission for example stated in 2004 that ‘Signatories of the Barcelona declaration have accepted inter alia a declaration of principles to act inaccordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to develop the rule of law and democracy in theirpolitical systems, respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guar-antee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms’ (European Commission 2004).
7. Since 2007 European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
8 . Aid for economic infrastructure includes initiatives for private sector devel-opment, transportation, energy, information society, economic reform, trade facilitation, and the like. Aid for social infrastructure comprises initiatives for health, education, vocational training, and the environment.
9 . MEDA II covered the period of 2000–2006 with 5.4 billion euros (European Commission 2012b). Social structure received 23 per cent and economicstructure 62 per cent (European Commission 2009).
10. Between 2007 and 2013 the budget of ENPI comprised 12 billion euros. Social structure received 43 per cent and economic structure 38 per cent. These figures are based on an analysis of all national indicative programs for 2007 and 2010 (European External Action Service 2014).
11. These findings are consistent with the literature on the issue (Huber 2008; Holden 2005, 470; Panebianco 2010, 186; Youngs 2002a, 55; 2009). Notethat economic and social structure can indirectly contribute to democratiza-tion; see Carothers (2009a).
12. A World Bank report found that the Palestinians are becoming increasingly aid-dependent as their economy deteriorates. While in 2007 aid constituted 25 per cent of the GDP, in 2008 it constituted 32 per cent of it (World Bank 2008).
13. Already at the very beginning, when democracy was incorporated into EU foreign policy in the early 1990s, the new objective faced a difficult test inAlgeria. In the late 1980s, Algeria had entered into a process of democratiza-tion. When in a first voting round in December 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) appeared as a clear winner, the second round was cancelled andthe state of emergency declared. While the European Community expressed‘the strong hope that the Algerian authorities will undertake every possible effort for a return to normal institutional life so that … the democratic processwill pursue on a stable course’ (in Hill and Smith 2000, 343), the EU didnot suspend its trade agreement with Algeria. France, which was at the time guiding European policy towards its former colony, saw the rule of the mili-tary as the ‘lesser evil’ (Jünemann 2000, 111).
14. The regulation for its new financial instrument, ENI, now includes an article that states that ‘where a partner country fails to observe the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Union shall invite the country concerned to hold consul-tations in view of finding a solution acceptable to both parties, except incases of special urgency. Where consultation with the country concerneddoes not lead to a solution acceptable to both parties, or if consultations are refused or in case of special urgency, the Council may take appropriatemeasures … which may include full or partial suspension of Union support’ (European Commission 2011c).
15. On a more detailed discussion of the Lebanese case see Seeberg (2009) andKhatib (2009).
16. It was the first Mediterranean country to open its market for industrial goods from the EU (and vice versa) in 2008. For Tunisia, the EU is the major trade partner: 64.5 per cent of Tunisian imports come from the EU and 72.1 per cent of Tunisian exports go to the EU (European Commission 2010). For the EU, Tunisia is the 31st trading partner.
17. In 2003, the EU sharpened its tone towards the Tunisian regime. Balfour points out that during ‘the visit of its President to Algiers and Tunis in March … Romano
Prodi underlined unequivocally that the fight against terrorism should not be used as a “pretext to reduce public liberties, nor to renounce improvinghuman rights in Tunisia”’ (Balfour 2006, 126). Also, between 2004 and 2007,the Association Council did not meet for almost three years due to humanrights and democracy-related issues (van Hüllen 2009, 15).
8 The EU’s New Security Environment
1. Marc Otte, the EU’s former special representative to the Middle East peace process, has for example stated that the ‘Israeli–Palestinian conflict lies at the heart of the problems in the region as a whole and must be resolved in order to bring about a comprehensive Middle East peace. This is vital not only for the region but also for us. We, in the European Union, are closeneighbors, on the doorstep of the Middle East’ (Otte 2003). According to aspecial Eurobarometer survey in 2003, 81 per cent of all Europeans also want the EU to play a role in it (European Commission 2003b, 59).
2. This was also accompanied by a bilateral EU–Iranian Dialogue on Human Rights, held between 2002 and 2004 and suspended by Iran in 2006.
3. Also Brynjar Lia has argued that ‘by focusing on the “terrorist threats”,southern regimes have been very successful in branding all manifestations of opposition – violent and non-violent – as a threat to the stability of the region’ (Lia 1999, 49–50).
9 The Formation of a Democratic Role Identity, Its Hype,and Subsequent Stumbling
1. Smith points out that human rights ‘became an issue in 1964 after the European Court of Justice set out the doctrine of the supremacy of EC law over national law. This was resisted by the German and Italian constitutional courts, because EC law, in contrast to their national constitutions, did notprotect human rights. In response, in a series of judgments from 1969, the ECJ asserted ‘its jurisdiction over the review of Community provisions and action for conformity with human rights’’ (K. Smith 2003, 99). The firstEU/EC treaty to mention the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was the Single European Act of 1986. Since the Maastricht Treaty, human rights are a founding principle of the European Union. The European Parliament has been one of the main driving sources to craft a European Constitution with its own bill of rights. Since 2000, the EU has a Charter of Fundamental Rights which was made legally binding through the Lisbon Treaty in 2007.
2. It states ‘that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for andprotection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy aswell as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forceswithin the Union’ (European Council 1993).
3. Similar to this case, the European Commission was also taking measuresagainst the Hungarian government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban
in early 2012, after it had passed a new constitution which infringes on democracy in areas such as an independent judiciary or press. In a rare activism against a Member State, the European Commission initiated a legalproceeding against Hungary, accusing it of violating EU treaties. EU JusticeCommissioner Viviane Reding stated that ‘(n)ow that the laws have been passed without taking into account the Commission’s legal concerns, it is the Commission’s responsibility as guardian of the Treaties to ensure that EU lawis upheld. I expect the Hungarian authorities to address the Commission’slegal concerns swiftly’ (Reding 2012). Thus, democracy as a core value and principle for EU Member States is established and enshrined in EU treaties.
4 . Fligstein has shown that about 44 per cent do not think of themselves as European (Fligstein 2008, 4;, see also Hooghe and Marks 2005).
5 . The current euro crisis could eventually turn into a third such juncture. However, while integration has increased, this has mainly happened withinthe European Monetary Union with the European Stability Mechanism, the Six-Pack and Two-Pack and the Fiscal Compact, as well as the Single Supervisory Mechanism granted to the European Central Bank. It did notmean a foundational change. Nonetheless, the euro crisis has led to protests against the EU, notably also since an austerity agenda was imposed by the so-called Troika (Commission, Central Bank, International Monetary Fund) on Member States requiring a bailout (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, as well as Ireland) which limited the budgetary powers of the respectivenational parliaments. Parties drove election campaigns on anti-EU tickets and euro-sceptic parties could enter the Greek (Syriza, Chrysi Avgi) and Italian (Movimento 5 Stelle) parliaments. Majorities in most Member States believed that EU economic integration had weakened their economies (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press 2012) and distrust in the EU rose from 32 per cent in 2007 to 60 per cent in 2013 (Euractiv 2013). Nonetheless, trust in EU institutions is still higher than in national institutions and a stable absolute majority of 62 per cent of Europeans still identify as EU citi-zens (European Commission 2013a, 79).
6 . It makes the equality of men and women subject to interpretation through sharia, grants some social and economic rights to citizens only, does notprohibit degrading punishment, and permits – if so determined in nationallaw – limitations of freedom of thought and religion, as well as the deathpenalty against persons under the age of 18 (Rishmawi 2010).
7 . Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Palestinian Authority,Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.
8 . Also the Parliament argues in its resolution on human rights in the world in 1989/1990 that ‘human rights are universal … and governments have a duty to promote them beyond as well as inside their own frontiers’ (European Parliament 1991, 166); that ‘there has been considerable worldwide growth in the recognition of human rights; a Community based on democracy andthe rule of law has worldwide responsibilities because of these principles which it should also incorporate in its foreign policy’, and that ‘action in favor of human rights is a legitimate international activity which cannot beconstrued as improper interference in the internal affairs of third countries’ (European Parliament 1991, 168).
9. The concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ was introduced in the early 1970s by Francois Duchêne to describe a Europe which was ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’ (Duchêne 1973, 19). Ian Manners, in contrast, termed the EU a ‘normative power’, arguing that because ‘of its particular historical evolution, its hybrid polity, and its constitutionalconfiguration, the EU has a normatively different basis for its relations with the world. … (N)ot only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly … this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics’ (Manners 2002, 252). The concept was, however, criticized in the academiccommunity. Thomas Diez argued that the representation of the EU as anormative power ‘constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the “outside world”’ (Diez 2005, 614). He proposed the ‘past as other’ concept which instead of portraying the self as a model, questions the self and ‘instills a critical moment in policy discourse’ (Diez 2005, 634). Mannersand Diez then came to agree that rather ‘than the propagation of particular “European” norms, it is … reflection and reflexivity that constitute the EU as a normative power that is different from pure self-interested hegemony’(Manners and Diez 2007, 174).
10 The Emergence of Democracy Promotion in TurkishForeign Policy
1. This capacity has become compromised with the row in Turkish–Israeli rela-tions; see Huber and Tocci (2013) and Huber (2012).
2. A free-trade agreement with Israel exists since 1996. 3. For an excellent study on this first approach to democracy promotion, see
Kirisci (2012b). 4. It should be noted that it is not clear which ‘model’ Turkish politicians
have meant when raising this concept. Ömer Taşpınar has highlighted that there are diverse models, that is, Turkey’s experience with political Islamon the one hand, and its experience in civil–military relations on the other (Taşpınar 2011, 13). Besides internal contradiction, the model also suffersfrom external ones, depending on the viewpoint of the ‘other’. While Europe focuses on issues such as Islam and democracy, the Arab world has rather admired Turkey’s position towards Israel (Nafaa 2011, 44).
11 The De-securitization of Foreign Policy
1. This process of othering the Arab world had deeper roots in the past; see Kamel (2015).
12 Turkey’s Evolving Democratic Role Identity and ItsActivation through Two Relevant Others
1. Negotiations were frozen on eight chapters over the Cyprus conflict in December 2006 and the French vetoed five chapters upon Nicolas Sarkozy’s
coming to power in 2007. In 2009 Cyprus blocked six chapters and after June 2010 no new chapter was opened at all until November 2013, when the regional chapter was opened.
2. Davutoğlu’s first three principle match the EU’s five CFSP objectives, while his last two principles embody neo-Ottomanist ideas, but always in line with the first three principles. Davutoğlu’s first operational principle – balancebetween security and democracy – brings together the EU’s objectives of safe-guarding the Union’s values and interests, the security of the Union, and democracy promotion; his second principle – zero problems toward neigh-bors – brings the EU’s objective of international cooperation to the region surrounding Turkey; his third principle – proactive and pre-emptive peacediplomacy – mirrors the EU’s objective of peace and international security.The fourth principle – multidimensional foreign policy – embodies the ideaof turning away from Turkey’s one-dimensional orientation toward theWest. However, this does not mean a turn-away from the West, but rather that Turkey should engage with all regional systems in its neighborhood,including former Ottoman areas, as well as the West and Russia. Finally, the fifth principle – rhythmic diplomacy – implies a turn-away from Turkey’spassive policy in regional and international affairs toward an activist foreignpolicy in international affairs, notably through international and regional organizations.
3 . Similarly, in 2004, Gül argued in Warsaw that ‘we are proving that a Muslimsociety can attain contemporary standards of democracy, human rights, rule of law, transparency, accountability and good governance’ (Gül 2004b) or in Berlin in 2005 that ‘Turkey’s EU membership promises to be a mutuallyrewarding process both for Turkey and Europe. The Turkish experience also promises to make a positive impact much beyond our borders. In this sense, it is revealing to see the interest shown by the Muslim world, at the intellec-tual and popular level, in Turkey’s reform process and its progress. Turkey isdestined to grow in strength as a vibrant society with vast human resources enjoying democracy in a secular state’ (Gül 2005b).
4 . Zooming in on responses in the four Spring states, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia, in 2012 Turkey was seen as positive in Libya (90 per cent),Egypt (84 per cent), and Tunisia (80 per cent), but not Syria (28 per cent).Turkey’s response to the events in the region was seen as positive in Libya (90 per cent), Egypt (88 per cent), and Tunisia (76 per cent), but negative in Syria (66 per cent). Most support for the role of Turkey as a model came from Libya (71 per cent) and Egypt (67 per cent), least support from Syria (22 per cent) (Akgün and Gündogar 2013).
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Abrams, Elliot, 53, 63, 71, 87accession
democracy as a criterion for, 128as an EU instrument of influence,
14, 113Turkey’s accession process, 150, 163,
167, 168, 169, 171, 172actorness
comparability of cases in terms of, 19–21, 182
EU operational actorness, 102–105Afghanistan
Indian democracy promotion in, 16invasion of the Soviet Union in, 68,
69, 72, 91invasion of the United States in, 186
AKP, see Justice and Development Party
Alfonsin, Raul, 15, 38Allende, Salvador, 12, 38, 82, 86American Convention on Human
Rights, 55, 62, 76American Revolution, 9Americas Watch Committee, 95Amnesty International, 95Amsterdam Treaty, 103, 128, 129, 132,
142Ancient Athens, democracy
promotion, 1, 2, 7–9, 187anti-Vietnam war movement, 81apartheid, 17, 81APDP, see Asia Pacific Democracy
PartnershipAquinas, Thomas, 9Arab League
Charter on Human Rights, 137
Arab uprisingsand democratization, 136EU reaction to, 110–120, 144–146and migration, 124Turkish reaction to, 154, 157–159,
Argentina, as a democracy promoter, 15Ashton, Catherine 45, 119, 120, 123,
145, 146on EU foreign policy values,
145–146negotiations with Iran, 123on Arab uprisings in Syria and
Egypt, 119–120Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership,
Barcelona Process, see Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
Blair, Tony, 132Brazil, as a democracy promoter, 1,
15–16British Empire, as a democracy
promoter, 10–11Brzezinski, Zbigniew
on American values, 83arc of crisis, 67on conflicts in neighborhood, 66on human rights norms, 78on loss of neighborhood to
communism, 65split with Cyrus Vance, 92
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 13, 86–87
Bush, George, 54, 89Bush, George W.
Freedom Agenda, 13Turkish democracy promotion, 175see also Iraq war
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 136–137
capitalism, 33, 66, 72Carter, Jimmy, 3, 13, 26, 51–98
on Afghanistan invasion of the Soviet Union, 68
on Cuban interventionism, 68electoral campaign, 82–83on fear of communism, 67
Carter, Jimmy – continuedforeign policy principles, 90on growth of human rights norms
and of democracy, 78on historical US role, 90letter to Somoza, 62–63on meeting Pinochet, 61and Ortega, 67on persuasion as a democracy
promotion instrument, 60–61on US responsibilities, 78–79on US shortcomings regarding
human rights, 62on US values and foreign policy, 83
Cedar revolution, 135CFSP, see Common Foreign and
Security Policycheap talk
and role identity, 41–42use by Reagan, 94–96
Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, 87–88
Chileforeign policy of Carter
administration in, 55, 61foreign policy of Reagan
administration in, 56, 60, 63, 94US involvement in overthrow of
Allende, 12Chirac, Jacques, 132CHP, see Republican People’s PartyCiampi, Carlo Azeglio, 132Civil rights movement
spill over effect on foreign policy,39, 80–84
Civilian powerTurkey, 172see also normative power
Clinton, Bill, 13, 54Cold War
disintegration of Cold War consensus in the US, 81
end of Cold War and new security environment in Europe, 121
end of Cold War and new security environment in Turkey, 160
end of détente, 66–68and US security interests in South
colonialism, 186Commission, European
competences, 14, 20, 102–105definition of democracy, 105–107on democracy and foreign policy,
133as a guardian of democracy
promotion policies, 142–143on human rights discourse with
partner states, 118on human rights norms and foreign
policy, 139, 140Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), 103, 104, 131, 133, 142, 172
communismcontainment of, 12and democracy promotion
dilemma, 51, 65, 66threat perception of, 67–72
Community of Democracies, 16conditionality, political
conceptualization, 26–29of the EU, 111–118of Turkey, 158–159of the US, 55–58
Congressdemocratic foreign policy identity,
92–96human rights legislation, 53, 60, 71,
82, 85, 86Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements, 85
see also Iran-Contra affairconservative internationalism, 96constructivism
and democracy promotion, 34–35
and democratic peace theory, 35modernist constructivism, 43–44and threat perceptions, 46–47
Contadora Group, 77Contras, 68, 71, 94
see also Iran-Contra affairConvention on the Future of Europe,
132, 171Copenhagen criteria, 128, 161, 164,
Copenhagen European Council, 167, 171
Country Reports on Human Rightsof the European Council, 28, 105,
106of the US State Department, 28, 52,
53, 54, 55, 77, 86critical theory and democracy
promotion, 33Cuba, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 79Cyprus conflict, 164, 165
Dahl, Robert, 1, 9, 24, 48, 167Davutoğlu, Ahmet
on Arab uprisings and Turkey’s role, 178–179, 180, 187
on coup d’état in Egypt, 157–158localizing European foreign policy
values, 172–173on security, 160
DCFTA, see Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), 102, 110, 114, 115, 116
democracydefinition of, 23–24, 25electoral, 52, 55, 80, 84, 96, 167growth of, 39, 47, 73–80, 97,
133–141liberal, republican, deliberative,
23–24negative connotation, 9radical, 7right to, 16, 75, 76, 77, 134, 138
democracy assistanceas democracy promotion
instrument, 26–29of the European Union, 110–111of Turkey, 154–155of the United States, 58–60
democracy dilemma, 36democracy promotion
definition of, 22–24measurement of, 27–29types of, 24–27
democratic deficits, of the EU, 129–130
democratic Party, 82, 90
democratic peaceas a paradigm, 69as a rationale for democracy
promotion, 35Derian, Patricia, 87Détente, 3, 66, 67, 72, 82, 91, 183Duarte, José Napoleón, 60
Ecevit, Bülent, 168EEAS, see European External Action
ServiceEED, see European Endowment for
DemocracyEIDHR, see European Instrument for
Democracy and Human RightsEisenhower, Dwight D., 12, 89El Salvador, US foreign policy towards,
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 82
EMP, see Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
enlargementCommissioner for, 14, 20, 29, 45,
104, 119, 140, 173and European democratic role
identity, 127, 140–141, 146and European Neighborhood Policy,
4, 14, 102, 109ENP, see European Neighborhood
PolicyENPI, see European Neighborhood
Policy InstrumentEPC, see European Political
Cooperationepistemic communities, 32Erbakan, Necmettin, 162, 163, 164Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip
on being part of the Western community of shared democratic values, 175
on coup d’état in Egypt and the reaction of the EU, 180
on democracy, 152on democracy promotion,
175–176and Egypt, 157and gender equality, 156on Turkey as a model, 155, 157on Turkey’s role, 176
ESDP, see European Security and Defense Policy
ESS, see European Security Strategyd’Estaing, Valérie Giscard, 171EU, see European UnionEUPOL COPPS, 122Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP), 101, 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 118, 120
European Endowment for Democracy (EED), 110
European External Action Service (EEAS), 15, 103, 104, 112
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 14, 26, 28, 101, 104, 107, 109, 110, 111, 120
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 14, 102, 104, 109, 110, 113, 114, 120, 151
European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), 104, 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 118
European Political Cooperation (EPC), 102, 103
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), 103
European Security Strategy (ESS), 121, 125
European Union (EU)definition of democracy, 105–108democracy assistance, 110–111democratic deficits, 129–133democratic role identity, 142–146and the growth of democracy and
human rights norms, 133–141identitive democracy promotion,
118–120political conditionality, 111–118threat perceptions, 121–126see also actorness
Europeanization, and Turkish foreign policy, 167, 172
Fischer, Joschka, 132Ford, Gerald, 12, 89foreign policy, definition, 22–23Freedom Agenda, 13
see also Iraq warFreedom House, 73, 74, 114, 135, 167Freedom Party, 128French empire, 2, 7, 10French revolution, 9FSLN, see Sandinista Front for
National Liberation of NicaraguaFüle, Štefan, 119, 145
German Marshall Fund, 143, 170Gezi protests, 180Ghaddafi, Muammar, 138Gorbachev, Michail, 72governance facility, 102, 114, 120Gramsci, Antonio, 33Green revolution, 135Grenada, US operation in, 71Gül, Abdullah, 152, 156, 157, 165,
169, 170, 173, 174, 176Gulf war, 149, 160
see also Iraq war
Habermas, Jürgen, 23, 24, 132Haider, Jörg, 128Hamas, 13, 113, 150Hayek, Friedrich, 24Helsinki European Council, 164,
167High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council, 150, 158human rights
and democracy, 24see also American Convention on
Human Rights; Arab League, Charter on Human Rights; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
hypocrisy, 95, 96
ICCPR, see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR, see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
identitydefinition of, 47–48democratic role identity, 39–40democratic type identity, 37–39discussion of, 36–37and the other, 41–42
India, as democracy promoter, 15, 16
interestsand democracy promotion, 35–36and threat perceptions, 36, 45
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 28, 52, 55, 75, 137
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 28, 52, 55
Intifada, 109, 113, 122, 160Iran
Iran-Contra affair, 71Iranian hostage crisis, 90, 91, 92nuclear file, 123revolution, 67and Turkey, 149, 150, 156, 158, 160,
162, 163, 165see also green revolution
Iraq war, 13, 139, 160, 161Islam
and Europe, 122–126and Turkey, 161–165, 166–170,
177–181Islamic Opening, 162Islamic Welfare Party, 162Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 122, 163
Jackson, Henry Scoop, 82Japan, as democracy promoter, 15–17Johnson, Lyndon B., 89Justice and Development Party (AKP)
and democratization, 167–171and de-securitization, 163–165and Neo-Ottomanism/Islam, 177and new foreign policy, 150–151
Kant, Immanuel, 9Kemalism, 162, 164, 168, 169, 170Kennedy, Edward, 85Kennedy, John F., 12, 89Kılıçdaroğlu, Kemal, 180
Kirkpatrick, Jeanne, 53, 66, 67, 70, 90, 91, 92
Kissinger, Henry, 12, 51, 70KRG, see Kurdish Regional
GovernmentKurdish Regional Government (KRG),
165Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 160,
Laeken European Council, 132Lawyers’ Committee for Human
Rights, 95Lebanon, EU democracy promotion
in, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119
liberalismdefinition of democracy, 23–24IR theory, 31–33liberal internationalism, 32, 85, 96
Libya, EU foreign policy toward, 102, 111, 112, 115, 117, 119, 120
Lincoln, Abraham, 81Lisbon Treaty, 103, 129, 130Locke, John, 24
Maastricht Treaty, 20, 103, 129, 131, 142, 172
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 9Madison, James, 9MEDA, see Mediterranean
Development AssistanceMediterranean Development
Assistance, 104, 108, 109, 110, 111, 116, 117, 118, 120
Mercosur, 16migration, EU policy toward, 109,
112, 121, 123, 124, 125Mill, James, 9, 10, 24Mill, John Stuart, 24Monroe Doctrine, 65Morocco, EU democracy promotion
in, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119Morsi, Mohammed, 17, 113, 116, 119,
120, 157, 158, 180Mubarak, Hosni, 157Muslim Brotherhood, 119, 126, 157,
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), 13, 53, 55, 60
National Security Council, 161National Security Strategy Document,
164NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty
OrganizationNED, see National Endowment for
DemocracyNeo-Ottomanism, 164, 165, 172, 177Nicaragua, US policy towards, 55, 59,
62, 63, 67, 68, 71Nice Treaty, 132, 142Nixon, Richard, 12, 89normative power, 141norms
definition of, 47–48and democracy promotion, 39–40norm localization, 172–173
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 121, 157, 158, 160, 161
Nozick, Robert, 24
OAS, see Organization of American States
Obama, Barack, 14, 89, 186OIC, see Organization of the Islamic
ConferenceOrganization of American States
(OAS), 15, 16, 18, 29, 69, 75, 76, 77, 79
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 17, 156, 157
Ortega, Daniel, 67Oslo Accords, 112, 122Ottoman Empire, 124, 162Özal, Turgut, 149, 153, 162, 164
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), 122
Palestinian Authority (PA), 13, 112, 120, 134, 150
Paraguay, US foreign policy in, 55, 59, 63, 77
Parliament, European, 101, 103, 105, 107, 108, 116, 129, 130, 132, 142
Peloponnesian War, 7, 8, 41Pericles, 187Pinochet, Augusto, 61
PKK, see Kurdistan Workers’ PartyPLO, see Palestine Liberation
Organisationprivileged partnership, 172Prodi, Romano, 132, 140, 141
realism, 132, 140, 141Republican People’s Party (CHP), 180Roosevelt, Franklin D., 12, 81rule of law, 24, 25, 55, 103, 106, 107,
108, 129, 136, 141, 142, 150, 152, 173, 174, 179
SAARC, see South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
Sandinista Front for National Liberation of Nicaragua (FSLN), 67
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 109Schumpeter, Joseph, 24SEA, see Single European Actsecuritization, 46, 125, 162, 163, 164,
177Sharia, 136Shultz, George P.
on communism, 71–72on democratic peace, 69on democratization, 79, 80on US foreign policy goals, 94on US foreign policy role, 97
Single European Act (SEA), 103, 129social facts, 38, 42, 43Solana, Javier
on enlargement, 141on European security environment,
121, 125on European values, 133, 145
Solemn Declaration, 129Somoza, Anastasio, 56, 62, 63, 67, 76South Africa, as democracy promoter,
17South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), 16Soviet Union (USSR), 62, 66, 67, 68,
69, 71, 72, 78, 79, 82, 90, 91, 93, 121, 131, 133, 138, 153
speech acts, 27subcommittees on democracy and
human rights, 102, 118, 119, 120
SyriaEU foreign policy toward, 108, 111,
112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122, 123, 136
Turkish foreign policy toward, 149, 150, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 177, 178
terrorismas EU threat perception, 121, 124,
125, 126as Turkish threat perception, 161,
163as US threat perception, 93
TESEV, see Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
threat perceptionsdefinition of, 45–47and democracy promotion, 35–36and democratic role identity, 40–42
Thucydides, 187TIKA, see Turkish Cooperation and
Coordination AgencyTimerman, Jacobo, 84, 94Tocqueville paradox, 39, 81transnational historical materialism,
33Tunisia, EU foreign policy toward,
115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 126, 136, 144, 146
Turkeydefinition of democracy, 151–152democracy assistance, 153–155democratic role identity, 171–181democratization, 167–171identitive democracy promotion,
155–158political conditionality, 158–159threat perceptions, 160–165
Turkic states, Turkish democracypromotion in, 153
Turkish Cooperation andCoordination Agency (TIKA), 151, 152, 153, 154, 155
Turkish Economic and Social StudiesFoundation (TESEV), 155, 170, 177, 178
UfM, see Union for the MediterraneanUN, see United NationsUNIFIL, see United Nations Interim
Force in LebanonUnion for the Mediterranean (UfM),
104, 109, 110, 118, 120United Nations (UN), 16, 25, 27, 53,
55, 63, 66, 69, 75, 79, 122, 137, 138, 139, 142
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 122
United States (US)definition of democracy, 51–55democracy assistance, 58–60democratic role identity, 84–98democratic transformation, 80–84identitive democracy promotion,
60–64and international normative
change, 73–80political conditionality, 55–58threat perceptions, 65–72
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 13, 57, 58, 59, 71, 107
US, see United StatesUSAID, see United States Agency for
International DevelopmentUSSR, see Soviet Union
Vance, Cyrus, 52, 55, 78, 79, 87,92
War on Terror, 163Washington Office on Latin America,
95Watergate, 82, 86, 90waves of democratization, 23, 80, 97,
134, 136, 144, 166Wilson, Woodrow, 11, 12, 81
List of Figures
List of Tables
Part IDemocracy Promotion – Who Does What and Why ?
1 Who Promotes Democracy? The Protagonists
2 What Is Democracy Promotion? The Explanandum
3 Why Is Democracy Promoted? The Argument
Part II The United States and Democracy Promotion in Central and South America in the Last Period of the Cold War
4 The Return of Democracy Promotion to US Foreign Policy
5 A Decade of Crisis in Central and South America
6 The Unearthing of a Democratic Role Identity and Its Activation ina Grand Foreign Policy Debate
Part III The EU and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean Region since the End ofthe Cold War
7 The EU’s Approach to Democracy Promotion and Its Ups and Downsin the Mediterranean Region
8 The EU’s New Security Environmen
9 The Formation of a Democratic Role Identity, Its Hype, and Subsequent Stumbling
Part IV Turkey and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean Region since the Early 2000s
10 The Emergence of Democracy Promotion in Turkish Foreign Policy
11 The De-securitization of Foreign Policy
12 Turkey’s Evolving Democratic RoleIdentity and Its Activation throughTwo Relevant Others
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